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"الملف 73/7 I (D 19) وضع الكويت، سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية في ١٩١١" [و‎‎٥‎٥] (٦٣١/١٢٤)

محتويات السجل: مجلدان (٣٣٤ ورقة). يعود تاريخه إلى ٢٨ يناير ١٩١١-١٩ يناير ١٩١٢. اللغة أو اللغات المستخدمة: الإنجليزية والفرنسية. النسخة الأصلية محفوظة في المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وثائق جُمعت بصفة شخصية. وسجلات من مكتب الهند إدارة الحكومة البريطانية التي كانت الحكومة في الهند ترفع إليها تقاريرها بين عامي ١٨٥٨ و١٩٤٧، حيث خلِفت مجلس إدارة شركة الهند الشرقية. .

نسخ

النسخ مستحدث آليًا ومن المرجّح أن يحتوي على أخطاء.

عرض تخطيط الصفحة

the baghdad railway.
GERMANrS ATTITUi E.
>
Two v?ry important commimicationi defining
the .attitude of the German Government to
wards the Baghdad Railway question appeared
in German newspapers on the 5th March One
of them, which appeared in the official
Nordrlfiutsc/ie Ally-mcine Zcitu»g, and the sub
stance of which has already been given,
pointed out that the construction of the line
as far as Baghdad had already been definitely
settled between the Turkish Government and
the German company which was building the
railway, so that no negotiations between the
Ottoman Empire and any other Power could
possibly deal with this part of the scheme.
Concerning the final section from Baghdad to
the coast of the Persian Gulf the official com
munication emphasised the fact that the con
cession for the construction of this part of the
line had also been granted to the German com
pany, so that certain rights had been granted
to this corporation by formal agreement.
All reports of negotiations between Turkey
and Great Britain were thus obviously beside
the mark because England could not discuss with
Turkey alone the question in which Germany
has certain conceded rights, just as it would be
improper for Germany to^ discuss with England
the matter of a railway which runs exclusively
through Turkish territory. If Great firitaiu
had any wishes in regard to the final section
of the line, the British Government must
formulate them and communicate them both
to Turkey and Germany. So far as Germany
was concerned, said the communication,
England's wishes would be considered in a
friendly spirit.
A ottatiox tn E n or. an t>
This official statement was supplemented by
the following despatch, sent to the J'rnnkfwter
Zeitung by its Berlin correspondent, whom the
Standard'i Berlin correspondent describes as
" one of the chosen mouth pieces of fch? German
Foreign Office":—
*' English newspapers continue to show agita
tion concfruing the question of the Baghdad
Railway-in Germany. Long ago we became
accustomed to treat questions connected with
the Baghdad Railway as a business matter,
while in England they cannot divest the matter
of all the political significance which has been
artiflcally attributed to it. Even the House
of Commons cannot refrain from occupying
itself with the nutter by addressing all sorts
of indiscreet questions to Sir Edward Grey.
^ In all these discussions a large section of
the British Press has been unable to see the
Tights of the question clearly, for .British rule
in India, British supremacy in the Persian
Gulf, and the alleged British Protectorate over
Koweit serve as reasons for advancing claims
on territory which is beyond all doubt the pos
session of Turkey. Above everything the
British Government is urged to demand the
control of the final section of the line from
Baghdad to the coast, and to make friendly
relations with Germany and Turkey conditional
upon the fulfilment of this demand. Unusually
oo ingeous journalists in England talk of the
-workVs peace being endangered in this connec
tion. The question of the Baghdad Railway
would have a far'greater prospect of being
settled satisfactorily for Great Britain and the
other Powers concerned if the EngTish would
cease to confuse claims with rights. It appears,
undeniable that Great Britain claims m alleged
protectorate over Koweit, and to control the
tinal section of the Baghdad line
"It is, however, not what England demands,
but what right, she has to control this section
of the railway that essentially matters Prudent
English newspapers refrain from exphiining on
what rio'hts such a demand is based, and the
1.., i-U ~ 1
t pnoi £i8a souo ifq^q jl sol j
• q put? puno.iS oq} uo rmop scjts A ;: ' T v '! P
-iui oqs eSaaoio soop oqs uaqM. puis
jo *^no opinio 13 o: l s l B • l0l l
jaw ^9^ o 1 } p.m{ sn si qi oq^^jojs 1
■saqsip pu^ so^id Sut/fiiiao ^ua^xsuiuip
oi oju guiMooo am uioaj souix^ A' juoa ; 3-
__i_iiijLiui_miii "o 'virnii f ion Ai
" Reasonable Voices.
" We note with satisfaction that rea.sona.'deb-
voices are already'being raised on this point inn
England, for one English paper recently ex-
plained very clearlv that Turkey can construct
on her own territory whatever railways she
pleases or entrust their construction and man-
ao-ement to whatever companies she may ohoose
for this purpose. The only contracting parties
in the matter of the Baghdad railway are the
Turkish Government and the' Baghdad Lauway
Company, which is under German management.
Neither of these partiss can negotiate with any
third party unless both have settled the points
in dispute between themselves. It is thus clear
that the Turkish Government will nor desire
and will'not be able to negotiate with Great
Britain, nor will the German Government desiie
or be able to enter into with British
financiers until Germany and Turkey are per
fectly agreed on the points in question. 1 hose
impatient politicians in England who have
visions of Germans before the gates of Koweit,
and who, to prevent so terrible a possibility,
desire to goad the British Foreign Office into
