"ولايات الجزيرة العربية السبعة المستقلة [اليمن، عسير، الحجاز، نجد، الكويت، جبل شمر، الجوف]" [و‎‎٥‎٥] (٦٨٠/١٠٩)

apprehensions and might even cause the local Sheikhs to
turn away from His Majesty's Government and consider aub-
raifting ttoeraaelvss to Persia or to Ibn Saud.
(c) The basis of His Majesty's Goverament's present
treaty relationship with Kowait was unsatisfactory. In
the first place it did not rest, as we.s the case with
Bahrein, Muscat and the Trucial Sheikhdoms, on a long
series of formal treaties with the gb®ikli (Sating back for
over a century or, &a in the case of Qatar, on a compre
hensive treaty-, hut sras 'oarisd only 01 a comparatively
brief correspondence exchanged between the Sheikhs and
His Majesty's Governraeot since 1099 and on the reciprocal
ens*geneats, still presumably binding since thsy had not
been abrogated, entered into in connesiou with the lease
of Bunder Shweikh in 1307; secondly thare were certain
gaps, e .g. we had no slavery agreement wl'fch Koweit. It
might, he suggested, be possible to fill in the gaps left
by this correapcndencs and tighten our ccetrol in that
way. An example was cur rocsat requsst to the Sheikh for
certain undertakings in regard to air facilities in his
Sheikhdom, one result of which would ba to concentre to
effective control of such facilities, whether military or
civil, in the hands of His Majesty's Government. Another
instance was the recoat proposed am en® i ent of the Koweit
Order-in-Council so as to place rssponsibility for Juris
diction over non-Moslan foreigners in the hands of His
Majesty's Government. A gradial tightfHitog of cur control
of this character, particularly if pursued as a definite
policy on all convenient occasions, would, he thought, at
once avoid the difficulties Involved in establishing a■
formal protectorate and would make it very nuch simpler.
COLCNEL....