الملف E/8 I ابن سعود [ظ‎‎٧‎٩] (٦٠٦/١٧١)

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Serai. After a short interview in the Serai Bin Sa ad called for horses and
to the camp with him accompanied by a large crowd of horsemen, who on tv T0 ^ e
gave us an " ardtha " or welcoming ceremony, which consists in galloping fn ^
to and fro in front of honoured guests, shouting, brandishing swords^ fv'" y
rifles, etc. ~ ' n S off
5. Bin Saud told us that he had arrived about half-an-hour before we did
was exceedingly cordial and friendly. The friendly personal relations existiji h
tween him and Captain Shakespear, resulting from their meetings at Kuwait a^rl
the desert, put us on good terms at once, and made our subsequent interv' ^
easy. On arrival at the camp we found that Bin Saud had caused a very large w
to be pitched for us, and done all he could in other ways to make us comfort Kl
inter alia by getting one of the best cooks in Bahrain over and entertaini e '
sumptuously in Arab style during the whole of our two days' stay. ^ de
6. On the day of our arrival and the greater part of the next day, Tuesday
(16th December), we discussed with him the points mentioned in the memorandum
attached to Sir Percy Cox's letter under reply. The result of these discussions is
set forth in Memorandum I attached to this letter. After we had discussed the "
points Bin Saud raised the question of the policy of the British Government in Katar
and Trucial Oman with special reference to their attitude in regard to enemies of lug
who might take sanctuary in these states and then use them as a base for intriguing
against him, or as a retreat after inciting some Bedouin tribe to revolt against him
He said that of course he had not the slightest objections to fugitives f rom y'
wrath taking refuge with the neighbouring Shaikhs in accordance with the usual
Arab custom, provided that they did not use their sanctuary as a base for intrigue •
but if they did so he would be compelled to take steps for his own safety. The gist
of this conversation is recorded in Memorandum II attached to this letter.
7. After business had been concluded at the final interview Bin Saud volun
teered to show us in confidence the conditions which had been proposed bv the
Turkish Government and himself as a basis for settlement of his future position.
Ljie document he produced and read out to us was in the form of a draft agreement
containing 11 articles, five of which had been suggested by Bin Saud himself and
the other six by the Turkish Government. The terms proposed by Bin Saud in
sisted on complete autonomy for the region actually controlled by him, special
reference being made to his right to the coast-line and to the appointment and
control of all local officials. The terms proposed by the Turkish Government
^aid down a partial autonomy for Bin Saud under the suzerainty of the Sultan
with the following conditions :—
(1) Ihe re-instatement of the former Turkish garrisons in the Hasa pro
vince. ■■ r
(2) Kazis and other judicial ofiicers to be appointed bv direct " firman "
by the Sultr.n.
(3) The exclusion of all foreign merchants and agents of Foreign Powers.
(4) All communications from Foreign Powers or their representatives to
^ be referred to the Turkish authorities for disposal.
(5) xhe payment of an annual revenue of £T.3,000.
(6) No concessions to be given by Bin Sand to any foreign companies foi
i ail ways or motor-car services.
we 0athti fJ\ p. co nditi o n (6) above some conversation took place, from which
ausrices shnuM iw " v ^1° ^ av erse to giving concessions under British
good offices 1 s position be regulanzed or in some way assured through our
Saud marlp 0 } t 'rl the discussions, on more than one occasion, Bin
and the Tnrk<3 Iri K 0 u . ou | prefer that any reconciliation between himself
ment Lc^l SS be f c ?f^ dt ^ ou g h "n<ier the auspices of the British Gow in
ly with that Turkish Government! permaneIlc ^ of ^ arrangement made direct
shoukl 'nMm^t f iv n ,^ a , ud sent ^structions to his Deputy at Katij that he
u J e cts to enter andtrade and open shops, should they arrive