pursuing an aggressive policy, would do well
to remember that the German company and the
Turkish Government have the first say in the
matter. „ .,, . , ,,,
<< \\ r e have sufficient faith m the healthy
business instincts of the English to believe that
they will succeed in getting rid of the poetical
prejudices which have hitherto influenced their
treatment of this question, it is possible to
talk business with those Englishmen with
whom it would be tutile to talk politic^. It
the English measure the importance of the
Baghded Railwav question by their own prac
tical interests, they will find reasonable oppon
ents in Germany and Turkey.'
GRAN r n V tzieu's S tatement.
In the course of the debate on the budget in
the Turkish Chamber on the 5th March the
Grand Vizier made.an impertant statement with
regard to the scheme.
Ismail Kemal, the leader of the Democrats,
criticized the system of kilometric guarautees
for railways, and the Baghdad Railway, remind
ing the Ohamber of the offers of the British
and French groups to build certain lines with
out a guarantee, which were rejected by the
ex-Sultan Abdul flam id.
The Grand Vizier pointed out that the
present Government was not responsible
for past concessions, but was detei mined
scrupulously to observe the engagements
contracted. He defended the system of
guarantees, declaring that the Government
had suffered no loss on this head, while cue
receipts from provincial taxation had inc.reased
45 per cent., thanks to improved communica
tions, since the reign of the Sultan Abdul Aziz.
The continuation of the Baghdad line was a
settled matter. Although any increase in the
Customs was pledged, the railway company
had renounced its rights to the recent Customs
surtax of 3 per cent., in order to permit the
application of the money to reforms in Mace
donia. A similar question had arisen to-day in
regard to the 4 per cent, increase in the Cus
toms. However, the Government would
never renounce the prolongation of the line.
It was impossible that it should remain at
VA Helif, the junction of Baghdad and Con
stantinople being a primary nece* si v. With
the completion of the sections t) KI tie!if
there would remain 600 kilometres only as far
as Baghdad, which would cost £;T;!i).>,000
annually—a trifle compared with the results he
would hope and strive ! o attain.
Personally he was irrevocably determined
not to recoil', and was confident of the supporCof
the Chamber. In regard to the sections beyond
Baghdad, an understanding was inevitable
owing to the loyalty and goodwill of the
Government whose only interests were Ottoman
iuterests. When the line reached Baghdad, if
an understanding had not been arrived at, the
Chamber would hare a right to criticize the
Government.
THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY..
GERMANY'S ATTITUDE.
Two T«ry important communications defining
the attitude of the German Government to
wards the Baghdad Railway question appeared
m German newspapers on the 5th March One
*7 iJ 161 "', Wh i, ch a PPeared in the official
v/oraaeutsohe Allgt-meine Zeituvg^ and the sub
stance of which has already been ffiven
pointed out that the construction of the line
as far as Baghdad had already been definitely
settled between the Turkish Government and
the German company which waa building the
railway, so that no negotiations between the
Ottoman fiixipire and any other Power could
possibly deal with this part of the scheme
Concerning the final section from Baghdad to
the coast of the Persian Gulf the official com
munication emphasised the fact that the con
cession for the construction of this part of the
line had also been granted to the German com
pany, so that certain rights had been granted
to. this corporation by formal agreement.
All reports of negotiations between Turkey
and Great Britain were thus obviously beside
the mark because England could not discuss with
Turkey alone the question in which Germany
has certain conceded rights, just as it would be
improper for Germany to: disciiss with England
the matter of a rail way which runs exclusively
through Turkish territory. If Great Britain
had any wishes in regard to the final section
of the line, the British Gorernment must
formulate them and communicate them both
to Turkey and Germany, So far as Germany
was concerned, said the communication,
England's wishes would be considered in a
friendly spirit.
A g TTATIOX ix ENGr .ANT),
This official statement was supplemented by
the following despatch, sent to the hrankfw ter
Zeitung by its Berlin correspondent, whom the
Standard'? Berlin correspondent describes as
" one of the chosen moutli pieces of the German
Foreign Office":—
11 Englislyiewspapers continue to show agita
tion concerning the question of the Baghdad
Railway in Germany. Long ago we became
accustomed to treat questions coimected with
the Baghdad Railway as a business matter,
while in England they cannot direst the matter
of all the political significance which has been
artifically attributed to it. Even the House
of Commons cannot refrain from occupying
itself with the matter by addressing all sorts
of indiscreet questions to Sir Edward Grey,
•' in all these discussions a large section of
the British Press has been unable to see the
rights of the question clearly, for ..ritish rule
in India, British supremacy in the Persian
Gulf, and the alleged British Protectorate over
Koweit serve as reasons for advancing claims
on territox'-y which is beyond all doubt the pos
session of Turkey. Above everything the
British Government is urged to demand the
control of the final section of the line from
Baghdad to the coast, and to make friendly
relations with Germany and Turkey conditional
