"ملف 8/7 I تقارير الاستخبارات في جدة" [ظ‎‎٣‎١] (٥٣٦/٦٢)

compelled by engine trouble to land, but that the atmosphere was hazy
and the leader ot the formation was therefore doubtful of his exact position;
he thought that the landing was made in Trans-Jordan territory. In fact
it was made in Nejd territory. Mr. Hope Gill drew attention to the fact
that the landing was due to circumstances beyond the pilot’s control and
expressed His Majesty’s Government’s regret. In reply of the I2th Decem
ber the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he found it necessary to
draw His Majesty’s Government’s attention to the fact that, although the
Hejazi Government were always ready to afford all possible assistance, they
could not avoid taking such measures as would leave no room for any in
fringement of their regulations or violation of their honour.
37. In transmitting this reply to His Majesty’s Government, His
Majesty’s Minister observed that its language reflected the churlish spirit in
which the Hejazi Government habitually dealt with questions of this kind.
It might almost be construed as a menace, but in view of His Majesty’s
Government’s desire to avoid fruitless correspondence over the matter. Sir
A. Ryan did not propose to pursue it in writing but would draw Fuad Bey’s
attention to the unfriendly tone of the reply on his return from Riadh, He
did so in January. Fuad Hamza explained somewhat lamely and obscurely,
what he apparently tried to convey was that the note meant that, even if the
Hejaz-Nejd Government had to condone a violation of territory, it did not
impair their rights. In view however, of the friendly nature of contem
porary correspondence about the missing ’Iraqi pilot, Squadron-Leader
Warburton, Sir Andrew did not press the matter further.
’Iraq.
38. There is nothing of interest to report, except the death at Riadh
in October or early November of the Mutair chieftain Faisal ad-Dawish,
once a prominent figure on the ’Iraq frontier and leader of the 1929 rebellion
against Ibn Sa’ud. He is said to have died of an internal disorder in the
nature of dy sen try.
39 The project of a pilgrim route for cars from ’Iraq to the Hejaz nas
been noted in paragraph 22. \
Kuwait and Bahrain.
40. There is nothing definite to report, beyond a certain increased
activity on the Kuwait border on the part of Ibn Muhairib, Ibn Sa’ud’s
frontier official.
Asir and the Yemen.
41 The meeting of Sa’udi and Yemeni delegates referred to in para
graph 46 of the last report was held early in November at an-Nadhir near
Mount ’Arwa, the place in dispute. Neither side would give way, however,
and the matter was referred to their respective Governments. Telegraphic
messages were thereupon exchanged between Ibn Sa’ud and the Imam
Yahya, as a result of which the latter asked the former to arbitrate.
“Wherefore His Majesty”, as the Hejazi proclamation puts it, “wishing the
dispute to be settled by peaceful means and bloodshed to be avoided,
desirous also of seeing co-operation prevail amongst the Arabs, could not
but telegraph to His Highness the Imam giving judgment against himself
namelv the surrender of Mount ’Arwa to the Yemen Friendly rela
tions have thus been established between His Majesty the King and His
Highness the Imam on firm foundations, please God Almighty.” Ibn Sa’ud
jnust have felt that circumstances were indeed against him, to induce him to
yield ground to the Yemen. I
42. The local pact nevertheless bore fruit. On the '15th December a
treaty of friendship, neighbourliness, and extradition was signed at Abu
’Arish between the Hejaz-Nejd and the Yemen. It came as a surprise and
is not much believed in. , i