"الملف 35/10 هجوم الشيخ صالح على مسقط سنة ١٨٩٥" [ظ‎‎١‎١‎٥] (٢٤٠/٢٣٠)

consider it necessary to do, though I believe that such is the power of our
name in Oman that the exercise of a little tact on the part of a British officer
would go far to settle many of the inter-tribal disputes which ordinarily occur.
16. Should the Government of India not favour at present the idea of
a protectorate over Oman, I would submit, for consideration, whether the
protection of our interests will not require us to take some active steps when
Mutrah and Muscat are again threatened.
I have already explained the reasons which in my opinion would require
us to adopt this course. With the enemy outside the towns a word from us
followed if necessary by a few shells from one of our men-of-war in the har
bour, would probably have the effect of dispersing the rebels as it has done
before, and saving the property of our subjects from plunder.
17. But the best safeguard would be a clear intimation to the leading
Sheikhs of Oman that, whatever differences they may have with their SultaiT,
we will not permit an attack on Mutrah and Muscat. I am aware that this
would imply the active support of the present ruler in the event of a rebel
lion against him, but without some such support it is difficult to see how the
property of our subjects and their trade are to be protected, whilst such a
clear exposition of our intentions would be the surest preventive against a
rising, as the Chiefs would know that it would bring them into contact with
our power.
18. In return for this support we might demand from the Sultan a closer
reliance on us, an earnestness on his part to be willing to be guided by our
advice, the right to inspect bis fortifications and advise him in the matter
of his defences for which we might supply him with a moderate amount of
newer arms and ammunition, and lastly a*voice in his political relations with
the leading Chiefs of the interior.
19. If, on the other hand, it is considered that Seyyid Feysul is not a
ruler to whom the Government of India would be willing to accord*this measure
of support, then we must be prepared to see the property and trade of our
subjects placed in jeopardy on every occasion of a rising against his authority,
and how often this may now happen it is impossible to say. The Sultan can
always retire to the forts on an emergency, and unless the enemy are strong
enough to invest them and force their capitulation, an arrangement will be
come to as in the last rebellion with the result that the principal loss will fall
on our people, and that trade will be for the time paralysed.
20. I may add that in both Mutrah and Muscat, our subjects own the
principal wealth in merchandise, goods and house property, whilst the export
and import trade of the country is mainly in their hands. The value of this
trade is shown in the last returns as 38 lakhs of dollars, and that is a low
estimate. In point of commercial interests, Mutrah and Muscat may now
almost be said to be British towns.
6
foreign Office Presa JTo. 181—17-5-95—56.