"ملخص لثورة الحجاز" [ظ‎‎٨‎٠] (٣٠/١٢)

10
Thev had been able to improve their situation by running transport convoys across the
break in the railway from Juruf ed Derwish to Maun .
South of Maan railway communication was probably detmitely severed* with tne
north for a very considerable period, if not permanently. This, however, did not
necessarily justify anticipation of the actual fall of Medina, whose garrisonf had by now
usurped the functions of the local inhabitants who had practically all been evicted from
the district, and could probably support itself on local production of gram and dates for
an indefinite period. The Arabs would not attack Medina itself, but it was possible
that all outlying Turkish posts and garrisons would fall into Arab hands.
As regards the political situation, the tension produced by the Khurma affair had
been aggravated by news from Philly who was with Ibn Saud, dated 25th June, that a
large raiding party of Akhwan under Turki, Ibn Sand's son, had left Nejd for Jebel
Shammar at the end of Ramadan. The dispute between the Quraish} ajid Wahabite
factions is historical, and Hussein naturally regarded Saud as the chief opponent to
his personal ascendency and to his scheme of unification of Arabia. His Majesty's
Government saw the necessity for intervention, and a strong message was sent to
both chiefs urging forbearance and conveying His Majesty's Government's policy of
friendship to both parties. This message appears to have succeeded in temporarily
allaying the King's fears, and he . gave assurances that his policy in the Khurma area
would be restricted to the restoration of order locally, and that no hostile action against
Ibn Saud was contemplated, but at the end of July, 1918, he suddenly asked to be
allowed to abdicate and retire with his family from the sphere of Arabian politics. A
reassuring message was sent him by His Majesty s Government and he withdrew Ins
application to abdicate. He promised to write to Ibn Saud in favourable terms, and
as evidence of his good faith offered to pay him a visit and personally discuss the
points at variance.
On the 22nd August it was reported that letters, dated 13th July, had been
written by Sherif Abdullah to two Ateibab chiefs. These letters were unfriendly to
Ibn Saud and proposed a concentration of Ateiba and other tribesmen at Shudhub
wells a day s journey east of Khurma. These letters were written without reference to
King Hussein, who has been urgently requested to instruct Sherif Shakir to commit
no act of aggression east of Khurma, and Abdulla to confine his energy to fighting
Turks.
A report, dated the 8th August, from Mr. Philby, political officer with Ibn Saud,
stated that the intervention of His Majesty's Government had had an excellent effect
on Ibn Saud, who, in a written reply, which covered much recent history, expressed
cordial agreement with the sentiment of His Majesty's Government. He left the
settlement ol all disputed questions to the discretion of the British Government
whether now or hereafter, pending which neither side was to provoke the other by any
hostile act.
* See | aragraph 18 and note.
t Despite the dilliculty of their position the Turks appear to hare maintained their moral and discipline
to some extent. Ihia is chielly owing^ to the energy and capability of their commander in Medina, i' ukhn
asha, a lurk of the old school. In March li)18 when Atif Bey, commander of the 2nd (Jomposite i 1 orc^aL
post for ihe north under somewhat peculiar circumstauces, Kakhri did his best to get him
tried by court raaitial for cowardice. On the occasion of the Mudowere garrison deserting their post
paragraph 22) l akhri had them tried by court martial and heavy sentences were promulgated on the olncers
concerned. In August 1918 a plot was discovered at Maan in* which several officers were implicated m au
en eavour to communicate with Sherif Feisal's forces and the ringleaders have been arrested and sent o
tnai to Damascus. Nor do the Turks appear to have abandoned the idea of re -establishing communication
with A.sir where the 21st Division is isolated. In March 1918 orders appear to have been issued that tba.
dmsum which consists of some 6 battalions with 20 guns should be formed into the XXIII Army Corps
1 here has beyn a good deal of evidence to show that messengers have from time to time been despatches
? lr ; ni - ne ? { the most important of the .-e messengers, Ashraf Bey, was captured by bhen
Abdulla m January 1917, with £T20 ,00U u hile en ronU to the South Uail.
I oee note to Appendix A.