"الملف 73/7 II (D 22) وضع الكويت - سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية" [و‎‎١‎٧‎٥] (٥٤٠/٣٥٥)

• • • • (\T
renounce their claims to Bahrein on conditions which there should be no difficulty in V ^
accepting, but they have learnt with disappointment the attitude of the Imperial
Ottoman Government in regard to El Katr and Koweit; nevertheless they do not
doubt that the Ottoman Government will appreciate the important sacritice made by
His Majesty's Government in the matter of British participation in the Bagdad Railway,
^ and that they will meet that sacrifice by a corresponding modification of the views set
forth in the Turkish memorandum of the 15th April.
8. His Majesty's Government must in the first instance protest against the con
tention that there is a misunderstanding with regard to the assurance given, and
repeatedly given, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, to the efiect that
Turkey did not entertain any intention of obtaining the supremacy over Bahrein,
Muscat, or the independent tribes on the coast of the Persian Gulf.
9. The original despatches, duly signed and dated, in which these assurances
were reported, have been carefully preserved in the archives of the Foreign Office, and
they can readily be produced for the inspection of the Turkish Embassy.
10. His Majesty's Government maintain that prior to Midhat Pashas expedition
there were on the Arabian coast no symbols of Turkish authority, no Turkish jurisdiction
or occupation, effective or ineffective. And while they are now prepared to recognise Annex 4.
Turkish sovereignty between the southernmost limits of Koweit (as hereinafter defined)
and Ojeir, they are unable to admit that any of the arguments adduced in the Turkish
memorandum in any way invalidates the statement that south of Ojeir, in the district
of El Katif, there is no trace of Turkish power ever having been paramount; and they
are fully persuaded that El Katr has never been locally regarded as forming part of,
or indeed as being subject to the influence of, the Ottoman Empire.
For themselves, relying no less on the obvious facts than on the Turkish assurances
mentioned above, they have never so regarded it, and they have repeatedly informed
the Sublime Porte accordingly.
11. His Majesty's Government can only reiterate their opinion that any lasting
settlement between the two Powers must provide for the definite renunciation by
the Ottoman Empire of the whole of the peninsula ot El Katr, including El Bidaa.
They have consistently opposed any consolidation of Turkish authority, which first
attempted to assert itself so recently as 1870, and they are bound-to continue that
opposition. _ . . ,
12. The Turkish memorandum of the 15th April does not afford His Majesty s
Government all the information which they consider essential to a due appreciation
of the attitude of the Turkish Government respecting Koweit. His Majesty's
Government are concerned to ensure the continuance of the local government of the
Sheikh of Koweit, as defined in their memorandum of the 29th July, 1911, which
incontestably forms part of the status quo. Further, His Majesty's Government would
be fully prepared to recognise Turkish suzerainty over Koweit and indeed to recognise
the Sheikh as a Turkish kaimakam, but they attach cardinal importance to the islands
of Warba and Bubiyan being admitted by Turkey to be within the confines of Koweit, Memo-
to the withdrawal of the Turkish military post from Bubiyan, and to a recognition ^dum ^
of the limits of Koweit injaccordance with the indications contained in the accompanying ^
memorandum. . j ,
13. His Majesty's Government regret that they would consider the introduction ot
divided responsibility for maritime police measures altdgether incompatible with the
principles and successful accomplishment of their pc'.icy in the Persian Gulf. This
policy" consists in the maintenance of the maritime peace, and has been successfully
pursued, to the advantage of all concerned, for a century. To modify the system in
these circumstances would be alike unnecessary and unjustifiable.
14. Indeed His Majesty's Government would go further. They consider that they
have acquired by prescription not merely the right but the duty to maintain peace
in the Persian Gulf; they have always been opposed to any proposal to trench upon
their prerogative ; and it was this attitude which led to the declaration made by the
Marquess of Lansdowne in the House of Lords on the 5th May, 1903, that " His
Majesty's Government would regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified
port, in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to ^British interests,
and they should certainly resist it with all the means at their disposal."
His Majesty's Government must therefore ask the Turkish Government to recognise
in the Persian Gulf the right of Great Britain—(a.) To control surveying, lighting,
buoying, and pilotage; (b.) To police its waters; and (c.) To conduct all quarantine
arrangemer fi na j p r0 posals for the acceptance of the Turkish Govern-
0