"تقرير إداري عن المقيمية السياسية في الخليج العربي والوكالة السياسية في مسقط عن الفترة ١٨٨٤-١٨٨٥." [ظ‎‎١‎٥] (١٣٠/٢٦)

24
ADMINISTEATION EEPOET OF THE PEESIAN GULF POLITICAL
APPENDIX B TO PART II.
The Portuguese in Eastern Arabia, hy Lieutenant -Colonel S. B. Miles.
It was very early after the Portuguese had commenced their career o£ conquest in th
East upon the discovery of the Cape route to India, that they turned their attention to e
Persian Gulf.
When Albuquerque returned from his first voyage to India in loOJ-, he advocated
policy of conquest and aggression, and appears to have been the originator of that scieme o
extensive annexation and occupation of the Indian seaboard which the King, Dom x anoe ,
was eventually induced to adopt, and which Albuquerque himself was selected to cany out.
This scheme was not adopted without much opposition from Saldanha and otheis, who
propounded a more cautious plan for the maintenance of the new commerce. The future policy
of the nation in the East was indeed hotly discussed at Lisbon, and the King^s decision was i'oi
a long time doubtful.
There was one point, however, on which all parties were agreed, and that was the im
portance of obstructing the old lines of commerce by the Arabian and Persian Gulfs, and
of securing the entire monopoly of the trade by diverting it to the new route; and to this
end immediate and determined efforts were resolved on.
In the year 1506 three fleets were despatched from Lisbon to the East, one of which
consisted of sixteen vessels under Tristan da Cunha with Alfonso d'Albuquerque as second
in command. The instructions given to do Cunha were to proceed to the Island of Socotra
and there construct a fort, which, while protecting the Christians supposed to inhabit that
island, should also serve as a depot for the use of the fleets destined to oppose the Egypto-
Venetian confederacy and to blockade the Red Sea.
On the completion of the fort, da Cunha was to proceed to India with his share of the
fleet, leaving Albuquerque with a small squadron to attack Jeddah and Aden, and to obstruct
the Moorish trade.
Albuquerque had, no doubt, at once perceived the uselessness of Socotra for the purpose
intended, and was well aware that his flotilla was too small for him to attempt the capture of
Aden. As will be seen presently, therefore, he thought fit, after the departure of Tristan
da Cunha, to deviate somewhat from his instructions, and sailed away to the north-east, intent
upon the capture of Hormuz, then the chief emporium of commerce in the Persian Gulf.
It did not require the genius of an Albuquerque to perceive that the acquisition of this
island would, by giving him the entire command of the Persian Gulf route, be of greater
service to his King than the temporary blockade of the Red Sea and the bombardment of
Jeddah.
Albuquerque's expedition against Hormuz was ouly partially successful, owing to the
defection of some of his officers ; but the importance of his achievement was fully recognised
at home, and he had the satisfaction of returning and completing his work tiiere before his
death.
It was on his way to reduce the city of Hormuz, and with the avowed object of destroyincr
rival sources of trade, and leaving no hostile states in his rear, that he paid his attention to
Oman, and laid in ruins the principal towns on that coast from Kilhah to Khor Fakan.
Some of these towns were sooner or later occupied and fortified, and with varying fortune
remained in possession of the Portuguese for about a century and a half, when their power
having greatly declined throughout the East, the Arabs were able at length to overcome them
and expel them from the country. The history of this occupation is sketched in the following
narrative:—
A complete account of the Portuguese conquests in the East would perhaps form one of
the most instructive and entertaining chapters in the history of the world, but it has yet to be
written, though there is an extensive literature on the subject, and 'there must be rich
materials awaiting investigation in the archives of Lisbon, Goa, and Madrid The native
annalists of Oman, as might be expected, maintain a discreet silence respectino- the arrival
and conquests of the infidels in their country; but some of the contests that took place ^a
later period, when the increasing feebleness of the Portuguese garrisons encourao-ed insurrection
are frequently and exultingly recorded, as well as their final expulsion. In lookin- back