"دليل الخليج. الجزء الأول. المواد التاريخية والسياسية. ملخص عن شؤون قطر، ١٨٧٣-١٩٠٤." [ظ‎‎٣‎١] (٩٢/٦٢)

52
George Hamilton is of opinion that the Porte should be informed again that His Majesty's
Government, do not recognise their claim to sovereignty over Katar peninsula, and should be
pressed to maintain the status quo in that region : and farther that the Porte should he at the
same time warned against talcing any steps to occupy Odeid, which in a appanage of the Chief of
Abuthahi, a dependent Chief, with whom His Majesty's Government are in direct treaty relations
and that no interference with it can be allowed.
Should the maintenance of the st&im in Katar be arranged, Lord George Hamilton
apprehends that, for the present, at least, no agreement with Ahmed'bm-Thani will he possible.
Should, however, the Porte decline to meet the views of His Majesty's Government, further
action will be desirable; and it will be a matter for consideration whether the opportunity
offered by the Sheikh's desire to come under British protection should not he turned to account.
198. On the 3rd Marcli 1903, a Turkish officer—named Arabi Effendi
arrived at Bahrein from Baghdad, and
No. 86 of secret e ., ^ay 1903, Nos. 64-87. stated that he had been appointed Mudir
of Zobarah and that his Government proposed to establish guard houses from
Zobarah to Ojair, and that another officer, Abdul Karim, expected shortly at Bah
rein, had been appointed mudir of Odied. The mudir of Zobarah left for Hasa
on the 5th March to receive instructions from the Governor there before proceed
ing to take up his post. In reporting these
No. 86 of Secret e., may, nos. 64-87. facts by telegram (dated 12th March)
Colonel Kemball proposed to send the Sphinx to visit Zobarah and Odeid. His
Excellency the Viceroy repeated this telegram to the Secretary of State and
proposed to wire to the Resident as follows:— i|
Proposal to send Sphinx io Zobarah and Odeid is approved. Landing of Turkish offi
cials pending settlement of case should not be permitted. Perseus from Maskat can co
operate at Odeid if required. Admiral and Cos informed. Keep them acquainted with
course of events.^
199. The Secretary of State approved of this proposal in telegram, dated
t. . t ,nno xr o-, 19th March 1903, and also informed the
No. 313 of Secret E., A u gu .t .903. No.. 3.3 -102. Govemrnent of India as f ol l ows ._
" Sir N. O^Conor was instructed on 20th February to act in accordance with India Office
letter of 4th February if active steps were imminent on the part of the Turks. He now reports
that without directly raising at present the question of Turkish sovereignty if it can be avoided,
he will make representations to the Porte of our objections ta the proposed administrative
appointments in El Katar or other alterations of the status quo."
200. The report referred to in this telegram of Sir N. O'Conor was the
_^ 010 following, dated 14th March 1903,
"No. 342 of Secret E., August 19C3, ^os. 313-402. -u' r, ru • t ^ j
which discusses the various complicated
questions arising from the position of affairs :—
"The question of Turkish sovereignty over Katar promontory has, as Your Lordship is aware
and will see from the accompanying memorandum,* been repeatedly the subject of discussion
with the Porte, and I am not without hope of succeeding in dissuading them from proceeding
with the appointments of Sub-Governors, on the ground that any disturbance of the status
quo is impolitic, without having to do more than to remind them of the declarations made by
His Majesty's Government on this subject on previous occasions.
I confess I see strong objections to basing our representations on the fact that we do not
recognise Turkish sovereignty over the coast, as its immediate result will be to provoke the
Ottoman Government to reassert, in the most formal and official manner, their claim, as
happened in 1891-93 (see memorandum); and if we allow their pretensions to pass with noth
ing more than a verbal or written contradiction, we shall rather lave weakened than streng
thened our present position. If, on the other hand, we are not satisfied with merely disclaim
ing their pretended rights, and the Porte persist in their intentions, we shall be forced to
take some definite action which may lead His Majesty's Government further than they in
tended, or further than it is necessary or politic to go at present. At any ratf, before taking
a step which may raise a very vexed and complicated question, it will, 1 venture to think,
obviously be advisable to decide beforehand whether His Majesty^s Government will forcibly
prevent the Ottoman Government from establishing any new outward symbols of Turkish
sovereignty along the whole west coast of the Persian Gulf to Katif, and, if so, what will be
their policy and action in regard to the Turkish military station at Bidaa, which undoubtedly
exists and has existed for many years.
It may safely be said that at the present moment Ottoman sovereignty over the whole
of Arabia is, at the best, a very slender one, and that, in the gradual process of disintegra
tion, which is proceeding pretty rapidly, it will become less and less. Is it, under these cir
cumstances, in accordance with British interests to hasten this disruption, or even to over-
weaken Turkish rule until we have some other to put in its place ? It may be that, in the
present instance. His Majesty's Government is prepared, after the death of the ruling Chief
*Vide Appendix C.