"الملف E5. مقتل الشيخ سلمان بن دعيج و ٢٥ آخرين في ٣ ديسمبر ١٩٠٠ عند الدراية على يد البهية" [ظ‎‎١‎١‎٢] (٢٥٢/٢٢٤)

They (the Turks) profess to regard the Arab tribal law, which permits
the life of any one member of the aggressive tribe to be taken in revenge for the
life of a member of another tribe, regardless of the question whether the indi
vidual is guilty or innocent, as inconsistent with the Islamic Code and the
criminal laws of the Empire. They have also pointed out that Sheikh Rashid
bin Muqareh and his elder son were themselves killed in the attack upon the
Bahreinis.
8. More important than those points, I think, are the facts that when
* singular Of Am.nwa, the firs l t . Ammari* was killed by the Behaih,
no application for redress was made to the
Residency by the Chief of Bahrein, and that if the retaliatory murder of Sheikh
Rashid's son was committed without the knowledge of Sheikh Esa, which I
consider very doubtful, no signs of disapproval were at any rate afterwards ex
pressed by him at his subject's action.
9. In these circumstances, I do not think it is necessary that we should
support the Chief in his demand for the execution of three more haphazardly
selected members of the Behaih or for their surrender to him. I am doubtful
whether we should press for the full pecuniary compensation demanded, but if this
is done the amount adding 2,400 dollars (Rs. 3,360) for the lives of the Chief's own
3 relatives would be Rs. 38,500, and I think that the prompt payment of this,
or any lesser sum which may be considered suitable, should be demanded of the
Turkish Government in firm language.
10. The attitude of Sheikh Esa himself towards the Bedouin of the mainland
in my opinion is most weak and unsatisfactory. Every year hundreds of Ejman
Beni Hajir and A1 Morra, besides the Nayim of Katar, cross over to the Islands
to draw their annual subsidies and 'presents' from the Chief, and yet of the two
sections of the Beni Hajir, Sheikh Nasir bin Mubarak A1 Abdallah is now generally
recognised as the leader of the Makhadthdthaba in virtue of his mother having bf»en
the daughter of a former Sheikh, and Ahmed bin Selman, the pirate, lives for eight
months of the year in the encampment of the A1 Muhammad, having married the
sister of their Chief. If all the Beni Hajir and the numerous sections of the A1
Morrah were rigorously forbidden to visit Bahrein until some suitable treatment
had been meted out to the members of their tribes and the other persons whom
they harboured, who were known to be Sheikh Esa's enemies a much more satisfac
tory condition of affairs would be inaugurated for Bahrein. At the present time,
however, the Chief, apart from his unwillingness to adopt this line of action
would probably find it impossible to enforce such a prohibition without our
assistance, as his permanent armed followers are so few in number. Before
leaving this subject I may mention as an instance of Sheikh Esa's weakness that
a few weeks ago when the Kaim-makam of Katif was searching for all the
members of the A1 Muhammad Sheikh^ family with a view to putting pressure
upon them to deliver up Ahmed bin Selman, the son of one of the arrested men
and a cousin by marriage of the pirate leader fled to Bahrein for safety and re
mained here openly for a few days, though he had disappeared again before I
heard of his visit. This man, Hamad bin Tami, apparently has contrived to
ingratiate himself with the Chief and is always given a welcome to these Islands.
11. To revert to the question of the Behaih blood-feud, I believe that ordi
narily the simplest method of repressing such an affair is to extort a heavy
guarantee or a number of hostages from both parties for the future maintenance
of the peace. In the case of Bahrein such a course is not necessary, as there
is no likelihood of any of the Behaih visiting Sheikh Esa's territories while the
feud last. 1 would recommend, however, that the Turkish Government be re
quested to take some such action in regard to the Behaih and that if they declare
their inability to do so and also make any delay in paying the compensation,
they should be told that in the circumstances we decline any longer to recognize
the subordination of the Dthaharan tribes to the Hasa Government, and that we
will take our own measures for dealing with them direct. 1 believe that by
an effective blockade of the Dthaharan and Katar Coasts for some months, so
as to prevent all Bedouin coming to Bahrein or going to the pearl-banks' we
could cause a very heavy pecuniary loss to the tribes and would probably reduce
them to a more genuine submission than has ever been done before.
G. C. PrtM, Simli.—No. C. 490 F. D.—27-9-05 67—R. S. W.