"الملف 73/7 I (D 19) وضع الكويت، سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية في ١٩١١" [و‎‎٥‎٢] (٦٣١/١١٨)

I nyC'
(^
■
I '# . '
^ i
( ^
1 ..r /4
, ii^
7 1*
T he B aghdad R ailway. ?S,^ r .
With reference to the Baghdad Railway, in
recent years the circumstances have changed,
and the entire political perspective is now
dilferent. Some years ago Germany entered on
that policy ot railway construction in Asia
Minor which gradually resulted in every rail
way in these portions of the Turkish Eupire,
except one, passing into her hands. The present
posit on dates from 190(5, when a convt'ntion
was concluded between the Turkish Govern
ment and the Anatolian Railway for an exten-
sioti of the line from Konieh, in the heart of
Asia Minor, to Baghdad and Basrah and a port
on the Persian Gulf.
It is quite clear that the Unionist Govern
ment in 1903 took up no hostile attitude to
wards the railway. They did not object to
the construction of the line under certain con
ditions, and it was only when those conditions
were not satisfied that His Majesty's Govern
ment receded, I believe with much regret, from
the negotiations into which they had entered.
Whether this was a fortunate or an unfortunate
decision it is not necessary to discuss. In the
circumstances it was inevitable, and, so far as
I know, it was ratified, rot merely by public
opinion, but by all who were competent to
decide on both political sides.
What is the present position? As regards rail
way construction, the progress during the past
few years has not been great. The line has been
carried to a point where it has halted for six
years. Money has been found, I believe, for tke
extension. The most difficult section of railway
now lies before its promoters. There is talk of
reviving negotiations. During the last day or two
1 have seen a great deal in newspapers about
fresh transactions which are alleged to have
taken place in Constantinople, and under which
the Baghdad railway is alleged to have surren
dered its concession for the Gulf section under
certain conditions in [return for the grant of a
line from Osmanieh to the well-known port
of Alexandretta. if this agreement is conclud -
ed it 'would be a "great ad van tape to {T Te
German coTTi^ali\~ wTTTcTTwould gain access
to the most important port on the Mediter
ranean, and, so far as I can see, the whole
tr.i do of Mesopotamia, which has a west -
w ard trend, must ttnet its outlet in that port.
Wnat more immediately concerns us if these
statements be true, is that the price alleged
to be paid for this very notable concession is the
surrender of the rights of the company at the
Gulf end of the former line, and if that be
so the position would be very much easier
should it be the desire of His Majesty's Govern
ment to enter into discussions either with the
Turkish Government or with anyone else upon
that branch of the subject.
B uitish I nterests.
What are the British] interests in the Bagh
dad Railway ? They are two-fold. In the first
place, they are commercial and economic on
every section of the railway from sea to sea,
from the Mediterranean to the Gulf. Secondly
they are political, strategic, and Imperial upon
those sections of the railway in the neighbour
hood of the Gulf. Over almost all the area
covered by the Baghdad railway, British trade
is predominant. We have to see, therefore,
that in these arrangements our trade should
not be subject to any differential treatment
in the future. Sir Edward Grey said the
other day that the orignal convention contained
satisfactory assurances on this point. I am
not quite clear as to that myself. A mere
clause in the statutes of the company prohibl t-
imy (l inerentia'l rate s h'mv pf Ijttlp. hv
itself . "Jt woulcl be comparatively easy to
THme a tariff favouring categories of goods
coming mainly from Germany as opposed to
goods coming mainly from Great Britain or
India. Therefore, I am a bit suspicious, and I
hope His Majesty's Government will be alive to
this aspect of the case, and that consent for
money required will not be given unless they
are assured that our commercial interests will
be protected over the whole of the area from
hostile and differential treatment.
There is one branch of the projected railway
about which I am not altogether happy, and
that is a branch just north of Baghdad to
Khanikhan. British trade going up the Gulf
in ships is sent to Baghdad in boats, and then
by mules over the mountains into Persia. That
British trade amounts to £1,000,000 a year.
