سجل قصاصات مقتبسة من صحف عن أفغانستان [و‎‎٨‎٧] (٣١٢/١٧٧)

X
The following sentences from an article headed " Afghanistan" in
the Tivtes this morning form a remarkable commentary upon the minis
terial communique published yesterday in the other official journal.
This was to the effect that the Cabinet Council called for Saturday was to
meet in order to discuss " the further development of frontier affairs in
India, the situation as it now presents itself having been neither unexpected
nor unprovided for." Unexpected it cannot have been, of course. How
far has it been " provided for " ? Let us see :—
Until the Indian Government is in a position to mass a force on the frontier of
sufficient strength to overcome any resistance that may be offered by these clans, it
would be most injudicious to make a forward movement; and that some time must
elapse before such an army can be collected is obvious to any one acquainted with the
present state of the roads in the Punjaub, It is true that the railway stretches from
Calcutta and Bombay up to Jhelum, 170 miles distant from Peshawur, but
the recent heavy floods have washed away a section of the line in the \icinity
of Phillour ; several bridges have gone, and communication is most uncertain.
Then, again, between Jhelum and Peshawur are many small streams and two
rivers. Most of these are unbridged; all afford hindrances to the rapid mobiliza
tion of troops on the border. From Eawul Pindee to Kohat the road is a mere
■track, after rain wellnigh impassable for troops. Further south, again, the roads
in the Dera Ghazee Khan district are of the poorest description. That station was
almost entirely destroyed by an overflow of the Indus last month. Floods of an
unexampled nature then occurred. At the present moment we learn that the whole of
Upper Scinde is under water, and that the march of a force via Rajanpore to Dadur is out
of the question. The direct road through Boogtee Derah to Quetta is a mere mountain
path, unfitted for the passage of wheeled artillery, yet it must be used ; the garrison of
that advanced post is scarcely 1,200 strong, and is in a most exposed and dangerous
situation. With a couple of field batteries, a full regiment of cavalry, and another
battalion of infantry—British, if possible—Major Sandeman should be able to hold
Quetta until the spring. There is little doubt that General Biddulph will push up these
reinforcements rapidly.
I RUSSIA AND AFGHANISTAN, j
PARIS, O ct . 4. 1 %
A letter in the Univers, dated St. Petersburg, B
the 29th of September, says :— 1
"About three months ago two emissaries, as' ■
unofficial as possible, sent by the Indian Govern- B
ment, arrived at Cabul. They were two merchants, J i
or at least two persons professing to be so, who 1 I
after numberless vicissitudes succeeded in failing H
at Cabul. ' Fail' is the right word ; they entirely I
failed in all their enterprises. The chief of these 1 S
was aimed at obtaining a passport for someEng- B
lish officers, whose mission would have been to follow M
from a distance the operations of the Russian
columns then on the march. Great personages,
confidential advisers of Shere Ali, were especially
the object of the assiduities and flattering insinua
tions of these singular merchants. General
Stolieteff, who had then been five weeks at Cabul,
having learned the arrival and proceedings of these
two persons, spoke to Shere Ali of them. The
Russian General had no great difficulty, as you
may imagine, considering the Ameer's suspicious
ness and Anglophobia, in convincing him of the dan
ger, or at least imprudence, of letting such travellers
stay in Cabul. The Ameer ordered the expulsion
of the two self-styled merchants, having them es
corted to the frontier. This unofficial attempt of
the Indian Government with Shere Ali—if, indeed,
there was any attempt, and if the two persons in
question really aoted for the Indian Government-
must be regarded as an enormous blunder on the
part of the English. It began with an unavow-
! able proposal. Moreover, it occasioned a first
I check for the English and a success for the
Russians. The fact is that the whole Russian
i Mission, and probably also Shere Ali and his ad-
1 visers, had no doubt that the two expelled persons
were envoys of the Indian Government directed to
: negotiate the free passage of English spies through
J Afghanistan. Now, all who have to do with
Crientals know the importance in their eyes of a
first success or failure ; how the former inspires
| them, and how the latter disheartens them.