upon the fulfilment of this demand". Unusually
co ir igeous journalists in England talk of the
-world's peace being endangered in this connec
tion The question of the Baghdad Railway
would have a far'greater prospect of being
settled satisfactorily for Great Britain and the
Other Powers concerned if the English would
cease to confuse claims with rights. It appears,
undeniable that Great Britain claims an alleged
protectorate over Koweit, and to control the
final section of the Baghdad line
" It is, however, not what England demands,
but what right she has to control this section
of the railway that essentially matters. Prudent
English newspapers refrain from explaining on
what rights such a demand is "based, and the
reasons given by the less prudent section of the
British Press cannot possible be taken seriously.
No one will desire to prevent Great Britain |
from assuring her rule over India, but if British
interests in India are to servo as claims on
railways and ports in Mesopotamia, then Eng
land might, with equal justice, claim supremacy
over South Italy, for the distance of Koweit
frum the nearest point of the Indian frontier
is almost exactly as far as Portsmouth is
from Naples. Concerning the British .claim
to the protectorate of Koweit. the Turks
are known to take a different view from that
of the English, and we have no reason to regard
the Turkish attitude towards this matter as
less justified than the British attitude, _ But,
apart from Koweit even a protectorate in one
form or another over this port would not justi
fy the putting forward of any claim whatever
by Great Britain to control the final section of
the Baghdad Railway,for with equal right the
possession of Gibraltar might be made the basis
,,of a claim to control the eptire, railway
system of Spain.
~ ^ , • / (5*5
" R easonabt.e V oices. .u
" We note with satisfaction fhat r'easonameCj
voices are already 'being raised on this point in'^
England, for one English paper recently ex
plained very clearly that Turkey can construct
on her own territory whatever railways she
pleases or entrust their construction and man
agement to whatever companies she may choose
for this purpose, The ©nly contracting parties
in the matter of the Baghdad railway are the
Turkish Government and the' Baghdad Railway
Company, which is under German management.
Neither of these partiss can negotiate with any
third party unless both have settled the points
in dispute between themselves. It is thus clear
that the Turkish Government will noc desire
and will 'not be able to negotiate with Great
Britain, nor will the German Government desire
or be able ; to enter into pourparlers with British
financiers until Germany and Turkey are per-
iectly agreed on the points in question. Those
-impatient politicians in England who have
visions of Germans before the gates of Koweit,
and who, to prevent so terrible a possibility,
desire to goad the British Foreign Office into
pursuing an aggressive policy, would do well
to remember that the German company and the
Turkish Government have the first say in the
matter.
" We have sufficient faith in the healthy
business instincts of the English to believe that
they will succeed in getting rid of the political
prejudices which have hitherto influenced their
treatment of this question. It is possible to
talk business with those Englishmen with
whom it would be futile to talk politics. If
the Ensrlish measure the importance of the
Baghded Railway question by their own prac
tical interests, thoy will find reasonable oppon
ents in Germany and Turkey."
G kanu V izieii's S tatement.
In the course of the debate on the budget in
the Turkish Chamber on the 5th March the
Grand Vizier made.an impevtant statement with
regard to the scheme,
Ismail Kemal, the leader of the Democrats,
criticized the system of kilometric guarantees
for railways, and the Baghdad Railway, remind
ing the Chamber of the offers of the British
and French groups to build certain lines with
out a guarantee, which were rejected by the
ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid,
The Grand Vizier pointed out that the
present Government was not responsible
for past concessions, but was determined
scrupulously to observe the eiagagements
contracted. lie defended the system of
guarantees, declaring that the Government
had suffered no loss on this head, while the
receipts from provincial taxation had increased
45 per c^nt., thanks to improved communica
tions, since the reign of the Sultan Abdul Aziz.
The continuation "of the Baghdad line was a
settled matter. Although any increase in the
Customs was pledged, the railway company
had renounced its rights to the recent Customs
surtax of 3 per cent., in order to permit the
application of the money to reforms in Mace
donia. A similar question had arisen to-day in
regard to the 4 per cent, increase in the Cus
toms. However, the Government would
never renounce the prolongation of the lino.
It was impossible that it should remain at
El Ilelif, the junction of Baghdad and Con
stantinople being a primary nece 1 ei y. With
the completion of the sections t; El Ilelif
there would remain 600 kilometres only as far
as Baghdad, which would cost £ r L>Or),000
annually—a trifle compared with the-results he
would hope and strive ! o attain.
Personally he was irrevocably determined
not to recoil, and was confident of the support^of
the Chamber, in regard to the sections beyond
Baghdad, an understanding was inevitable
owing to the loyalty and goodwill of, the
Government whose only interests were Ottoman
interests. When the line reached Baghdad, if
an understanding had not been arrived at, the
Chamber would have a right to criticize the
Government.