The whole of the trade of the other countries
of|Europe on that route is not one tenth of the
sum. What is to happen to that trade in the
future ? U p to Baghdad it will hold its own ,
I think. Wliat will happen on tlie middle
section between Baghdad and Khanikhan I am
not quite certain, but I have a very shrewd sus
picion that wh en the Russian railway is built
f rom Teheran to the frontier the w hole o f
f.TT^ tra.fip. of INorthern ana uentr al Perl iarin
so far" as it'now 1 down Ho'the southern
coast by the customary caravajj route,
will be ^ diverted to this new line, and if
that be so the prospect for British trade
isone which we cannot help regarding 7 with
some alarm. I hope the Government will keep
an open eye on this branch of the que&tioii,
and will leave no opportunity of secpriiig-fair
treatment which theenoimous p yej^ naterance
of our commerce on the route entitles us to
demand. Sir E. Grey said that if we wanted to
combat this route with advantage British trade
ought to make other routes, though he did not
specify what they should be, and he rather
blamed Mr. Balfour for not suggesting any
alternatives. It is not for the Opposition to
make suggestions in these cases. The respon
sibility lies with His Majesty's Government,
and it is for them to put pressure where it is
likely to be successful. I should like to know
whether Sir E. Grey's statement was merely a
platonic enunciation of general principles,
or whether it pointed to any definite plan in
t he mind o f His kajesty 7 s Government ?
Some years ago there was given to His Majes
ty's Government an autograph promise from
the then Shah of Persia that any Russian rail
way concession in the North of Persia should
be balanced by a corresponding British railway
in the South. That promise has been quoted
more than once. If it is true that a Russian
railroad is about to be commenced in the North,
the time is drawing near for the possible ful
filment of this pledge to us. (Hear, hear.) Our
interests in the Baghdad railway are political
and strategical. These considerations start
into being the moment we leave Baghdad.
It is a mistake to suppose that our inter
ests are confined to the Gulf. They extend
over the whole region from the Persian
Gulf to Baghdad. (Hear, hear.) The naviga
tion of the Tigris right up to that city has
been in the hands of a British company for
scores of years, who, though crulley hampered
in recent years, have managed to hold their
own. We have treaties with Arab chieftains
all along the banks of the river. Nearly 90 per
cent of the trade going to Baghdad is British or
Indian. Many Indian subjects visit and live at
the Holy Shrines. Thesef facts entitle us to a
predominant iniluence in any questions which
may arise with reference to that end of the
Baghdad rail way. (Hear, hear )
No R ivals in the G o.ls'.
The Persian Gulf is part of the maritime
frontier of India. With its politic?
involved the peace and integrity of the
Indian Empire. It is a fundamental prin
ciple that we cannot allow any rivals in the
Gulf. (Hear, hear.) The assertion of this
principle is not, and need not be, antagonistic
to any other power in that part of the world.
I imagine that it will be frankly accepted by
Germany. Whether we enter into negotiations
with that Power, or as seems more likely, with
Turkey, respecting the railway, I venture to
say there is nothing in our claims which is
likely to prevent a successful issue of those
negotiations. Quite frankly , if I wer e to spea k
as an Englishman alone, i should n ot b e verj
a nxious to see T rie ua ghdad Railway carried
_ down to the Gult. it would produce elements
* of change and novelty, and possibly of danger,
I am not clear that it would benefit our
trade. It might conceivably injure it. I have
never co nvinced myself that it-- is _dcsirable
fp "^ c o nlmue ' builcf^ [Tie rai Tway beyon u
Baghdad . ahd ^cerFalnly not beyond Basra^h .
IHoubF' whether a line from lias'rah to the
Gulf would ever pay the interest on the capital
expended. But if the Turkish Governmen t
are resolved to build the railway so far as iris
within Turkish territory, His Majesty's Govern
ment are bound to enter into discussion -with
Turkey. As Sir E. Grey said, we possess certain
advantages in the discussion withTurkej-
It is only, however, by international co-oper
ation that the requisite security for the invest
ment could be obtained. I doubt very much
whether the Baghdad section can be financed by
any Power alone if remunerative profits are to
be secured. There are also great schemes afloat
for the reclamation and irrigation ot Chaldea
and Mesopotamia. Everyone would like to see
those projects translated into fact, but those
who have travelled there are inclined to wonder
where, if those works are executed, the popula
tion is to come from in order to till the reclaim
ed ground and to revive the ancient glories
of the past. There is a very '.long furrow to be
hoed before the end is in sight, and without
British sunoort T think it is more than doubtful
|0i4 -ranpe iCaupuooos .xoqio qous SuipiAoad jo j
j[b8 H^l suav ob'iad.iaijuo s^Aud ocj put' 'o:
>{.kuv o^ sjooqos aaq^fo aoj apliu'exa uu sb gui.
•'looqos ppotu 13 ^ou^sip A jqaq ui qsjiqi^is
si?a \. iuyiuu .ioao£) jo Xoijod ^uosojci oqj, -jj
apiAoad 0} o^aopuu ;ou ppioo ^uemu.w
oq4 qoii [a\. uoi'j'Bonpa X'a'epuopos apiAoad o^ a
eqq'Bua o^ aepao ui A'jpuaqq 9.10m saoi^nji
A!ai3UH.id S Jipre jo uoLjssab aq^ s ' bav eaoqit uai]
•ssaxSoad aijui
if.ioA oaios 0 jjuhi o; atoq^ qqima 0; saoqoiee
A* T d i1 i I fc' IT 11 T 111 Tliim nn nir'-Um r. .n ii.
