"الملف 73/7 I (D 19) وضع الكويت، سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية في ١٩١١" [و‎‎١‎٩‎٥] (٦٣١/٤٢٣)

[This •ncm. teiiT, k operi:, of His Britannic Majesty's GovemmeEt.]
EASTERN DEPARTMENT. [April ]0 j
SECRET SERIES . g ECTION 3
[13381] No. 1.
Sir Edward Grey to Svr F. Bertie.
(No. 123.) J
,, ,, , . Foreign Offi'-.e, April \6, 1911.
M. CAMBOIS having" told Sir Arthur Nicolson that Count Benckendorff had spoken
to him of the desire of Russia to participate in the railway from Bagdad to the Gulf, in
order to show that the good understanding between England, France, and Russia had
not been upset by the Potsdam negotiations, 1 took an opportunity of discussing the
matter informally with M. Cambon to-day. Sir Arthur Nicolson being also present.
1 observed to M. Cambon that I appreciated the good political intentions of the
Russian Government, and the value of what they wished to demonstrate. On the other
hand, the Russian suggestion would complicate the negotiations exceedingly. Supposing
that France was to have a 20 per cent, share in the Bagdad—Gulf section, Russia
20 per cent., and England 20 per cent., and that, in addition, France was to have what
she desired with regard to the Syrian railways, part of the Hedjaz Railway, railways in
the north of Asia Minor, and the Danube—Adriatic Railway, while Russia had the
abnegation of German projects in the Russian sphere in Persia, in such circumstances
British public opinion would say that, as France and Russia had these things in addition
to a share in the Bagdad - Gulf section equal to ours, we should also get something in
addition. My idea was, therefore, that we should not participate in the advantages
which France and Russia were to get elsewhere, and that they should not participate in
the Bagdad—Gulf section, but allow us to make the best bargain we could with regard
to this. We have hitherto asked a share of at least 50 per cent., and if we got this the
rest of the section must, I supposed, go to Germany under the German arrangement
with Turkey.
M. Cambon said he entirely understood our difficulty. He had told Count
Benckendorff that the question as to whether France should participate in the
Bagdad-Gulf section was one which concerned us alone. She would participate if we
wished her to do so, but she did not regard it as her affair. He was impressed by the
desire of the Russian Government to retrieve the blunder which they had made at
Potsdam, and he took the same view as I did of their political intentions in the matter^
but it was very difficult for them to undo what they had done at Potsdam. He had
also pointed out to Count Benckendorff that the consent of Turkey was necessary to
Russian participation.
I observed that 1 had warned Count Beckendorff from the beginning that, while
M Sazonow should reduce as much as possible the difficulties in which he had become
entangled at Potsdam, he should not break off the agreement made there with Germany^
because the Khanikin Tehran branch and the other inconveniences in the arrangement
were not serious enough to justify a political quarrel between Russia and Germany,
which would suit neither Russia nor England, and which 1 assumed would not suit
France either.
M, Cambon asked whether he might tell Count Benckendorff, who was not
instructed to make any proposal formally, that I would talk over the matter with him.
I replied that I would do so next week ; but I hoped that M. Cambon would
explain the difficulties to him, as I should have to point them out to him when
he came.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
[1969 k—3]