سجل قصاصات مقتبسة من صحف عن أفغانستان [و‎‎٨‎٨] (٣١٢/١٧٩)

TACTICS IN AFGHANISTAN.
During the last thirty-six years the British
Army has had little experience of the sort of war
which we shall have to carry on in Afghanistan. I
> Something slightly resembling it has indeed taken !
place at the Cape, in Abyssinia, in the Bhootan war,
and the various expeditions against the mountain ;i
tribes which infest our North-West frontier. Still, j!
the knowledge thus acquired will be only partially ^
j . j useful in a campaign against the Afghans. Such
j warfare must be of an exceptionl description,
|;; ; 1 both from the character of the country and the I
;, Iia ^ ro of the Afghans, their arms, and their j
military and political organization. As to the | ■
nature of the country, it is as if in the south a
^ groundwork of sandy desert, and in the north one
■ of steppe were sprinkled with fragments of Switzer- ?
land. In the south also the climate is compara-
tively hot and there is little water ; while in the :
north the climate, save in the valleys, is cold, and
^ water is tolerably abundant. Hence there is a
difference both in the disposition of the people and
in the organization, description, and tactics of the
i' droops. In the south the inhabitants are more k
^ peaceable^and less manly, and cavalry is the '
favourite arm ; in the north the inhabitants are
hardier and bolder, and infantry are more freely
used. General Ferrier, formerly Adjutant-General S-
. of the Persian Army, writing in 1850, gives some
interesting and valuable information concerning
the military resources of Afghanistan. According
■ ^ to him, the Afghan army might in case of necessity "•
. consist of the whole male population, for every
man is a born soldier. He says that the troops
have no regular pay, but a portion of them are
j supposed to be paid, and are called Defteris. This
- so-called regular army consists of the Cabul, the $
Candahar, and the Herat divisions. In the Cabul I
division there are 21,000 cavalry and 10,000 :
infantry ; in the Candahar division, 12,000 cavalry
and 6,000 infantry ; in the Herat division, 12,000
cavalry and 10,000 infantry ; giving a grand total
of 71,000 men, besides artillery. In addition to ' <
these, the Sirdars, like the European barons of the -
Middle Ages, on being summoned, bring their ji
contingents, who are usually the men of their l!
clan ; finally, the inhabitants of towns, who owe ;
allegiance to no chief ; take up arms for the
sake of plunder, and either select a chief under "
whom to serve or act together in small parties
consisting of acquaintances or men from the same
locality.
j During a campaign the Sovereign gives pay '
to the contingents, handing over the money to m
the chiefs, who retain a large portion in their own |
hands, compensating their followers by giving |
them small grants of land or certain valuable j
privileges. The number of Sirdars and Khans is
out of all proportion to the number of. fighting
men. The chiefs and richer Afghans are accom- -•
. panied to the field by enormous retinues of ||
servants ; but the ordinary Afghan, idle and self-
indulgent as far as his means allow at home—when M
they can—on service display wonderful powers of i;
abstinence and endurance. Quickly collected, an
Afghan army, like the Highland clans of Scotland <
in the 17th century, soon melts away on the slightest
provocation, and when a battle occurs a compara- i ;
tively small proportion of those who began the
campaign are to be found in the ranks. The
irregular bands from the towns disperse to their
homes as soon as food becomes scarce ; and as the
Sirdars only carry provisions for themselves and
their immediate followers, and there is no attempt
: ■ at a regular commissariat, portions of the contingents -
are successively dismissed when the country is
unable to support the entire army by pillage. There ' '
is little strategy and no tactics, discipline, or
organization. The most ofdinary rules of war are
disregarded, and the army, marching without :
advanced guard, rearguard, or scouts, is a mere - "
moving mob of armed men. They are utterly ^
ignorant of the science of war, and, indeed, despise
it, placing reliance on their dash, strength, and
courage. They never attempt manoeuvres, but i-
attack in parallel order all along the line, each
band fighting in the way which seems best to them.
- Nevertheless, they have a natural instinct for war,
and are splendid skirmishers. It is a fact worth
noting that they generally make three onsets, but,
if they fail in the third, never attempt a fourth,
considering that fate is against them, and that it
would be impious to strive against its decree.
Their formation is in two lines, the first rank
consisting of the bravest, and the second, some
distance in the rear, of those less daring spirits who
wait for an opportunity to indulge in a love of
1 plunder and bloodshed with little personal risk.
I The chiefs are mere leaders, anxious to display
their personal prowess, and never seeking to handle
their troops. When victorious the Afghans are
; merciless, and never cease from slaughter till their
arms are powerless from the fatigue of striking.
Whenever possible, they select a plain for the ^
theatre of battle, in order that they may give full £
scope to the cavalry, of which the bulk of their
forces are composed, and which constitutes their /
favourite arm. The Afghan horsemen charge with
great intrepidity and dash, and if they only moved
with precision their cavalry would, according to
General Ferrier, be the finest in the world. Their
highest praise of a warrior is that he is a good
swordsman. Vain and presumptuous as they are
undoubtedly brave, they have a wholesome dread
of British artillery. Their arms are the firelock,
the carbine, pistols, swords, occasionally bows
and arrows, and the lance. Many of them
carry shields. Most of the barrels of their firearms
are Turkish and rifled, the locks being coarse and
defective. Such Wcis the state of Afghan military
resources a little more than a quarter of a century
ago, according to General Ferrier.
