"الملف 73/7 I (D 19) وضع الكويت، سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية في ١٩١١" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢‎٥] (٦٣١/٤٨٤)

43
•i i r. nf tho status of Kuwait, I am to in form
With regard to appSMb-emodificaUwo -• ^ 0 f t h e Earl of Crewe,
you that SuE. Grey ism substantia agi ^ exception of the first condition
as stated in your letter of ^ f ^^d control m the B,«h<kd-
^rXToT^e^'RaSway would be inadequate as a share lor to
Sir K Gr /y^wrote 0 alettefto 'sir IL Babingtotsmith. in which the followiug
passage occurs:— - ^ ,
" T think that the British share should be 55 per cent, and that we shouId con-
struct the harboui at Kuwait and have a large share in its subsequent control .
A copy of this letter was enclosed in the memorandum handed to the Otto
man Min/ster of Finance on the 29th July 1910 ; and m the same memorandum,
certain alternative proposals were placed before His Excellency .
Sir E Grey is of opinion that His Majesty's Government cannot now recede
from what they have already stated to the Ottoman Government, and that ob
ner cent of capital and control would be the maxiTOwm share which they could now
fairly claim, if the question were one of internationalisation under tne concession
of 1903.
From the terms of the written proposals of the Turkish Government, enclosed
in Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 139 of the 1st March (of which a copy_ is trans
mitted herewith), it would appear that what is contemplated by the Sublime Porte
is that the 1003 Convention, in so far as it applies to the sections in question, should
be cancelled and that another arrangement should be substituted. It is, of course,
clear that the consideration of these proposals must be largely dependent upon
whether or not they have the concurrence of the German Government and, both
from the failure of Sir G. Lowther to elicit any precise and definite information on
the point, and from the semi-official statements,which have appeared in the G erman
press, it would seem that such is not indeed the case. Be this as it may. Sir E,
Grey is of opinion that the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to the
proposals now made should be carefully considered in all its bearings, with a view
to sending a reasoned reply to the Ottoman Government without undue delay.
It is therefore essential to enquire whether, in the interests of British trade
or on other grounds, a preponderating share of capital and control is a condition
sine and non of British participation in the enterprise. If a settlement on the lines
desired should prove attainable in regard to Kuwait, and if the 1903 concession is
to be cancelled in so far as concerns the railway beyond Baghdad, and a formal in
ternational agreement substituted (such agreement stipulating, inter alia, that
differential tariffs are absolutely excluded, and that the whole management of the
line shall be conducted on approved methods), is it indispensable that British con
trol, either in share-capital or on the Board, should be preponderating ? Is it not
possible that British control, in so far as concerns equality of treatment for British
merchandise, could be rendered effective by stipulating in the contemplated in
ternational agreement or bi-lateral contract, that British assent to the desired in
crease in the customs is conditional upon the continued fulfilment of certain obli
gations by Turkey, and that default on her part would, ipso facto, determine the pe
riod of British assent to the enhanced customs tariff ? Even if His Majesty 's Gov
ernment were to hesitate to exercise such a power, the knowledge that they pos
sessed it would undoubtedly exercise a salutary effect; and, on the analogy of the
3 per cent, customs increase, agreed to for seven years in 1907, it might be provided
that the 4 per cent increase should be levied for only a fixed period, when its conti
nuance for a further period would depend upon whether or not the Ottoman Gov
ernment had fulfilled all obligations as to the exclusion of manipulation of rates.
If it is considered desirable that agreement should be reached as to British
participation in the enterprise it is important not to forego such participation on
inadequate grounds. Sir E. Grey does not desire to express a, final opinion as to
the expediency of such participation until he has been further acquainted with
the views of the Secretary of State for India and of the Board of Trade.