سجل قصاصات مقتبسة من صحف عن أفغانستان [و‎‎٢‎٣] (٣١٢/٤٦)

people had been overcome. Up &> this point the
conduct of the war had been fairly able. No extra
ordinarily brilliant achievement had been done, but
no egregious error had been committed. The
mistake in leaving the siege train at Candahar had
been condoned by the skill and valour shown in the
assault on Ghizni; aad all the difficulties from the
country, of which we were supremely ignorant, and
dubious allies had been overcome with credit. It
would be well for our military reputation if the
subsequent acts had been equally prudently con
ducted.
In the meanwhile the corps under Colonel Wade
and the Sikh contingent had been operating against
Akbar Khan in the Khyber Pass. On the 2Gth of
i July Ali MUsjid fell after a day's siege, and Akbar
1 Khan, sick in body and at heart, broke up his camp
at Dacca, and fled to his father in Cabul, whence *
they withdrew, as already mentioned, to the Hindoo
Koosh. And then it was resolved to weaken the
army of occupation. The original intention had
been to place JShah Shuja on the throne, and then
withdraw ; but it at once became evident that the
Shah had no party in the State, and that he
must be maintained, if maintained at all, by
English bayonets. It was necessary then to
leave a considerable force behind in order to
j garrison the chief places, and the dubious attitude
of tlie Sikhs, more dubious than ever after the
death of Runjeet Singh, added very much to the
anxieties of the time. Yet on the 18th of Sep
tember the Bombay column returned to India, and
in a few weeks it was followed by a portion of the
Bengal army, under Sir John Keaue. Cabul,
Candahar, Ghizni, and Jellalabad were garrisoned
in iorce, and Sir \\'illoughby Cotton was entrusted
with the chief command, and General Nott with
the charge of Candahar. During the winter of
1839 tho English troops remained in safety, and
without too great discomfort, in the Bala Hissar,
and during that winter and the following spring the
principal interest centred round Bamian and
the glens of the Hindoo Koosh, beyond
which Dost Mahomed still maintained some
semblance of authority. By making the most
strenuous exertions Dost Mahomed had once
more an army at his disposal, raised from Usbegs and
.'Afghans, and during the month of September he
advanced against our posts at Sighan and Bajgah,
Our advanced troops withdrew as he approached,
without suffering much loss in men, but with the 1
loss of ail their baggage; and reinforcements were
sent up from Cabul to Bamian, where on the 14th
of September the English force concentrated, under
the command of Brigadier Dennie. On the 17th
the scouts reported that a small Afghan force was a
few miles ahead in the valley that debouches from
. Bamian, and Dennie at onco marched out
a small detachment to drive it back. Fortu
nately Dennie followed with additional troops,
for it turned out that the small Afghan
force was the vaunted army, computed at
40 ,000 strong, under the immediate command of
Dost Mahomed and his son Afzul. Dennie's little
army did not exceed 1500 men, of whom 400 were
Afghans. The remainder were Ghoorkas and
; native infantry. But the gallant officer showed
not the slightest hesitation, and attacked with his
small force and two guns tho overwhelming
■ numbers of Usbeg and Afghan chivalry. The
. result justified his gallantry, and the great victory
of Bamian must, among the achievements of the
first Afghan war, rank with the assault on Ghizni.
The month of September, the same month in
which we are at the present moment be it remem
bered, was yet to see fighting in the mountainous
country of Kohistan. Sir Robert Sale com
manded our forces there. There was the
successful afiair of Toofcundurrah, and the unsuc-
■ cessful assault on Joolgah ; and during the
month of October there was unremitting
pursuit after the Barucksye Ameer, until at last,
on the 2d of November, our army came up with
him at Purwandurrah. But, as Kaye says, this
hour, which should have been one of triumph, was
one of humiliation. Our native cavalry iled like )
sheep at the charge of the Afghan horse, leaving
their officers alone to bear the brunt of the action,
and over the fall of Dost Mahomed this gallant
action cast a glamour ct romance and chivalry.
The very next day Dost Mahomed rode into Cabul,
and surrendered to Sir William Macnaghten,
From JNovember, 1840, to November, 1841, we
continued to garrison the country, and then there
broke out those disturbances which resulted in the
disasters of that winter. It is unnecessary to
retrace the follies that were committed, and those
weak negotiations that were carried on with Akbar
Khan, now the chief prop of the Barucksye fortunes,
nor need we recall those terrible disasters which
| cost us four thousand Indian troops, and the lives of
I niany a gallant English officer. Those hours were
i terrible ones, never to be forgotten. But their
lesson stands good for ever. The errors then com
mitted can never be repeated by Englishmen.
