"مُلخّص المراسلات المتعلّقة بشؤون زنزبار من ١٨٥٦ إلى ١٨٧٢." أعدّه النقيب ب. د. هندرسون، الملحق بالإدارة الخارجية" [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎٥] (١١٤/٥٠)

Proceedings subsequent to the arbitration relating to the question of the subsidy.
induced to abaadon solelv on the promise of the British Government to effect a just settlement
of his chims If it is to be left to the option of the Sultan of Zanzibar to evade fulfilment
of an award so unequivocal in its terms and concluded under such circumstances, il appears to
us that the moral influence of our political offh-ers in the Persian Gulf will be w.-akened, the
Chief's of the Oman coast will prefer seekincr the adjustment of their quarrels by the sword
to relvino on the mediation of the British Government, and there will be danger of a relapse
to the state of anarchy in the Persian Gulf, which it has cost many years o( negotiation and not
a little bloodshed to put down.
"The annual subsidy, moreover, was intended as compensation to Muscat for the loss of
valuable claims in Zanzibar, from which its revenues could be recruited. The State of Muscat
is' poor, and if the Zanzibar subsidy be withheld, it will be difficult and probably impossible
for the' Sultan to maintain a settled government, or preserve his position against Wahabee
influence, which even now it is difficult to resist. The efforts of the British Government to
preserve 'the peace of the Persian Gulf and suppress piratical aggressions, which are liable to
occur at all times, and more especially where Wahabee influence is felt, are intimately bound
up with the establishment of a firm government at Muscat, and we strongly deprecate the
adoption of any measures tending to weaken the authority of the Sultan.
"With respect to the character and conduct of the Sultan of Muscat, it has never been
satisfactorily proved that he murdered his father, Syed Thoweynee; and, however grave may be
the suspicion that he did so, that suspicion can furnish no ground on which we can countenance
the withholding of any of the right appertaining to him as Chief of Muscat after we have
formally recognized him as ruler of that principality. It we once admit the propnetv of
the refusal of the Sultan of Zanzibar to pay the subsidy, on the ground of the misconduct
of the Chief of Muscat, to be consistent, it would be incumbent on us to retrace our steps and
deny the right of Syed Salem to the throne of Muscat. In point of fact, however, we did not
allow, as we ought not to allow the personal merits or demerits of Syed Salem to weigh in our
consideration of the question of his recojrnition. Our duty is to support that ruler \Vhom
the subordinate Chiefs and people have chosen for their head, and, so long as lie can maintain
his position, we are bound on broad grounds of policy to give Syed Salem at any rate our moral
support.
" Having regard to the position of Zanzibar and its general relations to India, and to the
tribes on the shores of the Indian Sea, it appears to us that the Political Agent there ought
to be under the Government of Bombay, subject to the control of the Government of India,
rather than under the Foreign Office j and that the agent should bd chosen by the Government
of Bombay, who have the best opportunitits for making a good selection. Indeed, it would, in
our opinion, be better that the present anomalous state of things, and the inconveniences
alluded to in paragraph 7 of your despatch, should continue than that the control of political
affairs at Zanzibar should be entirely transferred to the Jborei^n Office, which could not take
cognizance of cases affecting the interests of Indian subjects, and subjects of neighbouring
allied States, with the rapidity and convenience that are desirable.
"At the same time we are of opinion that the inconveniences arising from double refer
ences, and the risk of conflicting orders, would be best obviated by causing the Agent at
Zanzibar to discontinue his direct communication wjth the Foreign Olfice. No real loss ot time
would ensure from the transmission of communications affecting European subjects through
the Bombay Government; and there can, in our opinion, be no more reason for direct com
munication with the Foreign Office from Zanzibar, than from Muscat, where the Agent enjoys
no such privilege. On the other hand, if Muscat be under the Government of India, and
Zanzibar be under the Foreign Office, there will not only be a conflict ot directions, but sooner
or later also a probable conflict of policy."
To the above despatch the Duke of Argyll replied (No. 28, dated ISth
February 1869) to the effect, that the whole question of the superintendence
of the affairs of the Persian Gulf and of the East Coast of Africa was under the
consideration of Her Majesty's Government, with a view to the rectification
of the existing system which was admitted on all sides " to be fraught with
much public inconvenience and embarrassment." In the meanwhile the Secre
tary of State observed that, if the Political Agent at Zanzibar failed in report
ing to the Bombay Government all matters connected with the agency as
distinct from the consulate, he should be severely censured.
" He is an officer for the time being of the Bombay Government, whatever may be his
antecedents, and the Governor of Bombay can at any time remove him and appoint another
person in his place."
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