"الملف 73/7 II (D 22) وضع الكويت - سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية" [ظ‎‎١‎١‎٠] (٥٤٠/٢٢٦)

47
information from a member of the Baghdad Railway staff that it was proposed
to construct a railway for the carriage of railway material between Baghdad
and Samarra, on the east side of the Tigris, and that there was talk of sending
presently two engineer brigades to survey between Khanikin and Baghdad.
From the enquiries which I have caused to be made I have been unable
to obtain any confirmation of these reports. It seems hardly likely, moreover,
that a railway should be built solely for the carriage of material.
I have, &c.,
Gerard Lowther.
(Copy sent informally to the Army Department for transmission to the
Division of the Chief of the Staff.)
(Received on the 27tli May 1912 with Political Secretary's letter No. 19, dated the 10th May
1912.)
ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA. [23rd April.]
CONPIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[17026]
No. 1.
No. 318.
Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey — (Received 23rd April).
Constantinople,
Sir, 18th April 1912.
In your despatch No. 114 of the 25th ultimo, you were good enough to
ask my views as to whether, should an opportunity occur of obtaining from
the Baghdad Railway Company the transfer to a British Company of the
branch of the line from Sadije to Khanikin in return for some concession to
Germany elsewhere, presumably outside the Turkish Empire, the Turkish
Government would be likely to raise objections to such a transaction.
I assume that the transfer here referred to would be not merely that of
the Sadije-Khanikin branch as an isolated line, which would in itself hardly
be a desirable acquisition to any British Company, but would be part of a larger
scheme involving perhaps the eventual reversion to His Majesty's Government
of whatever rights and privileges may have been secured under the Potsdam
agreement to Germany for railway construction in Persia from Khanikin, in
the event of the Russian Government failing to complete and link up their
Persian lines with the Khanikin branch within five years after the completion-
of the latter.
Viewed in this light, though it is somewhat difficult at present perhaps to
gauge what the Porte's attitude would be towards such a transaction which
would be influenced by the political considerations of the moment, it is prob
able that the Turkish Government might seize the opportunity to endeavour
to obtain from us some political or financial advantage in return for an
arrangement which, while in no way implying a loss to them, would be regard
ed in the light of granting a favour to us.
In any case any negotiations towards arrangement would have to be con
cluded a trois. The Turkish Government would strongly resent any negotia
tions being carried on between ourselves and the Germans without their
knowledge.
I have, &c.,
Gerard Lowther.
(Copy sent informally to the Army Department for transmission to the
Division of the Chief of the Staff,)