Three places only remained in our possession, and
these were Ghizni, Jellalabad, and Candahar. The
first of these surrendered after a siege of some
weeks, and that blow was scarcely less severe to our
prestige than that of Cabul itself. Here again the
cause of disaster was sheer improvidence and
vacillation. Had the inhabitants been expelled, and
l^ad the Com maud an t made sure of his water
supply, as he coold, Ghizhi should have been
impregnable. The most extraordinary want i
of foresight was shown by the fact that 1 f 2
there was no one in the garrison of V v
Ghizni who understood the practice of gunnery.
The siege of Candahar, and the victories won
outside its walls, is the one bright spot during
this dark crisis, nor was the gallantry exhibited by
the garrisons at Jellalabad and at Khelat-i-Ghiljie
less conspicuous. At Jellalabad there was doubt
and hesitation as to whether it would be prudent to
defend the place, but fortunately the manly counsels
of George Broadfoot and Henry Havelock prevailed
over the more timid advice of others. Jellalabad
was to be defended, and held it was against all
comers against Akbar Khan, against the moun
taineers—despite of cold, want of powder, and in
the face even of nature's hostility, the destruction
i caused by the dreaded earthquake, until at last 1
there appeared in "the tar eastern horizon the
glittering bayonets of" the relieving legions of
Sir George Pollock. At Khelat-i-Ghiljie the defence
' was not less gallant, and its resolute commandant.
Captain Halkett Craigie, held out during that incle
ment winter until he too was relieved by General
Nott. And during all these months the work of
| raising revindicating armies was in steady progress,
i Not then, as now, could troops concentrate at
Peshawur in ten days; not then, as now, were ;
there located 40,000 troops as a garrison in the I
; Punjab; but the Sikhs had to be propitiated or I
coerced, and the five vast bridgeless rivers to be
I crossed in the long road from Ferozepore to the
Khyber.
On the 5th of April Pollock outflanked the 1
Afghans holding the Khyber, and forced that
celebrated barrier with scarcely any loss.
In the face of skill and foresight Afghan j
valour was confounded, and the opposing |
| force seemed to melt away, and while Pollock
; had been revindicating not so much English 1
courage as English common sense and tactical |
judgment, the Jellalabad garrison had struck ai
final and fatal blow at their old foe, Akbar Khan. !
On the 6th of April our garrison, under Sale, |
msrehed out and attacked Akbar Khan, who had
drawn up his army, 6000 strong, to receive them.
The victory was complete, and with the loss of ten
men killed and fifty wounded the Afghan army was
driven in confusion from the field. Such was the
consummating act of the Jellalabad garrison, which
had nobly deserved the epithet applied to it by
Lord Ellenborough of the " illustrious garrison." i
Then followed in rapid succession the victory of
Jugdulluck, where Ghiljie fanaticism paled before
English valour, and the final triumph at Tezeen. The i
battle of Tezeen was the battle of the war. The
Afghans were strongly posted, well led, and filled
with the courage of patriotism and fanaticism ; but
nothing could withstand our men. The heights
were earned with cold steel, and the cavalry and
artillery completed in the plain the work wrought
on the heights of Haft-Kotul. Cabul was re-entered
on the 15th of September. During those weeks
Nott had also been advancing from Candahar. He
had relieved Khelat-i-Ghiljie, defeated the Afghans
at Goaine, and reoccupied Ghizni. On the 17th of
September, having dispersed the Afghan army col
lected at Maidan, Nott entered Cabul, where he
found Pollock had anticipated him by two davs.
Afghanistan had been reconquered, and the blood
of our soldiers avenged. The task of Pollock and
Nott was completed, and their armies slowly
withdrew to Indian territory. We had championed
a fallen cause, and we had set ourselves against
the force of events. The life of the Sudosye'cause
had been long extinct, and it was vain to seek to
put fresh life into a dead body. The danger from
Russia had been more accurately gauged, and the
Central Asian question more clearly appreciated.
That there was danger from Russia we now too
surely know , but, in tho days of Burnes and Mac
naghten, it was not close at hand. Yet their
political foresight is incontestable, although the
means they sanctioned were ill calculated to efieot
their object. The Afghan wars of almost forty
years ago possess a peculiar vitality to the present
day. The causes then at work are still in exist
ence. There is still a divided Afghanistan and
an enfeebled Persia, upon both of which the Russian
statesmen have sought to work for their own pur
poses. There is still the great game in Central A sia
greater and more complicated than ever before,
and there is still, with all its wide-stretching rami
fications, the rivalry of England and Russia." There
are two important changes, however. Russia has
drawn nearer to Cabul, and we are established on
its eastern and southern frontiers. As compared
with our power in 1842 we are ten times as strong,
and ten times as ready, while Russia is scarcely any
stronger or more prepared. But our great advan
tage is that we have become wiser. We know what
we can do, and we know how to do it. It is from
the glorious campaign of 1842 that we shall take a
precedent in any future emergency, and if we do
re-enter tho country in hostile guise it will not be
to instal some ei'ieminate member of an effete
dynasty upon the throne. We have learnt wisdom
since the destruction of the Cabul contingent, as
well as accumulated vigour and military strength.