"الملف 73/7 I (D 19) وضع الكويت، سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية في ١٩١١" [و‎‎١‎٢‎٠] (٦٣١/٢٥٣)

[This PiMsmaeat Is th e P roperty of His Bnt;maie M.^e:-ty'3 Governinent.]
EASTERN DKPARTMENT. January 18.]
SECRET SERIES. Section 2
[A mended C opy.]
[2081] No. 1.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.
(No. 28. Secret.)
. Foreign Office, January 18, 1911.
I CrAVE M. Gambon to-day, verbally, the substance of my conversation with
Count Benckendorff yesterday, omitting any reference to the details of German
participation m the 1 ehran—Khanikm branch railway and to the neutral zone in
Persia.
M. Cambon took the same view as I did as to what M. Sazonow had done at
St. Petersburgh with regard to the Bagdad Railway, and said that it was more than
ever necessary that France and we should keep in close touch and act in accord.
I concurred in this.
M. Cambon added that M. Sazonow had informed the French Ambassador in
St. Petersburgh that, owing to the publication of the draft agreement, the draft, would
have to be set aside, and some time would be required to arrange matters. M. Cambon
understood that M. Sazonow had said to Sir George Buchanan not only that time
would be required, but that in the course of further discussion the arrangement with
Germany might have to be extended, so as to embrace more than was comprised in
the negotiations at Potsdam.
I added that M. Sazonow had said that only what related to the Bagdad Railway
would be put in writing, and that whatever else there might be would not be in
writing.
I then told M. Cambon that, if we received a proposal as to the Bagdad Railway
from either Germany or Turkey, we would try to get the best possible. terms in
connection with the section from Bagdad to the Gulf. But we would not make a
definitive arrangement without consulting the French Government and keeping in
touch with them.
M. Cambon asked me what arrangement would be possible, for he understood
that we had told Djavid Bey that we could not agree to the conversion of the Bagdad-
Gulf section into a Turkish railway.
T replied that, on the contrary, we had told Djavid Bey that if the Gulf section
was to be a Turkish railway, and the Turks would employ British engineers,
materials, &c., an arrangement might be possible. As to Koweit, if the Turks
would guarantee the status quo of the sheikh's position we would recognise Turkish
suzerainty over the whole district. ^ r _ l . _
The information that we were prepared to recognise iurkish suzerainty over
Koweit seemed to be new to M. Cambon. He said that a Turkish railway made by
British engineers and British materials, with a British director, and a harbour
constructed and managed by us, seemed to oiler a possible solution.
I asked him what France would require.
He answered that the Bagdad-Horns line would be of no use until Mesopotamia
was made profitable by irrigation. France would, however, ask for the preference m
making this line if Turkey ever decided to have it built. _ This he regarded as a rather
remote contingency. France would also ask for the junction oi the Aleppo line
with the Bagdad Railway; for the Samsun-Sivas line ; and^ perhaps also some small
railway in the north. After all that had passed, Russia ought to agree to this.
I said that in any case we must keep in touch, and we must both see that
^ done „ . 1» »
written off. X am, &c.
E. GREY.
[1852 #—2]