OJ
aq
ed
dXl
IX
ua.
ievel wicli ircrtlighCs Of U HtjnUli Hna.gTiiallonTI
/
yf]<
vs
A
iV l
T he B aghdad K ail way.
With reference to the Baghdad Railway, in
recent ye^rs the circumstances have chano-ed
and the entire political perspective is now
ailterent. Some years ago Germany entered on
that policy of railway construction in Asia
Minor which gradually resulted in every rail
way in these portions of the Turkish Eupire
except one, passing into her hands. The present
position dates from 1903, when a convention
was concluded between the Turkish Govern
ment and the Anatolian Railway for an exten-
sio-n ot the line from Konieh, in the heart of
Asia Minor, to Baghdad and Basrah and a port
on the Persian Gulf. p
It is quite clear that the Unionist Govern
ment in 1903 took up no hostile attitude to
wards the railway. They did not object to
the construction of the line under certain con
ditions, and it was only when those conditions
were not satisfied that His Majesty's Govern
ment receded, I believe with much regret, from
the negotiations into which they had entered
Whether this was a fortunate or an unfortunate'
decision it is not necessary to discuss. In the
circumstances it was inevitable, and, so far as
I know, it was ratified, rot merely by public
opinion, but by all who were competent to
decide on both political sides.
What is the present position? As regards rail
way construction, the progress during the past
few years has not been great. The line has been
earned to a point where it has halted for six
years. Money has been found, I believe, for tke
extension. The most difficult section of railway
now lies before its promoters. There is talk of
reviving negotiations. During the last day or two
1 have seen a great deal in newspapers about
fresh transactions which are alleged to have
taken place in Constantinople, and under which
the Baghdad railway is alleged to have surren
dered its concession for the Gulf section under
certain conditions in |return for the grant of a
line from Osmanieh to the well-known port
of Alexandretta. If this agreement is conclud
ed it ?would be a great a d van taye to tl: e
German com^ahy^ wHlcTT^vvould gain access
to the most important port on the Mediter
ranean, and, so far as I can see, the whole
tra de of Mesopotamia, which has a west
w ard trend, musi; Hnd its outlet In that port.
Wnat more immediately concerns us if thes®
statements be true, is that the price alleged
to be paid for this very notable concession is the
surrender of the rights of the company at the
Gulf end of the former line, and if that be
so the position would be very much easier
should it be the desire of His Majesty's Govern-
mient to enter into discussions either with the
Turkish Government or with anyone else upon
that branch of the subject.
B ritish I nterests.
What are. the British] interests in the Bagh
dad Railway ? They are two-fold. In the first
place, they are commercial and^ economic on
every section of the railway from sea to sea,
from the Mediterranean to the Gulf. Secondly
they are political, strategic, and Imperial upon
those sections of the railway in the neighbour
hood of the Gulf. Over almost all the area
covered by the Baghdad railway, Bfitish trade
is predominant. We have to see, therefore,
that in these arrangements our trade should
not be subject to any differential treatment
in the future. Sir Edward Grey said the
other day that the orignal convention contained
satisfactory assurances on this point. I am
not quite clear as to that myself. A mere
clause in the statutes of the company prohibi t
ing diirerential rkt es fnav he nf littlp ngp hv
itserf. Ut would be comparatively easy to
TfaSea tariff favouring categories of goods
coming mainly from Germany as opposed to
goods coming mainly from Great Britain or
India. Therefore, I am a bit suspicious, and I
hope His Majesty's Government will be alive to
this aspect of the case, and that consent for
money required will not be given unless they
are assured that our commercial interests will
be protected over the whole of the area from
hostile and differential treatment.
There is one branch of the projected railway
about which I am not altogether happy, and
that is a branch just north of Baghdad to
Khanikhan. British trade going up the Gulf
in ships is sent to Baghdad in boats, and then
by mules over the mountains into Persia. That
British trade amounts to £1,000,000 a year.
