"الملف 73/7 I (D 19) وضع الكويت، سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية في ١٩١١" [و‎‎٥‎٧] (٦٣١/١٢٨)

C arrying out thk C oncession. " t ,'
The time to oppose the Baghdad Kaihvay, if
it was to be opposed in British interest?, was
before the concession was granted. The con
cession has not been extended, and it is within
the rights of the German concessionaires and
the Turkish Government to carry out its terms
as they please, in Turkish territory.
The branch which was to be made from
Baghdad to Khanikin was contained in the
original concession. Ihe right hon, gentleman
says " Yes ; but now you go beyond Turkish
territory there is going to be a branch made
from Khanikin to Teheran, and that is not going
to be under British control. Whether there had
been the Anglo-Russian "agreement or not,
anyone who looks at the map and sees Liiat the
branch from Khanikin to Teheran is going to
proceed not south but north, into Persian
territory, will know that in no conditions in
recent years would it have been possible for us
to secure concessions for railways in the north
of Persia. It we are to have concessions for
railways they must be in the South. Northern
Persia is out of our reach. Wo could not have
secured the concession, and, if we had, we
could not have protected it. If we were to
protect British interests thfy must be protect
ed in the south and not in the north of Persia,
and that remains unaffected by anything we
have*done since we came into otiice. So far as
British trade can be protected by guaranteeing
equal rights on these railways, it will be protect
ed. (Ministerial cheers) More than that we
cannot do with regard to these railways
The right hon. gentleman said that
t ho.-e guarantees of equal rights may
! be so ordered as to be in practice
unfavourable to British trade. Our only
guarantee against that is to obtain concessions
and make other routes of our own for British
trade. You cannot possibly take away the
concessions which the Germans have got. The
right lion, gentleman suggested no lever which
we could use to bring pressure to bear in the
interests of British trade on these railways
But we aro not quite so helpless in the
matter as might be supposed from the speech
of the right hon gentleman.
T hk M onky Q ukstion.
These railways are going to cost money. The
Turkish Government require money, and have
applied for a 4 per cent increase in the Customs
duty, which cannot be levied without our con
sent. I am exceedingly anxious that we should
give our consent. I wish to see the new reyijns
in Turkey strengthened. (Cheers.) I wish to see
them supplied with resources which wiil enable
them to establisli strong and just government
in all parts of the Turkish Empire. But if any
part of this money is to be used to promote a
railway which must be a source of doubtful
advantage to British trade, or, still more if the
money is to be used to make a railway which
will take the place of means of communication
which have been so far in the hands of British
concessionnaires. then it will be impossible for
us to agree to the 4 per cent increase until we
are satisfied that British trade interests will be
satisfactory safeguarded, (Cheers.)
As regards Koweifc, we are not anxious to
have a forward policy in the Persian Gulf, or
to acquire new territory, or disturb the statm
(/ mo ; but if the status quo is going to be dis
turbed by others, then undoubtedly we must
use our resources to maintain the position
which we have in the Persian Gulf. (Cheers.)
Part of the statu* quo is that we have entered
into treaty obligations with the Sheik of Koweib
and it is incumbent upon us to see that these
obligations towards to Sheik o r Koweit in.
maintaining his position are fulfilled. (Hear,
hear.)