حول هذه المادة

المحتوى

يحتوي المُجلَّد على مراسلات ومذكرات وقصاصات صحفية تتعلق بخط سكة الحديد المقترح من بغداد إلى البصرة، وهو تمديد لخط سكك حديد برلين في ألمانيا إلى بغداد. الكثير من هذه المراسلات أرسلتها إدارة الخارجية بالحكومة في الهند إلى المقيمية، وهي متبادلة بين إدوارد جراي وزير الدولة للشؤون الخارجية، فرانسيس بيرتي السفير البريطاني في فرنسا، لويس ماليت مساعد وكيل وزارة الدولة لشؤون الشرق الأدنى والأوسط، تشارلز مارلينج السفير البريطاني في روسيا، آرثر نيكلسون الوكيل الدائم لوزارة الشؤون الخارجية، هنري بابينجتون سميث رئيس بنك تركيا الوطني، جيرارد لوثر السفير البريطاني في القسطنطينية، رفعت باشا لقب عثماني كان يُستخدم عقب أسماء بعض حكام الأقاليم وكبار المسؤولين المدنيين والقادة العسكريين. وزير الشؤون الخارجية التركي، إدجار شباير ممول السكة الحديدية، جورج بوكانان السفير البريطاني في روسيا، إدوارد جوشن السفير البريطاني في برلين، هنري كومبرباتش القنصل البريطاني العام في تركيا، جورج باركلي الوزير البريطاني في بلاد فارس، مجلس التجارة، وويليام جراهام جرين، السكرتير الدائم لمجلس الأميرالية. كما توجد مراسلات متبادلة بين بيرسي كوكس المقيم السياسي الممثل الرئيسي للمقيمية البريطانية في الخليج وهي الذراع الرسمي للامبراطورية البريطانية من ١٧٦٣ إلى ١٩٧١ في بوشهر ،اللواء البحري إدموند سليد،وستيوارت نوكس الوكيل السياسي مبعوث مدني رسمي من الامبراطورية البريطانية في البحرين، ويليام شكسبير الوكيل السياسي مبعوث مدني رسمي من الامبراطورية البريطانية في الكويت.

يغطي المجلد النقاشات التي سبقت المفاوضات الرسمية بين بريطانيا والأتراك العثمانيين حول سكة حديد بغداد والمد المقترح لها إلى الخليج العربي. تتضمن القضايا والموضوعات ما يلي:

  • المسار المقترح للسكة الحديدة؛
  • السيطرة على الجزء ما بين بغداد والبصرة وامتلاكه؛
  • موقع المحطة ومن الذي سيتحكم بها، وكذلك تقرير سليد (صص. ٦٤-٧٤) حول مدى ملاءمة البصرة؛
  • الزيادة المقترحة للتعرفة الجمركية في المنطقة؛
  • الري من نهري دجلة والفرات؛
  • عقد نقل مواد السكة الحديدية بوسائل النقل النهرية؛
  • وضع الكويت خاصة فيما يتعلق بالسيادة والنفوذ التركي والبريطاني.