The whole of the trade of the other countries
ofjEurope on that route is not one tenth of the
sum. What is to happen to that trade in the
future ? Up to Baghdad it will hold its own ,
I think. What will happen on tne middle
section between Baghdad and Khanikhan I am
not quite certain, but I have a very shrewd sus
picion that wh en the Russian railway is built
from Teheran to the frontier the Vnole o t
tlie "trade of Northern and uentral_reraia» in
so i'ar as it" now gOM down CoThe gouthern
coast by the customary carava^ route,
will be diverted to this new line, and if
that be so the prospect for British" tra^e
is one which we cannot help regardiAa/" ^Jtlii
some alarm. I hope the Government mqK fceei/
an open eye on this branch of the Waatieii,
and will leave no opportunity of secpilig^air
treatment which the enoimous p^eoonSferance
of our commerce on the route entttl^/ us to
demand. Sir E. Grey said that if we wanted to
combat this route with advantage British trade
ought to make other routes, though he did not
specify what they should be, and he rather
blamed Mr. Balfour for not suggesting any
alternatives. It is not for the Opposition to
make suggestions in these cases. The respon
sibility lies with His Majesty's Government,
and it is for them to put pressure where it is
likely to be successful. I should like to know
whether Sir E. Grey's statement was merely a
platonic enunciation of general principles,
or whether it pointed to any definite plan in
t he mind o f His Majesty's Government ?
Some years ago there was given to His Majes
ty's Government an autograph promise from
the then Shah of Persia that any Russian rail
way concession in the North of Persia should
be balanced by a corresponding British railway
in the South. That promise has been quoted
more than once. If it is true that a Russian
railroad is about to be commenced in the North,
the time is drawing near for the possible ful
filment of this pledge to us. (Hear, hear.) Our
interests in the Baghdad railway are political
and strategical. These considerations start
into being the moment we leave Baghdad.
It is a mistake to suppose that our inter
ests' are confined to the Gulf. They extend
over the whole region from the Persian
Gulf to Baghdad. (Hear, hear.) The naviga
tion of the Tigris right up to that city has
been in the hands of a British company for
scores of years, who, though crulley hampered
in recent years, have managed to hold their
own. We have treaties with Arab chieftains
all along the banks of the river. Nearly 90 per
cent of the trade going to Baghdad is British or
Indian. Many Indian subjects visit' and live at
the Holy Shrines. These| facts entitle us to a
predominant influence in any questions which
may arise with reference to that end ofJthe
Baghdad railway. (Hear, hear.)
No R ivals in the G cdf- ■sic
The Persian Gulf is part of the maritime
frontier of India. With its politics are
involved the peace and integrity of the
Indian Empire. It is a fundamental prin
ciple that we iiannot allow any rivals in the
Gulf. (Hear, hear.) The assertion of this
principle is not, and need not be, antagonistic
to any other power in that part of the world.
I imagine that it will be frankly accepted by
Germany. Whether we enter into negotiations
with that Power, or as seems more likely, with
Turkey, respecting the railway, I venture to
say there is nothing in our claims which is
likely to prevent a successful issue of those
negotiations. Quite frankly , if I were to spea k
as an Englishman alone, I should not be very
a nxious to see tne iia gmiacl Railway carried
do wn to t he Gutt. it would produce elenients
of change and novelty, and possibly of danger.
I am not clear that it would benefit our
trade. It might conceivably injure it. 1 have
never convinced myself that it-is _desirabl e-
Baghdad , and certainly " not" beyond Basrah .
I'doubt' whetlier a line from Basrah to the-
Gulf would ever pay the interest on the capital
expended. But if the Turkish Governmen t
are resolved to build the railway so far as if is
within Turkish territory, His Majesty's Govern
ment are bound to enter into discussion'with
Turkey. As Sir E. Grey said, we possess certain
advantages in the discussion with Turkey.
It is only, however, by international co-oper
ation that the requisite security for the invest
ment could be obtained. I doubt very much
whether the Baghdad section can be financed by
any Power alone if remunerative profits are to
be secured. There, are also great schemes afloat
for the reclamation and irrigation of Chaldea
and Mesopotamia. Everyone would like to see
those projects translated into fact, but those
who have travelled there are inclined to wonder
where, if these works are executed, the popula
tion is to come from in order to till the reclaim
ed ground and to revive the ancient glories
of the past. There is a very Jlong furrow to be
hoed before the end is in sight, and without
British support I think it is more than doubtful
whether any of these schemes will reach frui
tion. Whatever method of constructing may
be favoured in the railway, I hope His Majesty's
Government will see that the predominance of-
British interests is maintained, and that no
thing is done to impair or whittle away Bri
tish rights. (Opposition cheers.) I shall be
glad to know whether the Government
have information to communicate on the sub
ject of the alleged agreement between Russia
and Germany, entered into, if not concluded , at
Potsdam, in November last. Several versions
of it have appeared in the newspapers. lam
quite prepared to believe that they are ail in
correct; but certain authoritative statenents
have been made by the German Chancellor at
Berlin and the Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs at St. Petersburg. From these utter
ances there is justification for the belief that
when the German railway from Baghdad
reaches the frontier of Persia the Russians are
prepared to build a line from Teheran to taeet
it.