"ملف 8/7 I تقارير الاستخبارات في جدة" [و‎‎٦‎٠] (٥٣٦/١١٩)

the paragraph about Ibn Rifada. He sent copies of the correspondence to
London and Jerusalem by bag. Four days later General Wauchope reported that
a party of from 200 to 400 Billi and other tribesmen had passed through Aqaba
on their way from Sinai to the Hejaz. A further report, dated a day or two later,
said that the party, now estimated at from 400 to 450 men, had passed north of
Aqaba on the night of the 20th-21st May, had proceeded to a place some 7 kilom.
from the frontier and had moved further south next day. It appeared from an
order or proclamation issued by the Amir Abdullah immediately on the receipt
of the first news that the leader was Ibn Rifada. The Amir intimated that these
people, who were said to expect his help,should be made to return to their families
and that steps should be taken to prevent the passage through Transjordan of
suspicious characters.
180. The first reports suggested a dash in force straight from Sinai to the
Hejaz across the narrow strips of Palestine and Transjordan territory which
converge to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. It is not so certain from later
accounts that the operation was so simple, but it is still too soon to decide at what
point the invaders actually concentrated; to what extent the numbers of any who
may have come from Sinai were swollen by accretions from Palestine or
Transjordan; how far the Amir was cognisant of or sympathetic towards the
enterprise; or what supplies the raiders derived from Transjordan sources in
the early stages. These questions have been, and are likely to be, disputed. The
one clear fact is that since the morning of the 21st May a rebel force which has
grown considerably, although not to really formidable dimensions, has been in
being in the neighbourhood of the coast some distance inside Hejazi territory.
181. Ibn Saud appears to have had no news of the incursion until
Mr. Hope Gill, having got instructions, informed him of it on the morning of
the 30th May. It would be impossible to do justice in this report to the flood of
correspondence which ensued from the 30th May to the 30th June. The main
facts which emerge from it may be summed up as follows :—
(a) The Hejazi Government took immediate military measures of two kinds.
They ordered out the Akhwan from the village settlements in the nearer parts of
Nejd to the estimated number of perhaps 5,000 or 6,000, sent important reinforce
ments by car to strengthen their garrisons in the north, and they despatched other
soldiers and supplies in the barge, fitted with auxiliary motor and one small gun,
which they recently purchased in Bahrein. This dhow seems to have gone on a
reef near Umlej with the result that the soldiers, &c., had to be transported in
smaller dhows to Wejh. It was apparently thought impossible to bring the
ordinary troops into action owing to the inaccessibility to motor transport of
Ibn Rifada’s force, the demolition of which was left for the Akhwan. These
were to concentrate at Al-Ula and to get to grips with the rebels by a movement
so planned as to cut off their retreat into Transjordan. They were expected to
reach Al-Ula about the beginning of July, but up to the 30th June there was no
certain news of them.
(5) On the diplomatic side the Hejazi Government made strong representa
tions to His Majesty’s Government, taking “ Told you so” as their text. They
suspected, not apparently without some reason, the existence of a widespread
Hashimite plot with ramifications extending from Egypt to Iraq; were violently
suspicious of the Amir Abdullah, and were much perturbed when King Ali, whom
they also suspected (though they made no accusation against King Feisal or the
Iraqi Government) left Bagdad for Amman by air on the 23rd June. During
the first half of June they addressed numerous demands to His Majesty’s
Government. Some of them had been anticipated by the latter and by the High
Commissioner for Transjordan; some, like the Hejazi requests for a complete
closing of the frontier and a promise to surrender any rebels crossing it, could
not be complied with; some, like their insistence on an investigation of responsi
bilities, to be conducted jointly by the two Governments, were at the very least
premature; and the request, restated in practically every note, that His Majesty’s
Government should bring about a new settlement between Hejaz-Nejd and
Transjordan similar to that arrived at last year 'with Iraq related to a question
which His Majesty’s Government had already undertaken in discussion with the
Hejazi mission in London to consider seriously, but which they regarded as
independent of the immediate problem created by Ibn Rifada. From the very
outset the authorities in Transjordan took vigorous measures to prevent the rebels