على امتداد كامل المجلد، توجد قصاصات من الصحف الدورية الإنجليزية تتعلق بسكة حديد بغداد والمفاوضات حول هذا الشأن.

الورقة ٤٧ عبارة عن خريطة مبدئية تقريبية لشبه جزيرة رأس تنورة. الورقة ٢٣٠ هي خريطة مطوية للخارج للمسار المقترح للسكة الحديدية والري باستخدام النهرين؛

الشكل والحيّز
مجلدان (٣٣٤ ورقة)
الترتيب

المجلد مرتب ترتيبًا زمنيًا. يوجد فهرس٢ بالموضوعات في البداية (الورقة ١ج). وهو غير مرتب ترتيباً معيناً، ولكنه منظم تحت بضعة عناوين شاملة. تشير الأرقام إلى أرقام الأوراق في التسلسل الثانوي السابق.

الخصائص المادية

ترقيم الأوراق: يتكون الملف من مجلدين (الجزئين الأول والثاني)، ويمتد ترقيم الأوراق عبر كلا الجزئين. يبدأ تسلسل ترقيم الأوراق الرئيسي بصفحة العنوان في الجزء الأول وينتهي على الورقة الخامسة من آخر الجزء الثاني؛ وهذه الأرقام مكتوبة بالقلم الرصاص ومحاطة بدائرة وتوجد غالبًا في أعلى يمين صفحة الوجه الجانب الأمامي للورقة أو لفرخٍ من الورق. كثيرًا ما يشار إليه اختصارًا بالحرف "و". من كل ورقة. يوجد تسلسل ترقيم ثانٍ على الصفحات ٨-٢٩١أ؛ وهذه الأرقام مكتوبة أيضًا بالقلم الرصاص في نفس مكان التسلسل الرئيسي، ولكن غير محاطة بدائرة. توجد الاستثناءات التالية بالترقيم: ٧، ٧أ؛ ١٣، ١٣أ؛ ١٥، ١٥أ؛ ١٦، ١٦أ، ١٦ب؛ ١٧، ١٧أ؛ ١٨، ١٨أ، ١٨ب؛ ٢٠، ٢٠أ، ٢٠ب؛ ٢١، ٢١أ، ٢١ب؛ ٥٢، ٥٢أ، ٥٢ب، ٥٢ج؛ ٥٣، ٥٣أ، ٥٣ب، ٥٣ج؛ ٥٤، ٥٤أ، ٥٤ب، ٥٤ج؛ ٥٥، ٥٥أ، ٥٥ب؛ ٥٦، ٥٦أ، ٥٦ب؛ ٥٧، ٥٧أ؛ ٢٩٠، ٢٩٠أ.

لغة الكتابة
الإنجليزية والفرنسية بالأحرف اللاتينية
للاطّلاع على المعلومات الكاملة لهذا السجل

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إعادة نشر هذه المادة
اقتباس هذه المادة في أبحاثك

"الملف 73/7 I (D 19) وضع الكويت، سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية في ١٩١١" [و‎‎٥‎٥] (٦٣١/١٢٤)و المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهندو IOR/R/15/1/610و مكتبة قطر الرقمية <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100023839674.0x000076> [تم الوصول إليها في ٢٦ نونبر ٢٠٢٤]

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يمكنك نسخ ولصق الفقرة التالية لتضمين الصورة في صفحة الويب الخاصة بك.

<meta charset="utf-8"><a href="https://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100023839674.0x000076">"الملف 73/7 I (D 19) وضع الكويت، سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية في ١٩١١" [<span dir="ltr">و‎‎٥‎٥</span>] (٦٣١/١٢٤)</a>
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تفاصيل الإطار الدولي لقابلية تشغيل وتبادل الصور

هذا التسجيل IIIF له ملف ظاهر متوفر كما يلي. إذا كان لديك عارض متوافق للصور يمكنك سحب الأيقونة لتحميله.https://www.qdl.qa/العربية/iiif/81055/vdc_100000000193.0x000247/manifestافتح في المتصفح العامافتح في عارض IIIF ميرادورطرق إضافية لاستخدام صور الأرشيف الرقمي

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