سجل قصاصات مقتبسة من صحف عن أفغانستان [ظ‎‎٩‎٣] (٣١٢/١٩٠)

EVENING STANDARD, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 5.
■ the remembrance of the expedition ot 1
The Memorial Diplomatique alleges that the
German Ambassador at Constantinople is pressing the
Sultan ta-advise the Amear to receive the English Mission,
and that the Emperor William has begged the Czar to avoid
raising any fresh complication.
Last night's Paris Univcrs publishes the following letterj
dated St. Petersburg, Sept. 29 :—" About three months ago
two emissaries, as unofficial as possible, sent by the Indian
Government, arrived at Cabul. They were two merchants,
or at least two persons professing to be so, who after num
berless vicissitudes succeeded in failing at Cabul, 'Fail'is
the right word ; they entirely failed in all their enterprises*
The chief of these was aimed at obtaining a passport for
sortie English officers, whose mission would have been
to follow from a distance the operations of the
Eussian columns then on the march. Great personages,
confidential advisers of Shere Ali, were especially the
object of the assiduities and flattering insinuations of these
singular merchants. General Stolieteff, who had then been
five weeks at Cabul, having learned the arrival and pro
ceedings of these two persons, spoke to Shere Ali of them.
The Eussian General had no great difficulty, as you may
imagine, consMering the Ameer's suspiciousness, and Anglo
phobia, in convincing him of the danger, or at least impru
dence, of letting such travellers stay in Cabul. The Ameer
ordered the expulsion of the two self-styled merchants,
having them escorted to the frontier. This unofficial
attempt of the Indian Government with Shere Ali—if, indeed,
there was any attempt, and if the two persons in ques
tion really acted for the Indian Government—must be re
garded as an enormous blunder on the part of the English,
It began with an avowable proposal. Moreover, it occa
sioned a first check for the English and a success for the
Russians, The fact is that the whole Russian Mission,
and probably also Shere Ali and his advisers, had no
doubt that the two expelled persons were envoys of the
Indian Government directed to negotiate the free pas
sage of English spies through Afghanistan, Now, all
who have to do with Orientals know the importance
in their eyes of a first success or failure ; how the former
inspires them, and how the latter disheartens them.
General Abramoff, though forming part of the Russian
Mission, has never entered Cabul. As the military head of
the Mission, he remained with the bulk of the escort at
Chita, about 200 kilometres from Cabul. Later on, when
there was no longer any doubt of the success of the
Mission, he drew further back with his detachment, and
finally quitted the Ameer's territory, installing himself in
a village not far from the Afghan frontier. There are only
vague data as to the distribution of Eussian troops in the
neighbourhood of Afghanistan. On this point there is the
greatest reserve, and it seems that even in the office of the
War Ministry nothing definite is known. All that has
leaked out is that not far from the frontier, or
rather on the frontier, are now encamped three
pretty strong detachments, without reckoning General
Abramoff's escort, composed of four sotnias of Cossacks.
General Stolieteff, accompanied by nine officers, three of
them of the staff, two interpreters, and 4-0 Cossacks, is still
at Cabul, I can inform you almost positively that he will
not be recalled. He will at most leave Cabul itself for
some other locality within reach. From the middle of July
to the end of August six caravans entered Cabul, comprising
• about 700 camels. Many men, a great part of them in
European dress, accompanied these caravans. Succeeding
each other at tolerably equal intervals, they all carried
letters and enclosures for the Eussian Mission. Three of
them have already returned empty, and accompanied by at
most a fifth part of the original escort."
Replying to Lord Lawrence's recently-published letter,
in which he dwelt Upon the advisability of "coming to
terms with the Ameer," GeneralM'Murdo writes as follows
to a contemporary :—"While admitting the gravity of
the offence committed by the Ameer, Lord Lawrence
urges that 4 we should not bear hard with him on this
account.' This reads well, but what is its true bearing
with reference to our relations with our subject races
in India? I submit, Vith great respect to Lord
Lawrence, that no one knows better than he does
the degree of appreciation in which the art of
insult is used as a political weapon by all Eastern poten
tates, and that their finesse in this line far surpasses that
of civilised nations ; and it is the manner in which such
affronts are resented or submitted to that affords the index
of po wer to their minds. There may be, as Lord Lawrence
contends, no real dishonour to us in coming to terms with
this Prince (although I look upon the threat to shoot
Major Cavagnari at Ali Musjid as a reflex of the Mac-
naghten tragedy, and significant enough of the length
he meant to go) ;^Mt the issue is not confined to Afghan
istan and England, but extends to the subject races of
India, by whom the Christian-like standard of policy
suggested by Lord Lawrence is not understood at all. Two
hundred and forty millions of people within our frontiers,
and innumerable races without, are willing to judge from
their own standpoint how we deal with this mortal affront,
and I claim support for our policy on the score of the safety
of our Empire alone ; and in connection with this perma
nent object I express my fervent hope that the passes into
Afghanistan, once they are traversed by our arms, may re
main for ever in our possession, whatever may be our ulti
mate policy with respect to that country itself,"
The Paris Temps remarks:—"'When we endeavour to
consider the difficulties and consequences of an expedition
i which appears inevitable, we must admit that the war
itself must occupy the least care of the English
Government. The war will, without doubt, be con-
ducted with a foresight and prudence which will wipe
away tne rememuiiuiuc uj. ^ 1839-
12. --We .also think that the fear of an armed con
flict with Russia does^not enter into the provisions of
England. Russia has evidently sought to inflict humilia
tion and to create an embarrassment for England, but she
can have no desire to engage in a struggle, the principal
seat of which would certainly not be the valley of the Oxus,
and which she feels at the present time altogether unable to |
sustain. Russian diplomacy has reserved for itself a most
simple means of eluding the representations and demands for
explanations which it must have expected from England.
