"الملف 73/7 II (D 22) وضع الكويت - سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية" [و‎‎١‎١‎٨] (٥٤٠/٢٤١)

65
and, on the 16th July, his Excellency telegraphed that the proposals " seem satis
factory on the whole and a great advance on those made hitherto/ , and, in parti
cular, he stated that the proposed distribution of capital in the Baghdad-Basrah
section of the railway might on certain conditions be accepted; copies of these
telegrams were communicated by the Marquess of Crewe to Sir E. Grey, and it was
intimated at the same time that the India Office would furnish an expression of opi
nion ; a letter dated the 18th July, 1911, was hereupon written by Sir A, Hirtzel, in
which he stated I understand that Lord Crewe has spoken to Sir E. Grey about
this, and my instructions are to send you the enclosed copy of the Foreign Office
memorandum with his Lordship's suggested alterations shown in manuscript,"
all the suggested alterations were incorporated in this document, which was the,,
draft of the proposed reply to the Turkish Ambassador, in so far as it related to the
Baghdad railway, and it was not until that reply had been submitted to Lord
Crewe and initialled by his Lordship that it was dispatched. Such being the
sequence of events. Sir E. Grey learnt with regret, nine months after the reply has
been despatched and its substance communicated to the French, Bussian, and
Oerman Governments—an interval during which no intimation of his Lordship's
change of attitude has reached Sir E. Grey.—that Lord Crewe has so far modified
his attitude as to regard the distribution of capital proposed as " wholly unaccept
able and even dangerous/ ,
Sir E. Grey is unaware of the reasons which have led Lord Crewe to modify his
views to so serious an extent as is implied by his letter under reply : but he must
point out the very grave objections which exist to withdrawing the offer formally
made to the Ottoman Government, after such long and serious consideration, after
the lapse of so many months, and at a moment when the Turkish Ambassador has
been instructed to discuss the proposals in the most friendly and accommodating
spirit. His Majesty's Government are, in Sir E. Grey's cpinion, in honour com
mitted to those proposals, and they must at any rate await their definite rejection
before recommencing negotiations on a totally different basis, -—negotiations which,
it must be remembered, failed on a previous occasion. The reply of the Turkish
Ambassador is by no means of a character to warrant so subversive a departure
from the rules of diplomatic procedure as a refusal to continue the negotiations
would imply, for to demand a participation of 50 per cent, or 60 per cent, at this
late stage of the proceedings would be tantamount to open rupture, and would
cause great disappointment and apprehension at Constantinople. Moreover, pre
liminary negotiations with France, Russia, and Germany would be necessary,
unless indeed Germany consented at once to forego any share at all in • the
Bagdhad-Basrah sections, which, in Sir E, Grey's opinion, it woujd be as
unreasonable to ask as it would be difficult to obtain.
Assuming that France and Russia were asked to renounce their shares and
were excluded, a long and difficult negotiation with Germany would ensue, and a
heavy price would have to be paid for her renunciation of a share equal to that of
any other foreign Power ; and assuming further that a successful issue were reached,
Sir E. Grey apprehends that it is not probable that the resumption of negotiations
with the Ottoman Government would be facilitated, as they would deeply resent the
discontinuance of the present discussion, and the initiation of negotiations betwen
two Powers, England and Germany, one of whom has largely renounced her
claims in return for a substantial quid fro quo, the other Of whom does not possess
jany legal claim at all in those regions.
The Ottoman Government, through the Turkish Ambassador in London,
have requested that no negotiations or discussion in connection with the Baghdad
railway should be conducted with the German Government, and His Highness was
assured that no such procedure was contemplated.
It was in consequence of the inability of His Majesty's Government to obtain
a 50 per cent, participation for British interests that the proposals now before the
Ottoman Government were made ; and Sir E. Grey thinks that one of the reasons
then advanced for being satisfied with'a smaller participation has been overlooked
in your letter under reply. If it be granted that His Majesty's Government can only
protect British and Indian trade against adverse treatment by securing a partici*
pation of 50 per cent., how are they then to avoid such adverse treatment on other