General Abramoff, though forming part of the
I Rusisan Mission, has never entered Cabul. As
j the military head of the Mission, he remained with
the bulk of the escort at Chita, about 200 kilo
metres from Cabul. Later on, when there was no
longer any doubt of the success of the Mission, he
1 drew further back with his detachment, and finally
quitted the Ameer's territory, installing himself in
a village not far from the Afghan frontier. There
are only vague data as to the distribution of
Russian troops in the neighbourhood of Afghan
istan. On this point there is the greatest reserve,
and it seems that even in the office of the War
Ministry nothing definite is known. All that has
leaked out is that not far from the frontier, or
rather on the frontier, are now encamped three
pretty strong detachments, without reckoning
General Abramoffs escort, composed of four sotnias
of Cossacks. General Stolieteff, accompanied by
nine officers, three of them of the Staff, two inter
preters, and 40 Cossacks, is still at»Cabul. I can
inform you almost positively that he will not be
recalled. He will at most leave Cabul itself for
some other locality within reach. From the
middle of July to the end of August six caravans
entered Cabul, comprising about 700 camels. Many
men, a great part of them in European dress, ac
companied these caravans, which were not com
mercial caravans. Succeeding each other at toler
ably equal intervals, they all carried letters and
enclosures for the Russian Mission. Three of them
| This artless communication gives room for many
commentaries in view of the events in preparation
imthat quarter. Without too much presumption,
may not the answer be found in a phrase of the
Golos —a phrase inconsiderable and probably escap-
1 ing notice in a moment of forgetfulness—" Russia
will observe in the impending conflict the same
: severe and strict neutrality which England observed
in the late war." The italics are those of the
Russian paper.
j The writer of the above letter claims to have de
rived his information from good sources, and to
have been corroborated by events in former letters
on Afghanistan.
The Memorial Diplomatique alleges that the
German Ambassador at Constantinople is pressing '
the Sultan to advise the Ameer to receive the
English mission, and that the Emperor William |
has begged the Czar to avoid raising any fresh com- |
plication.
The Eeichsanzeiger announces that Russia has 1
ordered the disarmament of her ports on the Black
Sea and the removal of the torpedoes.
THE BANKRUPTCY OF INDIA:'
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—The alarming article under this title by Mr.
Hyndman, in the Nineteenth Century for this
month, is entirely based on an assumption that the
total gross produce of India can be accurately
measured by a money value of £277,000,000. The
" terrible state of affairs " thus developed, and the
" general collapse " anticipated as the result are
attributed to the pressure of the Government as
sessment, and especially that upon the cultivators
of the land. The conclusions arrived at are so
startling that, though, like Mr. Hyndman, I have
never been in India, I, as an alarmed Englishman,
have tried to test the strength of the basis upon
which they rest. The only data I have at hand are
j taken from the figures in the last year's report of
I the Punjab. The number of cultivated acres there
agrees withj those quoted by Mr. Hyndman—say,
21,000,000 acres, and I adopt his average value of
£114s. per acre.
The Government assessment is £1,905,000, to pay 1
1 which one-sixth of the wheat crop (the produce of r
j 3,120,000 acres) would have to be sold and ex- i
ported. There would remain for consumption in
; the country the produce of 5,500,000 acres of wheat
and of 12,000,000 acres of other grain, the two
sufficing to yield for a year 2lb. per head per day
| for the population _ of 17,600,000, which is more
j than double the weight of corn eaten by the people
{ of this country. Besides this, they would have for |
consumption their garden vegetables and milk ;
and beyond it the money value of 845,000 acres of
oil seed, 720,000 acres of cotton and hemp, 391,000
acres of sugar-cane, 129,000 acres of indigo, 69,000
acres of tobacco, 88,000 acres of spices, drugs, and
dyes, 12,000 acres of poppy, and 8,800 acres of tea,
the aggregate value of which, without touching the
corn, would leave nearly twice the Government as
sessment.