Russia will repel any suspicion of bad faith. She will dis
avow all hostile intentions. England will be obliged to
accept the assurances, of which she will believe as much as
she likes, and there will only remain of this new passage
of arms a secret grievance the more, and an increase of
coolness in the relations of the two Powers. The real and
principal difficulty of the expedition which the English are
now preparing against Afghanistan is to know what object
is to be attributed to the expedition itself. Will th e English
content themselves with deposing Shere Ali, and putting
in his place a Prince devoted to them ? They would thereby
reap from success a precarious result altogether out
of proportion to the efforts which it will have cost, since
England will remain exposed to the obligation of some day
beginning over again a costly war. It may, therefore, be
taken for certain that England will desire to obtain besides
the dethronement of Shere Ali positive guarantees—that
she will, for instance, require the cession ot positions capable
of assuring the free passage of the defiles which separate
Afghanistan from the Punjaub; and we arc sure that in so
acting England will only be conforming to an imperious
necessity, at the same time feeling the inconvenience of
an occupation which must later be extended, thus reducing
the distance between themselves and that Russia which
they flattered themselves they were keeping at a distance
by making Afghanistan a neutral zone. This is an entire
change of positions. Instead of arresting the progress of
the Russians by the independence of Afghanistan in the
future, the English must oppose to them strategic positions
taken up in that country itself,"
The Times of India of the 13th ult. contains the follow
ing :—Sir.Neville Chamberlain and staff left Simla on the
8th, preceded to Peshawur by Major St. John and Dr.
Bellew. The following is the correct name and style of the
native envoy who has gone to herald Sir Neville Chamber
lain's Mission -Nawab Gholam Hussun Khan, Khan
Bahadur, C.S.I., native commandant 15th Bengal Cavalry.
The Viceroy's messenger also has the third-class Order of
Merit. Sirdar Yakoob Khan has not made his escape from
the clutches of the Ameer, but is still a prisoner at Cabul.
Maharajah Pertab Singh, brother of the Maharajah of
! Joudhpore, has accepted a post on Sir Neville Chamber-
; Iain's personal staff in the Cabul Mission. Nawab Obed-
Oollah, a Mussulman nobleman, and uncle of the Nawab
of Tonk, has joined the personal staff of Sir Neville
; Chamberlain, and will accompany the Mission to Cabul.
According to the latest advices from Cabul, a portion of the
Russian Embassy have proceeded thence to General Kauff-
| mann's headquarters on the Oxus.
THE AFGHAN DIFFICULTY.
The high authority of Lord Lawrence will, the Saturday
Review thinks, probably disturb the apparent unanimity
which prevailed in England as to the necessity of invading
Afghanistan. Lord Lawrence's judgment is entitled to re
spect, e cn when his arguments are not convincing
but it is remarkable that he seems neither to recog
nise the change of circumstances which arises fiom the
reception of a Russia!^ Envoy at Cabul nor the pos
sible share of Russ.'a in the recent policy of the
Ameer. It may have been prudent to tolerate the sullen
isolation .of a semi-barbarous ruler as long as it was
indiscriminate or impartial, and r.everthejess to resent his
ostentatious preference of a rival Power. If the enter
prise is undertaken, the mode of prosecution must be
determined exclusively by professional judgment. The
intention of the Viceroy to transfer the seat of Govern
ment to Mooltan during the winter is compatible with the
design either of an autumn or a spring campaign. If
no decisive movement is to be made at present, questions
will hereafter arise as to the expediency of having
hurried^ on the quarrel with the Ameer at a
moment when it was impossible to resent a probable
act of contumacy. The appointment of a Com
mander in Chief will soon be announced; and it may be
hoped that in the conduct of the war be will be allowed a
large discretion. The ulterior intentions of the English
Government and the Viceroy have naturally not been dis
closed. The army which is to march on Cabul will not
be encumbered by the presence of a pretender ; nor
will there be any disposition to dethrone Shere
Ali, if it is found possible to exact sufficient pledges
for his future submission and fidelity. If Asiatic poten
tates can be convinced at a moderate cost that it is not
safe to defy England at the instigation of Russia, the
war will not have been undertaken in vain. For the pre
sent it will be prudent to accept the assurances of the
Russian Government that it has taken no part in provoking
the quarrel, Russian journalists who announce that the
Afghan war has been arranged for the purpose of correcting
the miscarriages of Berlin may libel their own country
with impunity. All their efforts will be insufficient to
lower them to the level of the Irish brawlers who affect
enthusiastic sympathy for Shere Ali, as their predecessors,
r early 40 years ago, applauded in prose and verse the
bloodthirsty treason of Akbar Khan,