سجل قصاصات مقتبسة من صحف عن أفغانستان [و‎‎٦‎١] (٣١٢/١٢٥)

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THE INDIAN CRISIS.
THE MILITARY DEMONSTRA
TION.
RUSSIA AND THE AAfKF.R
(B y E astern T elegraph.)
(from our special corrkspondbnt.)
CALCUTTA, S cwdat.
The preparations for the campaign are being
pushed forward energetically, and no time what
ever is being lost.
The 8th Cavalry marched from Mooltan on
Friday morning, the Artillery followed yesterday,
and the European and Native Infantry march to
morrow. The 26th Infantry will arive by rail from
Lahore to-day, the 19th Cavalry are proceeding
from the same place by regular marches. The
troops are to assemble at Dehraghazikhan,
en route tq Quettah. Canclahar is believed
to be the eventual destination. The Commissariat
department is collecting supplies for 10,000 men.
The river steamers are held back for taking troops
across the Indus and for conveying heavy baggage,
although it is generally believed that the advance
will be made to Candahar and perhaps on to
Herat. The declared immediate object is to
strengthen the garrison of Quettah. The Govern
ment profess to aspect that the military demon
stration will bring Shere Ali to terms without
actual war; the popular and more probable belief
is that he will resist to the last what he cannot but
regard as a menace to his independence.
(B y G reat N orthern T elegraph.)
(from odr own correspondent.)
ST. PETEESBUEG, S unday.
The Exchange News of to-day says :—
" If we desired to give the simplest definition of
the Eastern Question we should say it was a ques
tion of rivalry between Russia and England.
Whether it is necessary for us to engage in a struggle
because of such rivalry we do not know, but we
do know that the struggle exists. Twice within the
memory of the present generation that struggle
has forced Russia to fly to arms, and twice it has
ended unfavourably to her. If it comes to armed
interference on England's part, Russia will hardly
leave the Ameer undefended, and Afghanistan may
probably play the same part that Servia played in
the unfortunate war just terminated."
SIMLA, sept. 29.
General Sir Neville Chamberlain has arrived
here.
ST. PETERSBURG, S ept . 23.
With reference to the telegrams and articles pub
lished by the English papers ascribing the stoppage
of the British Mission to the counsel of Russia, it
is pointed out in official quarters that when the
first news of the event arrived here the Ministers
for War and Foreign Affairs had no more precise
information on the subject than the public
generally.
It is added that thebelief expressed by these papers
of Russian complicity in the matter may have arisen
from the following considerations :—During the
Russo-Turkish war various reports were received
to the effect that England was making attempts to
create difficulties for Russia in Central Asia. The
English Mission of Sir Douglas Forsyth to
Kashgar was avowedly undertaken with this
purpose, and even in Bokhara it was alleged that
English agents were at work. In order to '
counteractthe effect of these movements, Russia took
various measures, and contemplated sending
several expeditions to reconnoitre the neighbouring
territories. However, aS soon as the Berlin Con
gress held out the prospect of bringing about a
peaceful solution of the question, all these measures
were countermanded. In any case, it is added, the
I assumption that the Russian Government had any
j part in the decision of Shere Ali to reject the
Anglo-Indian Mission is groundless. Such con- |
jectures are merely the outcome of the antagonism |
which existed between England and Russia during !
the late war.
THE AFGHAN CRISIS.
to the editor op the standard.
Sir ,—The crisis to which the Anglo-Afghan
rpiestion has attained is the most momentous that |
has occurred within the present generation, and on j
Ihe manner in which it is dealt with depends the
whole fabric of the English supremacy in Southern i
Asia. The series of articles which have been j
recently appearing in your columns throws light on
the historical and geographical facts that form the
basis of the relations that must subsist between j
India and Afghanistan. You have supplied the |
necessary data ; it is now time that our true policy ;
should be enunciated, both as regards Afghanistan,
the immediate subject under discussion, and as
regards Russia—the dark shadow that looms, indis
tinct but ominous, behind the Ameer of Cabul. It is
unnecessary for me to dwell upon the danger to India
from Russian schemes in Cabul either for the purpose
of embroiling that State with us, or of securing
diplomatic and commercial stations for Muscovite
officers within its territory. That danger is gene
rally admitted, and in India among the native |
population it is the foremost thought of the day.
Nor are Englishmen backward in expressing the
same belief. During forty years apprehension at
Russia's designs has been steadily acquiring con
sistency, and the warnings of such intelligent
foreign critics as Arminius Vambky have been
added to the prophetic utterances of many a
countryman of ours since Macnaghten first directed
attention to "the great game in Central Asia," as
he tersely put it. Those apprehensions are proved
by the Russian mission to Cabul to be far from
chimerical, and their justness is confirmed
by Shere Ali's subsequent action in refusing
to receive our representative. It is impossible
for any one to persist in shutting his eyes
to the fact that Russia does menace our hold on 1
India. Difficult, and perhaps impossible, as she
would find the task, Russia might, at least, cause us
Kuch loss in preserving our Indian Empire against
attack from within and without, that the greatest
of wars to nip the danger in an incipient stage
would be preferable.
There is no doubt that Lord Lytton and the
majority of the Indian Council recognise the gravity
of the occasion, and are resolved to take the .most
vigorous measures for effecting a permanent settle-
imentof the relations between Simla and Cabul.
Their acts announce their opinions, and in those
acts of. prompt and resolved decision the country |
will take the liveliest satisfaction. Lord
Lytton may rest assured that Englishmen
of almost every shade of Opinion will afford
him and his advisers their passionate support
in any measure calculated not only to bring Shere
Ali to his f enses, but also to settle our standing
with Cabul for ever, and to repulse every pretension
Russia may advance to station consuls and political
agents south of the Oxus. But in the valuable
telegrams which your Indian Correspondents have
•So energetically remitted to you, there is cause for
concern, as well as for the more agreeable senti
ments of pleasure and approval. There is doubt
and hesitation somewhere, be it at home or out in
India, that threaten to nullify those acts of vigorous
policy which must, if persisted in, solve the
Afghan question once and for ever. With three
months before us available for military operations,
by the admission of every one, and with the whole
winter on the testimony of others, if only British j
troops be employed, with three armies of the
total strength of between 30,000 and 40,000 fighting
men, converging on as many portions of Afghan^ !
istan, what is the meaning of the sentence "that
the advance will probably be put off to the spring?"
The assertion has been repeated in so manyquarters
that it is only right and proper that Englishmen
should realise the full significance of that little
sentence.
It has also been stated that the Afghan crisis
has advanced to so intricate and important a
stage that it passes out of the realm of Asiatic
politics into that of Imperial. I have no
objection to the phrase if it means that a
whole and perfect policy is to be followed in
Western Asia in conjunction with a re-arrangement
of our relations with Cabul. If such be
the case, I highly approve the statesman
ship that will make our action in Asia Minor,
in Persia, and in Cabul, identical for the
preservation of Southern Asia from the hostile
influence of Russia. But there is too much reason
:o fear that Imperial policy in this case is intended i
to be a debasing shuffiing-off of responsibility, a
weak trifling with questions of life and death to us
as a ruling Power, and a desire to obtain by com
promise and vacillation half concessions from the
Ameer and from Russia, which will herald the
decline of our prestige and power among the peoples
©f India.
If such be Imperial policy in dealing with
the Central Asian question, I vastly prefer the
Indian policy. What Indian policy is may be seen j