سجل قصاصات مقتبسة من صحف عن أفغانستان [ظ٢٤] (٣١٢/٤٩)
محتويات السجل: مجلد واحد (١٥٠ ورقة). يعود تاريخه إلى ٧ سبتمبر ١٨٧٨-١٩ أكتوبر ١٨٧٨. اللغة أو اللغات المستخدمة: الإنجليزية. النسخة الأصلية محفوظة في المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وثائق جُمعت بصفة شخصية. وسجلات من مكتب الهند إدارة الحكومة البريطانية التي كانت الحكومة في الهند ترفع إليها تقاريرها بين عامي ١٨٥٨ و١٩٤٧، حيث خلِفت مجلس إدارة شركة الهند الشرقية. .
نسخ
النسخ مستحدث آليًا ومن المرجّح أن يحتوي على أخطاء.
f(Lk Yufdl IS-
MINISTERS AND THE AFGHAN INCIDENT.
T he Cabinet," says a Tory paper this morning, "will consider I
without delay the measures to be adopted in an emergency as
trying as any of which the present generation of Englishmen have
had experience." Another paper, which wishes to be thought still
the only genuine ministerial organ, expatiates at large on the
fact that our Afghan troubles are due to Russia, and must be
dealt with by her Majesty's Ministers accordingly. We know
nothing. But, viewing the matter by our natural lights, we ,
think it highly probable that both these newspapers will presently
acknowledge that they have made a mistake. It is possible, indeed,
that the Cabinet may meet, it is reasonable to expect that the
Cabinet should meet, " to consider without delay the measures to
be adopted in a trying emergency." But it should be no surprise if i
Lord B eaconsfield agrees with Lord S alisbury not to call a
Council under the circumstances ; or at any rate not to assemble |
the Cabinet till it may seem to meet for general purposes. And
this for the reason indicated in the second newspaper article to
which we have referred. These Afghan troubles are of course due
to Russia. They are directly and manifestly the work of Russia.
They originate in a hostile determination to break engage
ments, made over and over again with England, not to interfere
in Afghanistan: engagements made, not by one provincial
Governor with another, but by the C zar to the Q ueen ; insisted ^
upon on the one hand and undertaken on the other (this should be
borne in mind) because it was understood and acknowledged that
any such interference would be and must be regarded as a menace |
to the British Empire. Now, after all. Ministers are but men, with
some of the weaknesses as well as some of the sterner and better
qu?rfftfcrbf fiwirkind. They have reputations to lose, jit is pos
sible for them to oe^placed in awkward and even ridwrHfous posi
tions. No more than other people car^hey be'mdifferent ttsi the ,
discovery that they have not been so wise, or so courageous; or
so triumphant as they held themselves out to be. At any rate, it
is not to be expected of them that they should be the first
to acknowledge that at a momentous crisis they so managed
matters as to plunge the country deeper into the manifest dangers ;
which they undertook to preserve it from, and from which they
announced that they had preserved it. Now if, after dispersing
themselves over Europe in confidence that nothing was likely to
happen to disturb a well-earned repose, they were suddenly to mest
together to consider what measures were to be taken in respect of ;
these Indian difficulties, what would the inference be ? The inference
would be that they recognized them as serious. But if they are
serious, they are so because they are due to Russian hostility,
made audacious by the triumph of Russia over their weak, ^
distracted, aimless, overawed, discomfited selves. Why, there- j;
fore, should they push forward to acknowledge themselves |
disconcerted by this same audacious hostility, or to seem to be i
so? How long ago is it since the Prime Minister formally
assured his countrymen that the relations of Russia and England
were "essentially friendly," and that the Czar's Government were
now convinced that "a restless and warlike spirit is one that
must debase and perhaps even ruin their country ?" How
long since was this blessed result attributed by his colleagues
and his scribes in the press to the energetic and overmastering
policy of the Beaconsfield Cabinet, and the grave lesson read
to the Czar from a timely display of British resolution and British
power? How long since is it (as we said the other day) that
our Plenipotentiaries came bragging back from Berlin with the cry
of Peace with honour," and of how sure they were that Russia had
been overawed ? All this is only a few weeks old ; and how
natural will it be, therefore, if now they hesitate to make a
great Government matter of armed operations which are nothing
less than war for the preservation of India against Russia
once more in the act of tearing up her pledges and flinging them
in our faces ? How can they acknowledge, as the Telegraph says
they must acknowledge, that within a few weeks they are actually
pitted against the openly defiant and hostile machinations of a
Power whose ability to disturb the empire they ridiculed while
they were helping her with means to do it? No. It may
be that we are mistaken. It may be that the Government
will really look the facts in the face, and deal with them as they
are, even at the cost of avowing themselves overreached and
deceived. But we doubt it. Their cue is not to acknowledge that
there is anything more than a mere frontier disturbance to meet.
