"ملف 53/32 III (D 53) مسائل متنوعة خاصة بالكويت" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢‎٠] (٤٨٦/٤٤٩)

8
on the tight bank of the Euphrates—chiefly
between Nasinyah and Samawah,
The Shammar. —Who used to be of such vita^
importance in the politics of Central and Eastern
Arabia, have more or less f 'ded out of the picture.
Formerly the Southern Shamraar were not only
a powerful nomad tribe, but also masters of the
oasis of Jabal Shammar. Their paramount
Shaikh, Ibn Rashid, was not only chief of his
own tribe, but wa" also ruler of a settled princi
pality, of wliich Hail was the capital. Since the
fall of Hail in 1921, however, they have fallen
from their high tstate, and have largely joined
the Northern section of the tribe.
Recent events in the Desert. —In 1923 a
tendency began to be noticeable amongst Najd
tribes to take refuge in 'Iraq fr.-m the exactions
of Ibn Sa'ud. These even included some families
from the most rabidly Ikhwan tribes like the
"Mutair—notably the Bivfihin, a sect of the
Auldd Wasil sub-section Buraih section of that
tribe. These refugees soon started raiding into
Najd, at the direct instigation of King Faisal
according to the popular belief in Najd, and
made the state of the country more disturbed than
it had been for years. The Kuwait Conference
between Najd and 'Ir&j and Trans-Jordania
was watched with intense interest to see whether
■"Iraq would agree to Ibn Sa'uddemand that
such refugees tribes should be compelled to return.
Big raids into, and from, Najd continued to take
place in rapid succession until May 1925 when,
under orders from the 'Ir^q Government, these
seceders from the Ikhwan tribes of Najd, who
had taken refuge in 'Iraq and had disturbed the
peace of the frontier for so long, started to move
towards the Northern Jazirah. By the end of
June; 1925 the country was free from them, and
an immediate improvement in tbe state of the
country followed. A long spell of quiet and more
or less immunity from raids followed—doubtless
due in part to the fact that the Ikhwan tribes
were otherwise engaged, the Hijaz campa'gn
being then in progress.
S^on after the fall of Jiddah at the end of
1925 many of the Ikhwan leaders returned to
Najd. Some were bitterly disappointed th tt the
Hijaz campaign had m t offered better facilities
for amassing plunder. Notable amongst these
was Faisal ad-Ddwish, No sooner Lad he arrived
at Artawi^ah than he summoned his followers to
prepare for a big raid against 'Iraq. Before he
bad time to set out, however, be received definite
orders fro:n Ibn Sa'ud forbidding him to proceed,
and reluctantly disbanded his men. In April he
visited Sultan bin Humaid, paramount shaikh of
the 'Utaibah, at Ghatghat. From there an
invitation was sent to Dhaidan al-Hithlain of I he
'Ajman, who joined them shortly afterwards.
They then apparently took an oath binding them-
selv^s together for mutual support in the event
of Ibn Sa'ud wishing to take punitive action
against any of them. There continued to be
much talk about the strained relations between
Ibn Sa'ud and the leaders of the Ikhwan, par
ticularly the three mentioned above, who were
much dissatisfied with Ibn Sa'ud's idea of organiz
ing a civilized government in the Hijaz, and his
prohibiting them from raiding across the frontier.
They argued that if as they maintained, the
people of 'Iraq, Kuwait, etc., were not tine
Muslims, they ought to be allowed to fiirht
against them j if, on the other hand, Ibn Sa'ud
prohibited this, saying that they were not enemies,
he had no right to prevent them from trading
with them—as he did in the case of Kuwait.
In the summer of 1927 a plot to murder Ibu
Sa U'l's son, Sa'ud, in Riyadh, and bis cousin
Ibn Jiluwi at Hasa, at the same time, was dis
covered and frustrated only just in time. In the
early part of 1927, on the Persian Government
refusing permission for tbe Imperial Airways to
establish a service to India along the south coast
of Persia, the suggestion was made that the
Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf might be
followed instead, and Ibn Sa'ud was approached
with a view to obtaining his permission for the
route over his territory to be used. As was to be
expected, the very idea of such a thing was
anathema to the Ikhwan, and Ibn Sa'ud on the
very strong advice of Ibn Jiluwi said that he
could not agree. Next came the building of
a Police Post at Baswah * or Busaiyah, as we
usua'ly call it. The Ikhwan apparently connect
it in their minds with the Air Route scheme,
and think that it is destined to become an
enormous petrol dump—hence their determination
to destroy it. The Air Route scheme and Busai
yah Post between them certainly seem to be the
immediate causes, or, perhaps it would be better
to say, the immediate excuses, of Faisal ad-
Dawish and his Mutair getting out of hand,
and going raiding in defiance of Ibn Sa'ud s
orders. The real reason is that they, like all
Bedouins, are parasites whi'do not earn their
living in the world, and must be paid, or raid.
The actual attack on Busaiyah Post, the raid on
the Kuwait 'Uraibdar, or local Bedouin, et,*. are
too recent to require re apitul ting.
At present the situation seems to be that Faisal
ad-Dawish, as stated above, is acting in open
defiance of Tbn Sa'ud. The 'Ajman and other
tribes are quiet at present, but are not a very
reliable weapon in Ibn Sa'ud's hands. Ibn Sa'ud is
C' rtainly in a very awkward position ; hp is
obviously having very strong pressure brought
to bear on him, ms it is hard to th'nk that a man
of his acumen can really think all that he has
been writing- in bis recent letters of protest. It
remains to be seen whether hp will be able to bring
Dawish to heel and re-establish his authority, or
nnt. Personally I think he will do so through
the Ulama, whom he has summoned to Riyadh.
He has a very persuasive tongue, and they have
great influence with the tribes, if he can make
them see reason.
Meanwhile, as far as Kuwait is concerned,
the people are still in a state of nervous tension.
The town wall has been repaired, and is manned
every night. The village of Jabrah is also
strongly held with a force of over three hundred
men, including a body of specially engaged
mercenaries, but not counting the Bedouin camped
in the vicinity. Many alarmist rumours are
current, and accurate news is at a discount.
* File No. 476-N.
890 F&PD.