الملف E/8 I ابن سعود [ظ‎‎٧‎٢] (٦٠٦/١٥٧)

2
is a danger to GUI' general interests in the Gulf and to our relations with thp
Arab Principalities, unless we have a working understanding with him. Tif
is recognised by His Majesty's Government, ^
Thus the Secretary of State for India addressing the Foreign Office on the
subject on 13th August, last wrote " * * they (the Government of India)
cannot afford to make him their enemy and they propose to enter into a friendly
exchange of views with him in order to regularise the position.
"It must of course be realised that Bin Saud, in return for a friendly
attitude towards us, may ask for our support It will b e
necessary then to make it clear to him tbat His Majesty's Government, while
willing to use their good offices to bring about a reconciliation, cannot under
take to support him, but must maintain the strictest neutrality."
A few days later as the result of deliberation between His Majesfy's India
and Foreign Offices, the following instructions were telegraphed to the' Govern
ment of India by the Secretary of State (on 21st August)
"The Amir must be made clearly to understand, if he asks for our support
against Turkey, as a quid pro quo for complying with our wishes, that while
we are willing to do our best to reconcile him with Turkish Government, we are
unable to support him (i^., against the Turks P. Z. 0.) and are bound to keen
a strictly neutral attitude
Later still, this time in connection primarily with the general suhiect of
Railway enterprise within Asiatic Turkey, the Government of India in making-
comment on certain aspects of the negotiations, telegraphed to the Secretary of
State on Sth September, as follows:—
" * • * There can be no doubt from the point of view of Indian in
terests, that a strong and reformed Turkey in Asia will act as a safeguard to
India from interference on the part of Foreign Powers from the west, and
might even in an indirect manner result in the maintenance of Persian
integrity. Now that His Majesty's Government have come to terms with the
Turkish Government, as regards their respective interests in the Persian Gulf,
they have nothing to fear from Turks and every advantage to gain from friendly
relations with the Porte. * * * * The Government of India are there
fore strongly of opinion that His Majesty's Government should spare no effort
to avoid any measure likely to contribute to the partition of Asiatic Turkey
either at the present time or hereafter and that His Majesty's Government
shoiud pursue a consistent policy of reforming strengthening and maintaining
the Turkish Empire
The above extracts indicate the policy of Government sufficiently clearly.
As regards Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud and the imminent meeting. It is apparent
from the correspondence with him that on his part he is anxi
ous to establish relations with us, but seeks a more definite exposition of our
attitude in regard to his relations with the Turks than mere expressions of
good-will and the declaration of neutrality. It has been suggessted to
him that he should explain more fully in what way he would expect us to
evince our good-will and in response to this he has replied that he would like
to have a meeting with a JBritish representative and discuss the position
with him in person.
It seems therefore to rest with Bin Saud to open the discussion by stating
frankly in what direction it is that he desires the expression of our good-will or
our co-operation.
On our side we have explained to the Porte that now that Bin Saud has
come down to the shores of the Gulf and controls certain Gulf Port9 3 he must
be regarded by us as having entered the sphere of Gulf politics and we cannot
ignore him but must find a modus wivendi with him for the protection of our
own interests, while at the same time maintaining a strictly neutral altitude in
legard to the estrangement prevailing between Bin Saud and the Porte. It.
wou.d also appear that we have expressed our willingness to promote a
reconciliation it desired to do so.