"الملف 73/7 II (D 22) وضع الكويت - سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية" [و‎‎١‎١‎٧] (٥٤٠/٢٣٩)

inter-departmental conference is necessary, the Marquess of Crewe will depute a
representative of this Office to attend it. But, personally, he considers it suffi
ciently established, that, regard being had to the magnitude of British interests
involved, this country cannot with dignity, or, indeed, ^with safety, agree to par
ticipate on a basis of less than 50 per cent., and he has always regarded the distri
bution of 60 per cent.^between Great Britain, France, and Russia (or between
the first two alone) as a wholly unacceptable, and even dangerous, alternative.
Further, he holds very strongly the view of his predecessor (see paragraph 9 of Sir
R Ritchie's letter of the 29th March, 1911) that a friendly agreement with Ger
many is an essential preliminary to a satisfactory settlement, and I am to suggest
that the Baghdad Railway Company and the German Government should at once
be approached with a view to such a modification of the declaration of the.7th
March, 1911, as would enable this country to participate in the Baghdad Basrah
branch to an extent more nearly proportionate to our commercial interests in that
region).
As regards El Katr, I am to say that, in Lord Crewe's opinion, an entirely new
situation would be created in the Persian Gulf, and one in every way detrimental
to British interests, if the Turks were allowed to consolidate themselves there. Such
consolidation is, indeed, contradictory of the main object of His Majesty's Gov
ernment in attempting a settlement of questions in the Gulf, which was to elimi
nate Turkish influence as far as possible, and in any case to limit it tothe head of the
Gulf. That influence in El Hasa has existed only since Midhat Pasha's expedition
in 1871, and may be said to exist at present on sufierance, for so long as the quasi-
independence of Kuwait is maintained, El Hasa must remain more or less
isolated. But the construction of the Baghdad Railway to Basrah or Kuwait will
undoubtedly enable the Turkish Government to make their authority much more
effective ; and the further result of allowing, under the sanction of a convention,
the consolidation of Turkish power in the Peninsula of El Katr will, his Lordship
thinks, be not only to enable the Turkish Government to extend and establish it
in the interior, but also to give them a secure and recognised point d'appui within
the British'sphere of interest. The position of Bahrein—as a kind of British enclave
in Turkish territory— will be anomalous and precarious, while the Trucial Coast
will become the scene of constant intrigues requiring increased vigilance— and
therefore increased expenditure—on the part of His Majesty s Government to check
it. Moreover, the Turkish desire to intervene jointly with us in the affairs of the
Gulf will be strengthened, and will amount to something like a claim if Turkish
authority is once recognised and effective.
In Lord Crewe's opinion, no convention, however strictly drawn, can remove
■these disadvantages. He apprehends that the Turks will always intrigue ; that
when taxed with it they will deny it or produce sufficiently plausible excuses ;
while His Majesty's Government, with their many commitments elsewhere, will
always have sufficient reason for not taking at any given moment an extreme step
which would not be the less inconvenient or expensive merely because it happened
to be justified by the terms of the convention. The Turkish garrison at El
Bidaa—unrecognised for forty years, but, nevertheless, in possession — may,
indeed, be regarded as a symbol of British policy in the Persian Gulf.
Turning now to Mohammerah, Lord Crewe understands that the Turks are
advancing extravagant claims, in the hope, by subsequent concessions there, of
obtaining corresponding advantages elsewhere; and in your letter under reply the
fear is expressed that if this hope is not realised, and the case goes to The Hague
Tribunal, the result might be even to give to Turkey the line claimed by Dervish
Pasha in 1850. Lord Crewe, as at present advised, sees no grounds for such an
apprehension. That line was not accepted by the mediating commissioners, and
his Lordship imagines that the evidence upon which they rejected it would weigh
equally with The Hague Tribunal. Moreover, it is clear that the Turks do not
greatly trust their own evidence, since otherwise they would not contemplate
giving the line away in negotiation. It would seem to his Lordship to be more
probable that the Hague Tribunal would fix a _ line approximating to that of the
mediating commissioners ; andjf the alternatives are to allow the consolidation