"الملف 73/7 I (D 19) وضع الكويت، سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية في ١٩١١" [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎٥] (٦٣١/٢٦٤)

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laVe, GERARD LOWTHER.
Enclosure in No. 1.
Precis of Article in the " Tanin " 0/ February 20, 1911.
Discussion about an Entente with England.
FOR some time there lias been keen anticipation of discussion for bringing about
an entente between the Ottoman Government and England concerning the Persian
Gulf the last section of the Bagdad Railway, &c., and the latest information goes to
show that the fonnd at ion-stone is to be laid by an exchange of views between Kitaat
Pasha and Sir Gerard Lowther. The opinion expressed by the former, that such
important questions ought to be discussed by statesmen and not in the columns 0
newspapers, is thus confirmed.
To judge by the unreasonable claims of the " Times ' and similar papers, there was
no hope of peace between the two parties. But in the more moderate papers there has
appeared a change full of promise. For instance, the " Statist says that it is the act
of a novice for England to play an ambitious, grasping role ; that Turkey has the right
to increase her resources, and therefore cannot remain without railways ; that England
has no right of veto over the extension of the Bagdad Railway in Turkey ; and that
once upon a time many English politicians opposed the Suez Canal project. Ihis
attitude shows us that the sense of what is right is not quite extinguished in. the
English, which brings us hope and consolation. Nevertheless, there are still
inconsistencies caused by ignorance. For instance, a telegram from London to a
French paper says that the English Cabinet will confirm Ottoman sovereign rights over
Koweit without difficulty, provided the sheikh's autonomy is respected and the harbour
of Koweit is left in English hands. Koweit harbour lias nothing to do with England
even now. Is it to be anglicised as a reward when Turkey has adopted a favourable
policy towards England with regard to the last section of the Bagdad Railway ? How
can the expressions " Ottoman sovereignty " and "English harbour" be reconciled?
To tell the truth, the telegram is nonsense ; and we think such a scheme is no more
likely to be put forward by England than to occur to Turkey.
The real bone of contention is the Persian Gulf. With regard to the Bagdad
Railway, there is no diagreement between the two Powers, and officially there cannot
be; it is a weapon—a dependent question—which will serve to settle the main
question. We do not know how far our views are shared officially; but if there is one
thing certain, it is that our consenting to listen to England's aims and objects with
regard to the Bagdad Railway is a great favour and sacrifice. There is mutual
sacrifice in a bargain ; and we ask England for her views on the last section of the
Bagdad Railway, and tell her to give up her important position in the Koweit and other
questions. That is the first foundation-stone of an entente.
We think England is coming round to this view. The object of " control " is now-
seen to mean preponderant participation in providing the capital, English being a
language which admits of such elasticity. All the row about the word " control " must
therefore be attributed to the elasticity of English.
If the matter had been a piece of plain business, there would have been no need
for discussion with the British Ambassador about the railway; there would have been
negotiations between the Ministry of Public Works and the company which was willing
to provide^ the capital. But as the real object was the Koweit and Persian Gulf
questions, it was felt that diplomatic approval was needed. When the basis of the
cntertie has been laid with regard to the political and diplomatic points, the commercial