"ثورة مسقط، في الفترة من أبريل ١٩١٧ إلى يناير ١٩١٨، واستُأنفت في الفترة من أبريل ١٩٢٠ إلى أكتوبر ١٩٢٠" [و‎‎٢‎٤‎٣] (٥٥٨/٤٩٨)

put it.
The result wan that we ware reduced to the absurd
position of supporting by armed force ui*ier our treaty
obligations a ruler against whom most of his subjects were in
open rebellion, who was thooreticully iodependent and yet who
would be driven into the sea in a day if it were not for us.
the immediate causes of the 1915 rebellion were an
outbreak of religious fanaticism ooineiding with the stoppage
of the importation of arms.
Event© from Colonel Bonn's first meeting with the Cfcnan ,
Chiefs in 1915 till Major ttaworth's meetii^ with the same
in September 1919*
in January 1918 the I nam aoo ompaai od by Sheikh ^ea 'bin
Salih al ^orlthi anS xaany tsaan Sheikhs attaoked in force our
d< fenoes at •'»ait-al-FalaJ guarding Jtottrah. The attack was
banten eff with eerioue loss to the Omanie who learnt their
lea*on there once and for all. The Imam howeTer remained in
indieputable poeeeeBion of the interior a^^a^cdistant
menace to the ooaat townn which he would/have ffirbKMUfr taken
had It not been for the certainty that he would be driven out
in a few days with the adrent of a British man-of-war.
Jn May Lt-Uclonel Benn the Political Agent sent a cir-
-cular letter to the Oman Sheikhs asking for a conference in
which peace might be arranged between the Sultan and the
Imam. This did not meat with a Tory warm response in the
interior, but after considerable correspondence a meeting
was finally arranged and took place at Sib on the l&th
September 1916 between Colonel Benn and Sheikh "sa as the
representative of the j6 Imam's party.
This meeting was entirely abortive. In the Sultan's
Bind was the paramount i*ea that he would eventually recover
his authority in the interior, in the minds of the repre-
-sentatives of the Imamtheir unassailable position as
conquerors and their mor 1 position as Ibadhls obeying