Mr. Hyndman has committed the error of arguing
from an English money value, at the place of pro
duction, upon articles of consumption, the true
value of which is their food sustaining power to the
[ people who consume them«
I October 4. Q,
•ITUVT iiTTmr/"vr\rTM n r
X
The following sentences from an article headed " Afghanistan" in
the Times this morning form a remarkable commentary upon the minis
terial communique published yesterday in the other official journal.
This was to the effect that the Cabinet Council called for Saturday was to
■meet in order to discuss " the further development of frontier affairs in
India, the situation as it now presents itself having been neither unexpected
nor unprovided for." Unexpected it cannot have been, of course. How
far has it been " provided for " ? Let us see :—
Until the Indian Government is in a position to mass a force on the frontier of
sufficient strength to overcome any resistance that may be offered by these clans, it
would be most injudicious to make a forward movement; and that some time must
elapse before such an army can be collected is obvious to any one acquainted with the
present state of the roads in the Punjaub. It is true that the railway stretches from
Calcutta and Bombay up to Jhelum, 170 miles distant from Peshawur, but
the recent heavy floods have washed away a section of the line in the -ucinity
of Phillour ; several bridges have gone, and communication is most uncertain.
Then, again, between Jhelum and Peshawur are many small streams and two
rivers. Most of these are unbridged ; all afford hindrances to the rapid mobiliza
tion of troops on the border. From Rawul Pindee to Kohat the road is a mere
'track, after rain wellnigh impassable for troops. Further south, again, the roads
in the Dera Ghazee Khan district are of the poorest description. That station was
almost entirely destroyed by an overflow of the Indus last month. Floods of an
unexampled nature then occurred. At the present moment we learn that the whole of
tipper Scinde is under water, and that the march of a force via Rajanpore to Dadur is out
of the question. The direct road through Boogtee Derah to Quetta is a mere mountain
path, unfitted for the passage of wheeled artillery, yet it must be used ; the garrison of
that advanced post is scarcely 1,200 strong, and is in a most exposed and dangerous
situation. With a couple of field batteries, a full regiment of cavalry, and another
battalion of infantry—British, if possible—Major Sandeman should be able to hold
Quetta until the spring. There is little doubt that General Biddulph will push up these
xeinforcements rapidly.
- ficJ* 6
RUSSIA AND AFGHANISTAN. I
PARIS, O ct . 4. ,
A letter in the Univers, dated St. Petersburg, 1
the 29th of September, says :— 1
" About three months ago two emissaries, as j
unofficial as possible, sent by the Indian Goveru-
: ment, arrived at Cabul. They were two merchants, |
or at least two persons professing to be so, who ;
| after numberless vicissitudes succeeded in failing |
at Cabul. ' Fail' is the right word ; they entirely [
failed in all their enterprises. The chief of these,
was aimed at obtaining a passport for some Eng
lish officers, whose mission would have been to follow
from a distance the operations of the Russian
columns then on the march. Great personages,
confidential advisers of Shere Ali, were especially
the object of the assiduities and flattering insinua
tions of these singular merchants. General
StolietefF, -who had then been five weeks at Cabul,
having learned the arrival and proceedings of these
two persons, spoke to Shere Ali of them. The
Russian General had no great difficulty, as you
may imagine, considering the Ameer's suspicious
ness and Anglophobia,in convincing him of the dan
ger, or at least imprudence,of letting such travellers
stay in Cabul. The Ameer ordered the expulsion
of the two self-styled merchants, having them es
corted to the frontier. This unofficial attempt of
I the Indian Government with Shere Ali—if, indeed,
1 there was any attempt, and if the two persons in
i question really acted for the Indian Government—
must be regarded as an enormous blunder on the
! part of the English. It began with an unavow-
able proposal. Moreover, it occasioned a first
check for the English and a success for the
Russians. The fact is that the whole Russian
j Mission, and probably also Shere Ali and his ad-
; visers, had no doubt that the two expelled persons
were envoys of the Indian Government directed to
negotiate the free passage of English spies through
I Afghanistan. Now, all who have to do with
! Orientals know the importance in their eyes of a
j first success or failure ; how the former inspires
j them, and how the latter disheartens them.