From the narratives of those who were present
during our operations in Afghanistan, we gather
'i some other particulars which are valuable at the
present moment, for progress is not rapid in
Central Asia, and in many essential matters there
have been few military changes during the last
half-century. Lady Sale tells us that the Afghan
horsemen were in the habit of both carrying and
using firearms, and also on occasions each trooper
, would take up behind him an infantry soldier in
order to convey the latter rapidly to the scene of
^ fight- Both she and others have mentioned some
'li s tpking instances of the impetuosity and courage
with which the Afghan cavalry charge. The most
:; remarkable of all was that made by Dost Mahomed,
H the father of tlie present Ameer, at the battle of
Purwandurrah, on the 2d of November, 1839. At
the head of only 80 horsemen, the Dost charged
H the 2d Bengal Cavalry and drove them before
them till they obtained safety from the British
guns. Of the officers, two were killed on the spot
and two others, Fraser and Ponsonby, escaped, but
I were covered with wounds. The English gentle -
men had fought like paladins. Their men refused
to follow them, so they plunged alone into the
ranks of the Afghans. The Afghan horsemen
showed equal readiness to charge infantry in the
affairs outside the cantonments of Cabul in 1841.
All testimony agrees that their infantry are ex
cellent skirmishers, making the most skilful use of j
the nature of the ground. Like the Scotch clans, j
they often charge sword in hand. As marksnjen
they are, notwithstanding the poorness of their
weapons, very good. Some of them during the
siege of the cantonments at Cabul in 1841 were,
according to Lady Sale, deadly shots. Speaking of
j two men—a barber and a blacksmith—she says :— i
: " They completely commanded the loopholes with
their long rifles, and although the distance is
probably 300 yards, yet they seldom failed to put a
ball through the clothes or into the body of any one
£' passing them."
The present Ameer, after his visit to Umballa in
1869, made many changes in military matters—
.. changes by no means approved by his subjects.
Impressed by what he had seen of English troops,
he sought to introduce an improved discipline i
and organization, and, by increasing the strength
of the regular troops, to make himself
more independent than he had hitherto been of h
'i the chiefs and their contingents. In 1873
Captain Marsh used often to talk to the officers of
' his guard at Candahar :—
' They all agree that the Ameer is making too many I
alterations sines his visit to Umballa in 1869 ; they do not I
,1 call them improvements, which I can quito-understand— i
: one, for instance, taking away from the army their usual |
easy flowing dress and clothing them in tight coats and j
trousers quite unsuited to Asiatics. The Ameer has trans- ,
lated the drill-book into Pushtoo, and instead of one's I
< hearing orders in very curious English, as formerly, the j
men now really understand what is being said to them."
On his entry into Candahar :—
" The streets were lined with regular troops to keep off
the crowds assembled to see me. The soldiers are most
comically dressed. Their uniform, which is of an English
pattern, is cut out of a striped woollen cloth that looks
like bed ticking ; their trousers were too short, but well
strapped down; on their heads .were tall, red, conical
caps, or kullas, with real balls dangling at the top, but no i
loongees, or turbans, giving their heads a very bare, cold 1
appearance. Their cross belts are of brown leather, as also I
their pouches, and they are armed with old Tower
muskets. The square in front of the Ark is a spacious
one, and here the guns were parked. They appeared to be
of all shapes, sizes, and dates, with carriages and limbers
white with age."
A few miles before he entered the city he was
met by an escort of honour of 50 Sowars belonging |§?
to the Regular Army. " These men were got up
in imitation of our Native Cavalry, and tolerably j
mounted on Turkoman and Herat horses."
At Herat, on leaving the presence of Yakoob
Khan, the Governor of the Province, he was " sur
prised to find a well-dressed and soldierly-looking ;
company of Heratee Sepoys ready to present arms
to me, which, by the way, they did very badly."
Invited to visit the armoury and gun foundry, he
saw " six new smooth-bores, six-pounders, well-
made and mounted, besides a lot of small old
guns ; his rifles were roughly made, but looked
serviceable." The army of Herat, according to
Captain Marsh, consists of six regiments of 1°000
men each, two regularly-drilled and armed,'the -S
others, from want of means, of inferiov quality.
The cavalry, though numerous, are of a motley
description and quite devoid of discipline. In case :
of war the Governor of Herat could place in the
field about 10,000 regular troops of all arms, of
good physique, and receiving rations, uniform, and
about 6s. per month. The cavalry receive in ad
dition forage for their horses. In addition to the
regular army, there is a numerous feudal militia.
When at Umballa in 1869 the Ameer said to Lord
Mayo that they could make breech-loading rifles
and guns in his country, but could not manage the
ammunition. It is well known that a manufactory !