سجل قصاصات مقتبسة من صحف عن أفغانستان [و‎‎٢‎١] (٣١٢/٤٢)

the Malliks of the Khyber receivud 130,000 rupees
per annum. After the annexation of Pocthawur by
- tha Sikhs, Dost Mahomed paid them only
1 20,000. During our occupatiou of Cabul, 1839 42,
we paid them 125,000 rupees annually, and after
| our withdrawal Dost Mahomed continued a pay-
1 ment of 27,000. At his death these allowances
were stopped, nor has Shere Ali renewed them.
I Consequently his hold on the Afridi and Shinwarri
I tribes, who virtually hold the pass from Jamrood
to Dhaka, has been much weaKencd. To work on I
I this will now le Lord Lvi.ton's great objocf. If i \
^ wa can buy the Khyber Malliks over to the side of j
: the British, the forcing of the pass will be i
•, much simplified ; and, avaricious to a degree, 1
' faithless to his salt, utterly regardless of tribal •
honour or family affection, the Afghan is ready
■ to sell his sword to the hightst bidder,
i Once through tho pass, there appears small reason
to believe we should be unable to keep it open for
| the free transmission of supplies. Foriified posts
at judiciously selected spots, coupled with liberal
1 douceurs to the neighbouring chieftains, is all that
is requisite. An eminent authority has given it as
■ his opinion that 4,000 Infantry with 12 mountain
| guns, aided by 300 Cavalry for patrolling purposes,
'i would be ample.
The forcing of the Khyber and the necessary con
struction of a road practicable for wheeled traffic to
I Cabul would be but the commencement of the trials
of an Afghan war. The fortresses of Jellalabad,
Cabul, and Ghuznoe would have to be reduced ;
f of their present condition little or nothing H
I is known ; but from Asiatic sources we have
learut that, subsequent to our departure from
the country, Dost Mahomed spent much labour
: and money in perfecting their defences, and,
although it is imnrob able that they have been com
pleted on any very scientific plans, it is beyond all
> doubt that they will not fall with the ease Ghuznea
| fell in the last campaign. Admitting that we have
| only Afghan organization, unaided by European
g officers, to war against, we shall require two
^ columns to operate with. Profiting by past lessons,
| it would be criminal to repeat the blunders /
j of 1839, and send in too small a force.
■ The present leader of the mission. Sir Neville
Chamberlain, had bitter experience of the folly of
| under-estim-ning a foo in the failure of the Urn- :
balla Expedition, so that it maybe assumed he
will insist on an adequate army accompanying
him should he be deputed to "bring the Ameer
j to terms. Twenty-five thousand men for the
; northern or Khyber column, and 15,000 for
the southern or Bolan force, will be am
ple, without leaving too wide a margin for
detachments necessarily left behind to keep open
communications. The Bolan Pass, which was the
^ cause of such enormous loss among the cattle of the
Army of the Indus, now has a fair road running
. through it, so that we may expect an expeditionary
force to traverse it without its cavalry brigade
being reduced to an effective strength of 100 sabres,
as was the case in 1839 ; and we may rest assured
recent experience has taught us that 38,000
t camp followers are not necessary for an army of
| 9,500 men. Between Khelat and Candahar there
j is some very bad ground, a lack of forage, and an
utter absence of water. These drawbacks are
j known, and so can be provided against. We must
| have no repetition of the mistakes that cost us
I 16,000 lives in 1841—no divided military and
I political commands, no etfete generals, no under-
" estimating the value of our foes, no faith in Afghan .
I treaties.
The denuding India of 40,000 men is a step
I that we dare not undertake. Already our army
g there is dangerously small, those of the feudatory
I Princes dangerously large. To leave such an ele-
I ment of mischief unwatched would be suicidal
I policy, and if it is determined to bring the
I Ameer to book we must not hesitate to reinforce
I our troops in the East Indies. The near ap-
I preach of winter will prevent any invasion of Af-
| ghanistan being attempted for at least six months,
and if by that time Shere Ali has not repented of
the insult offered to Her Majesty's representative
last Saturday we should be able to mass a force at
Jacobabad and Poshawur which would insure
| his punishment being short, sharp, and deciaive^__^B
" [t&KcikJj"
THE INDIAN CRISIS.
IMMINENT ADVANCE ON
AFGHANISTAN.
CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS.
THE RUSSIAN MISSION TO CABUL.
CONTINENTAL VIEWS OF THE
SITUATION.
(By Eastern Telegraph.)
(from our own correspondents.)
BOMBAY, T uesday E vening,
Although but three days have elapsed since the
Mission was turned back on its way up the
Khyber Pass energetic preparations have already
been made, and a large number of troops are on
tho move. The Government are evidently deter
mined to bring matters to a crisis before the
winter arrives. There will be no attempt made to
induce the Ameer to receive our Envoy ; indeed, j
the Mission is already broken up. Sir Neville ;
Chamberlain is on his way to Madras, and the !
other members of the Mission have gone to Simla.
The native envoy who went on to Cabul has been
recalled.
Steps have been ta^en to strengthen the force
at Quetta, and it is considered certain that a
forward move will be made from that point upon
Candahar.
A force of eight thousand men, including the
59th, 17th, and 60th Rifles, the 23d Pioneers, and
a portion of the 10th Hussars, will assemble at
Mooltan and advance through the Bolan Pass to
Quetta, An advance from that town to Candahar
will sever Cabul from i Herat, and cut the Ameer
off from the larger half of his territory.
A force under General Roberts, six thousand |
strong, starts from Rawul Pindee to Kohat, some
thirty miles south of Peshawur. This column will,
it is believed, enter Afghanistan by the Koorum
Valley, which lies south of the Khyber Pass, and is
separated from the Valley of the Cabul by the Safed
Koli range. The road from the head of this valley
goes through the Hobandi Pass into the valley of
the Logur, and a force arriving there would sever
Cabul from Ghazni.
A third column will proceed up the Khyber
Pas?.
The troops will march from Mooltan and Rawul
Pindee in three days' time.
There is seldom much snow before December,
so there is plenty of time to occupy Cabul and
Candahar before the winter. The Afghans were
able to offer no serious opposition to our last
invasion, and it is not likely that they will prove
themselves more formidable upon the present
occasion.
CALCUTTA, T uesday.
The text of the Viceroy's two letters to the
Ameer of Afghanistan is published. It is semi
officially announced that no answer has been
received either to these letters, or to a letter which !
was previously sent.
Orders have been issued to concentrate the
troops towards the frontier, with a view to early |
operations in case events should require such a
step.