; General Abramoff, though forming part of the
j Rusisan Mission, has never entered Cabul. As
I the military head of the Mission, he remained with
i the bulk of the escort at Chita, about 200 kilo
metres from Cabul. Later on, when there was no
I longer any doubt of the success of the Mission, he
drew further back with his detachment, and finally
| quitted the Ameer's territory, installing himself in
a village not far from the Afghan frontier. There
are only vague data as to the distribution of ;
Russian troops in the neighbourhood of Afghan
istan. On this point there is the greatest reserve, >
and it seems that even in the office of the War
Ministry nothing definite is known. All that has
1 leaked out is that not far from the frontier, or
rather on the frontier, are now encamped three i
pretty strong detachments, without reckoning
General AbramofFs escort, composed of foursotnias
of Cossacks. General Stolieteff", accompanied by 1
nine officers, three of them of the Staff, two inter- j
, prefers, and 40 Cossacks, is still at»Cabul. I can
inform you almost positively that he will not be
recalled. He will at most leave Cabul itself for 1
some other locality within reach. From the
middle of July to the end of August six caravans
entered Cabul, comprising about 700 camels. Many
men, a great part of them in European dress, ac
companied these caravans, which were not com
mercial caravans. Succeeding each other at toler
ably equal intervals, they all carried letters and
enclosures for the Russian Mission. Three of them
have already returned empty, and accompanied by
a fifth part of the original escort."
This artless communication gives room for many
commentaries in view of the events in preparation
•I in.that quarter. Without too much presumption,
may not the answer be found in a phrase of the
Golos—a phrase inconsiderable and probably escap-
1 ing notice in a moment of forgetfulness— <£ Russia
will observe in the impending conflict the same
I severe and strict neutrality which England observed
| in the late war." The italics are those of the
Russian paper.
The writer of the above letter claims to have de
rived his information from good sources, and to
have been corroborated by events in former letters
on Afghanistan.
The Memorial Diplomatique alleges that the
German Ambassador at Constantinople is pressing
thH Sultan to advise the Ameer to receive the
English mission, and that the Emperor William
has begged the Czar to avoid raising any fresh com
plication.
The Eeichsanzeiger announces that Russia has
ordered the disarmament of her ports on the Black 1
Sea and the removal of the torpedoes.
" THE BANKRUPTCY OF INDIA:
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—The alarming article under this title by Mr.
Hyndman, in the Nineteenth Century for this
month, is entirely based on an assumption that the
total gross produce of India can be accurately
measured by a money value of £277,000,000. The
" terrible state of affairs " thus developed, and the
" general collapse " anticipated as the result are
j attributed to the pressure of the Government as-
| sessment, and especially that upon the cultivators
I of the land. The conclusions arrived at are so
startling that, though, like Mr. Hyndman, I have
never been in India, I, as an alarmed Englishman,
have tried to test the strength of the basis upon
| which they rest. The only data I have at hand are
1 taken from the figures in the last year's leport of
| the Punjab. The number of cultivated acres there
agrees withj those quoted by Mr. Hyndman—say,
21,000,000 acres, and I adopt his average value of
£1 14s. per acre.
The Government assessment is £1,905,000, to pay
which one-sixth of the wheat crop (the produce of
1,120,000 acres) would have to be sold and ex
ported. There would remain for consumption in
the country the produce of 5,500,000 acres of wheat
and of 12,000,000 acres of other grain, the two
sufficing to yield for a year 21b. per head per day
for the population of 17,600,000, which is more
than double the weight of corn eaten by the people
of this country. Besides this, they would have for
consumption their garden vegetables and milk ;
and beyond it the money value of 845,000 acres of
oil seed, 720,000 acres of cotton and hemp, 391,000
| acres of sugar-cane, 129,000 acres of indigo, 69,000
acres of tobacco, 88,000 acres of spices, drugs, and
dyes, 12,000 acres of poppy, and 8,800 acres of tea,
the aggregate value of which, without touching the
corn, would leave nearly twice the Government as
sessment.
Mr. Hyndman has committed the error of arguing
from an English money value, at the place of pro
duction, upon articles of consumption, the true
value of which is their food sustaining power to the
people who consume them*
October 4. Q,