"ملف 28/7 II الحرب: البروباجاندا - الرأي المحلي" [و‎‎٤‎٧] (٦٨٦/٩٣)

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Dear Bertram Thomas,
try of Information,
Malet Street,
London, Y? .0.1.
x* For our own gxxldance in producing puhlieity material^ as well as for
the mutual benefit of posts, we should be glad of your views as to the beat
ways of eapltallslng the sympathies of pro-Britiah Arabs. We realise, of
course, that 1< eal conditions vary, but we believe certain common principles
exist and Justify an exchange of information on repaying practices# We
should therefore welcome mn account of your past experience and future plans
on the points set out below:
1# Many Arabs know that a German victory would mean an end to all Aral
national aspirations, and they are undoubtedly eager that Britain should not
be beaten - at least too badly# They are probably acquainted with Germany's
record of racial discrimination, religious persecution and aggr«s«ion# So
far, however, even the pro-Britiah Arabs have on the whole been passive
sympathisers# Gan more active collaboration be sourht with advantage ?
2# Pro-British sympathies vary in different Arab com tries and
' muni ties, and consequently different approaches are required# Common prin
ciples, however, exist* Do you therefore agree that a common policy to pro
mote Arab collaboration, as above, by an appeal to their self-interest #
should be pursued* What are the essontial points in this policyf
5* It follows that the exposure of German racial philosophy, designs
upon the Arab world and "new order" must continue* How can the scope of this
work be enlarged and more definitely related to the guidance of Arab syznpath- |
leers towards our own objectives?
4* Broadcasting, British or Axis, is probably the moat effective
single propaganda Instrument* Y&at part should it play or what general
messages should it carry in order to gain this more active Arab support?
Similarly, how can we further increase our own broadcasting prestige and
decrease that of the Axis?
(a) What inducements could be devised to lead Arabs to concentrate
more on listening to our broadcasts? Cen 1 cal advertisement be pushed? Can
Arab sympathisers got cafes to switch on to London or Cairo?
(b) Can the reliability and truthfulness of our broadcasts be hammered
in more effectively and if so how?
(c) Do you consider that the true spirit behind Axis broadcasts could
be illustrated more fully and that the Gulf between their hatred, untruth
and hypocrisy and the Arab mind could be exposed more convincingly?
(d) Having made listeners more conscious of the insulting spirit of ,
s broadcasts, should we not large them to treat those with contempt or
with general derision, noise and laughter?
5* Cen our Arab sympathisers be induced to refrain from reading Axis
publications or to treat them with contempt; to destroy Axis publications,
while passing on British, Allied and American publications to others?
6* Can we induce pro-British Arabs to resist ths temptation of
spreading anti-British rumours while giving widest publicity to pro-British
statements?
7* Should we not appeal more strongly to the religious aentiments of
those of our Arab friends who realise that the issues which we tefend ere *
skin to the spirit of Islam, while those represented by the Axle are incom
patible with it? Should not such Arabs be enjoined to mobilise their spiri
tual resources and pray for a British victory?
8* Should a special pamphlet be prepared on some such lines as "How can ,
I help the cause of righteousness to win the war?" and distributed among our
Arab friends? It might deal with:
(a) How to react to broadcasts#
(b) How to deal with those who are spreading false rumours*
(o) How to treat the present war in conversation, in the family clrclf
at school, in the b&gfor, in business conversation#