"ملخص لثورة الحجاز" [و‎‎٨‎٠] (٣٠/١١)

U iegraph line near Dar e, JIamra on the 3rd_jJuly, and another important sector of
i- ^and two five-arcbed bridges near this place were destroyed on the 5th On the
luth the Aiabs surprised a detachment of 50 Turkish cavalrv and infantry under Abdel
Hamid Bey el Masn (late 4th Army representative with Ibn Rashid) who were m route
from vledmato 1 a:! tojoin Ibn Rashid (^paragraph 24). The whole party were killed
or captured, Abdel Hamid el Masri being among the former. On the 17th, Fakhri Pasha
represented die situation of his forces as serious and critical; he complained'bitterly of the
way m which they had been neglected. He thought that Medina might be able to hold
out till the beginning of Septem ber, when the new date harvest, which promised well
(li,000 000 kilos), was due. hut douhted if the '2nd Composite force at Tehuk would he able
to hold out so long. On the 3 1st, Sherif Ali made a successful raid against one of his
posts south-west of Medina, killing about 50 Turks.
28. On the 1st August it was reported that Arab activity against the railway
north of Milan continued and arrangements were being made for an extension
ijoi thuaids^ of operations in the autumn. With this object in view, two companies of
Imperial Camel Corps were en route to Akab :i. On the 5th August the enemy's
|®Oficent ration at Kutrani was still proceeding. A small Turkish column with machine
.runs and a convoy of 50 animals had succeeded in reaching Maan towards the end of
-July. Repairs to the damaged line between Juruf ed Derwish and Jerdun continued.
A proposal by the Commander at Jerdun to make an attack from that place against
• Jafilali with the object of collecting the considerable quantities of grein in this area
and ejecting the Arabs was discountenanced by the Officer Commanding Ilnd Army
.Corpus, who condemned anv offensive at present far from the railway as premature, and
considered it more important to clear the Arabs away from the line in the section Maan
||| to Aneiza. ISo attempt had as yet been made to repair the railway south of Mann
{see note to paragraph 16). An aerodrome had been established by the Turks at Tebuk
ith the object oi sending drugs and money to the Hejaz Expeditionary Force by air.
ihe supply situation at jMaan had been temporarily improved by the arrival of a convov
from Jerdun, and, on the 29th Ju ly, six days supplies were said to be available. The
euccessful defence of Jerdun by the I urks had had a restraining influence on the Maan
sheikhs, but a plot, in which Armenians and Arab officers were involved had been
discovered by the i urks, who made several arrests.
On the 8th August the Imperial Camel Corps detachment captured Mudowere
station (5^ also paragraph 22) and killed 35 Turks and captured 120 with 2 guns and
^3 machine guns.
Following on the capture of Mudowere, Haret el Amara, the next station to the
south, was evacuated on the 9th. On the same day the Ilnd Army Corps decided to
assume the offensive in the Maan area and gave orders for 15 days' food and foraire for
3,000 men and 500 animals to be collected at Hasa and Juruf ed Derwish. The attack
column was to consist of the 2/73rd, 3/73rd, 1/75th, 2/75th, and a mule volunteer
regiment, while another battalion, the l/l2th, reinforced the Maan garrison.
On the 10th Fakhri Pasha* despatched a message of farewell as, in view of the fall
of Mudowere, he considered Medina doomed, and on the llth the purchasing officer of
the Hejaz Expeditionary Force at Damascus received orders to close his accounts and
make no further purchases.
( ^n the 12th August Sherif Abdulla severely damaged the railway between Toweira
and Bir .ledid and destroyed 2,000 rails, and captured 17 prisoners.
On the same date Fakhri Pasha sent a further despondent message. He considered
that \elderem were mainly responsible for his predicament, and stated he preferred to
surrender or starve rather than be defeated by the Aral>s at Medina, Enver Pasha
yxpressed his appreciation of Fakhri s difficulties and considered that the onus of
opening the railway developed not on the H.E F. but on Yelderem.
The enemy were reported to be showing considerable interest in the Akhwant
movement centred at Ritawia, 5 days east of Aneize, in Qasim. The Nejd men, in the
service ot 11 ussein, were said to be regarded as infidels by the Akhwan, who attributed
to Hussein the delay over the 1918 Haj.
* 29. I he situation on the Hejaz railway about the end of August can be summed
up as follows :—
North of Maan railway communication with the north was temporarily cut. The
enemy were endeavouring to restore this communication with the troops and material
locally available, and it was probable that in course of time would effect this object.
Sec Appendix M.
f See paragraph 23 and note.