"ملف 61/11 IV (D 77) مسائل متنوعة خاصة بالحجاز ونجد" [و‎‎٨‎٠] (٣٦٦/١٦٩)

and afterwards the Shammar had been used against Ibn Saud. Vvhen Ibn Saud
secured Taraba and Khurma, His Majesty's Government had accepted the new
situation, but they pursued a policy which had the appearance of encircling the
King. The installation of King Feisul and the Amir Abdullah in Iraq and
Transjordan at a time when Ibn Saud was pushing northward, and the use made
o'f frontier tribes, had strengthened the impression, though it may have been
erroneous, that such an encirclement was in progress.
5. The pressure of encirclement was relieved when in 19124 the British lost
faith in Hussein and the King embarked on the campaign which drove the
Hashimites out of the Hejaz. But there was still a pressure from the north.
Fuad Bey referred to statements by Sir P. Cox and/or Sir H. Dobbs which
implied that Great Britain could look across the frontiers at Ibn Saud and see
him reduced to impotence. (When correcting this passage Fuad Bey was rather
uncertain. He recollected something which Sir H. Dobbs had said to
Sheikh Hafiz Wahba in Bagdad and thought that something had appeared in
the press. He offered to look the matter up, but 1 did not ask him to do so.)
6. Fuad Bey referred to recent controversies, which had arisen during my
mission here, as marking a fresh phase of apparent coldness and antagonism on
the part of His Majesty's Government. Now for thirty years, ne continued, the
King had served British interests. He indicated in general terms six ways in
which Ibn Saud had done this :—
(1) He had always placed his reliance on the British.
(2) He had always kept himself and his country quiet and had not molested
Great Britain's allies. He had eventually made war on his own
people for the sake of Great Britain and Iraq.
(3) He had helped Great Britain during and after the war. He had
attacked Ibn Rashid. When he knew that Hussein was backed by
His Majesty's Government, and that it was a British interest that
Hussein should not be interfered with, he had accepted the position
and maintained friendly relations with Hussein as far as possible.
(4) In his attitude towards critical situations in British dependencies,
e.g., in Palestine and India, he had used a moderating influence.
(5) and (6) It had been, and was still, his policy never to go against British
advice and to discountenance Soviet propaganda, working in close
co-operation with Great Britain in regard to the latter.
7. Fuad Bey did not pretend that the King had studied British interests
alone in working on the above lines. lie had followed them because it v.<is <i!>
in his own interest to do so. n ^ i
8. Fuad Bey went on to say that the friendship between Ibn baud and
Great Britain rested on a sound basis, unlike the friendship with King reisul
and the Amir Abdullah, which was not, and could not on the side of those rulers,
be genuine. Great Britain had in Iraq and Iransjordan a pi i\ilcged position
which it was important for her to maintain, but which could not be maintainea
without prejudice to the national aspirations of these countries. There was a
conflict between British interests and those national aspirations such that true
friendship was impossible. There was nothing of the sort to mar the relations
between Great Britain and Ibn hand. Except in one mattei, which Fuad Be\
hoped to see disposed of in the near future, namely, slavery, we did not seek to
impose ourselves on Ibn Saud. Was there anything else ? he asked me. (1 replied
that our policy in regard to slavery was important to us, and that 1 liad told mm
my views. I recognised that there was nothing fundamental to divide Ibn Saud
and His Majesty's Government, though I should have more to say about the
details of Fuad Bey's statement.)
9. Fuad Bey described the friendship between the King and Great Britain,
in contrast with those other friendships of which he had spoken, as being "pure
and virgin. " It could be utilised. , ,
10. What did Great Britain want of Ibn baud? Hiad Bey asked. He
supplied an answer under six general heads as follows :—
(1) The continued maintenance ot friendly and peacetul relations.
(2) The continued maintenance of the security in this country which was
essential, p . cj ., in the interests of Britisli pilgrims.
(3) The maintenance of friendly relations with the surrounding countries in
which Great Britain had special interests.
[192 h—1] B :