"ثورة مسقط، في الفترة من أبريل ١٩١٧ إلى يناير ١٩١٨، واستُأنفت في الفترة من أبريل ١٩٢٠ إلى أكتوبر ١٩٢٠" [و‎‎١‎٠‎٧] (٥٥٨/٢٢٤)

(^)
reform is to be secured by a State Loan under British guar -
antee, secured on the Custons,which are to be managed by a
Superintendent appointed by the Sultan on our nomination. The
Saltan is now sufficiently convinced of the hopelessness of
his position to accept even the last expedient,always so
strenuously resisted by both himself and his father.
Mow I have no title to disagree with this statement
of the position and I do not do so. Major Haworth has studied
it on the spot for over a year,and I think it most probable
that his diagnosis is quite correct. The only criticism I have
to offer is that his remedy and his diagnosis are not quite
consistent. My point is that it seems hardly feasible to
combine a policy of conciliation of the rebels with the employ
ment of a force of foreigners (Baluchis),officered by Eng -
lishmen,the first employment of which is to be to strike the
rebels a shrewd blow by turning them out of the Wady Samail»
It seems to me that if the force has to go out for this purpose
the result of victory would be to harden the fanatical element
against the Sultan and his British helpers,with a possible
blood-feud if lives were lostpif, and the result of defeat would
undoubtedly be to commit us to military operations in the
interior of Oman,to which Government has always been,and is
now especially,opposed. Assuming however that the force would
not go out unless success were absolutely assured (though it
is not always easy to hold the enthusiastic commandant of a
newly raised levy) it is the position in the case of victory
that principally perturbs me. If the rebel movement were a
mere selfish struggle between the Ins and the Outs,for power
anc| money, there would of course be no difficulty ; the
Sultan
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