To be sure, it does not seem easy to do so in face of the Russian
mission to Cabul, which, quite apart from the conduct of the
Ameer, is an act of menacing and defiant bad faith in a
matter acknowledged on both sides to be one of vital import
ance to the English Empire. But already the word has gone forth.
Their own organ, the Thnes ) has told the country that " our reckon
ing will be with the Ameer, and with him alone. There is nothing
worse before us than one of those troublesome little wars to which
we have so often found ourselves committed in every quarter of
حول هذه المادة
- المحتوى
قصاصات صحفية من صحف بريطانية وهندية تتعلق بالحرب الأفغانية (المعروفة اليوم بالحرب الأفغانية-الإنجليزية الثانية)، والمفاوضات في كابول، وسياسة الحكومة البريطانية بشأن الحدود الهندية، وتحركات الروس خلال الحرب.
القصاصات مأخوذة من عدد من الصحف، من بينها: صحيفة ذي بال مول بادجيت ، وصحيفة ذي بال مول جازيت ، وصحيفة ذي جلوب ، وصحيفة ذي تايمز ، وصحيفة ذي بيونير ميل ، وصحيفة ذي ستاندارد ، وصحيفة ذي ديلي نيوز ، وصحيفة ذي تلجراف ، وصحيفة ذي إيفنينج ستاندارد ، وصحيفة ذي ساترداي ريفيو ، وصحيفة ذي سبيكتيتور ، وصحيفة ذي مورنينج بوست وصحيفة ذي وورلد .
- الشكل والحيّز
- مجلد واحد (١٥٠ ورقة)
- الترتيب
القصاصات مرتّبة ترتيباً زمنياً وصفحات الكتاب مربوطة بثلاث حزم صص. ١-٤٧، صص. ٤٧-٩٦، و صص. ٩٧-١٤٢
- الخصائص المادية
ترقيم الأوراق: الملف مُرقّم في أعلى يمين وجه كل ورقة بالقلم الرصاص ومحاطاً بدائرة.
- لغة الكتابة
- الإنجليزية بالأحرف اللاتينية للاطّلاع على المعلومات الكاملة لهذا السجل
استخدام وإعادة نشر هذه المادة
- إعادة نشر هذه المادة
سجل قصاصات مقتبسة من صحف عن أفغانستان [ظ٢٤] (٣١٢/٤٩)و المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهندو Mss Eur F126/24و مكتبة قطر الرقمية <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100024093679.0x000032> [تم الوصول إليها في ١٠ March ٢٠٢٥]
https://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100024093679.0x000032
يمكنك نسخ ولصق الفقرة التالية لتضمين الصورة في صفحة الويب الخاصة بك.
<meta charset="utf-8"><a href="https://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100024093679.0x000032">سجل قصاصات مقتبسة من صحف عن أفغانستان [<span dir="ltr">ظ٢٤</span>] (٣١٢/٤٩)</a> <a href="https://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100024093679.0x000032"> <img src="https://iiif.qdl.qa/iiif/images/81055/vdc_100000001524.0x0003a3/Mss Eur F126_24_0064.jp2/full/!280,240/0/default.jpg" alt="" /> </a>
هذا التسجيل IIIF له ملف ظاهر متوفر كما يلي. إذا كان لديك عارض متوافق للصور يمكنك سحب الأيقونة لتحميله.https://www.qdl.qa/العربية/iiif/81055/vdc_100000001524.0x0003a3/manifestافتح في المتصفح العامافتح في عارض IIIF ميرادورطرق إضافية لاستخدام صور الأرشيف الرقمي
حقوق النسخ والتأليف: كيفية استخدام هذا المحتوى
- رقم الاستدعاء
- Mss Eur F126/24
- العنوان
- سجل قصاصات مقتبسة من صحف عن أفغانستان
- الصفحات
- 7r,9v:10r,13v:14r,19v,24v:25r,33v:34v,40r:41r,67r:68v,75r:76r,80r:80v,85v:87r,95r:96r,103r:103v,107r:108r,114r,120r:122r,124r:124v,129r:130r,137r:137v,145v:146v,150r:150v
- المؤلف
- Pall Mall Gazette
- شروط الاستخدام
- نطاق عام