"دليل الخليج. الجزء الأول. المواد التاريخية والسياسية. ملخص عن شؤون قطر، ١٨٧٣-١٩٠٤." [و‎‎٨] (٩٢/١٥)

5
16. Commenting on our obligation under the Treaty of 1861 to prevent
and employ force against aggressive enterprises of this nature, he noted as one
o£ our preventive measures the assistance of the various Chieftains of the
Katar Coast, who, it was understood, were held responsible in these matters
for their immediate coast line. This responsibility the Chief of Bidaa, or at
any rate his son, Jasim bin Mahomed, was prepared to evade on the plea that
they were under Turkish influence. " It is, therefore, now, I think, a matter
for consideration whether the Turkish Government should not be asked to
state clearly for what portions of the coast they undertake to be responsible."
The Resident also mentioned the insecurity of the Chief of Bahrein's position
owing to the enmity of the other branch of the family, the secret sympathy
of the Turks, and his own want of conciliation towards the Arab Chiefs and
others as a reason for anticipating an early change in the position of affairs.
17. In reply to these letters the Government of India instructed him
not to hold communications with the local Turkish officials regarding Bahrein.
"Any necessary representations can, under present cirsumstances, bemadawith more effect
through Her Majesty^s Ambassador at Constantinople under instructions from the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs. Interference in the affairs of Bahrein and of the Arab Chiefs
on the Coast should^ as far as practicable, be limited to protecting the legitimate interests
of British subjects, maintaining our Treaty rights, and. performing our Treaty obligations.
When these are affected it will be proper to take steps to put matter right; otherwise the
less interference you exercise the better
18. The defeat of the Beni Hajir by the El Nairn tribe apparently dis
couraged the former from attempting any further warlike movements, and.
seven of them were said to have been arrested by Jasim bin Mahomed for
plundering a Bahrein boat, in which he had a considerable sum of money, but
the Turks took advantage of these disturbances to send their gun-boat, the
Iskenderia, to the Katar Coast apparently to make enquiries concerning them ;
the result being that her Commander seemed to have taken the Chiefs of
Bidaa and the Agent of the Governor of Lahsa to task for their share in
causing them.
Apprehended attack of Nasir bin Mobarik on Katar and Bahrein—
1874.
19. Nasir bin Mobarik soon afterwards left Hasaand arrived on the Katar
Coast, where his presence could not fail to cause additional anxiety as regards
Bahrein. He wrote to the Resident stating that he had been for the last six
years deprived of his just rights in Bahrein which was the property of all
his family, and begging that the British Government would not prohibit his
getting these rights. The Resident in reply told him that any attempts at
aggression would meet with the active opposition of the British Government.
He found that the Chief of Bahrein was in a state of anxiety about the pre
sence of Nasir bin Mobarik on the Katar Coast, and the possibility of his
receiving assistance from the Chief of Bidaa and the Katar people generally in
an attack on Bahrein :—
" Sheikh Esau in dwelling on the danger to his Government from the propinquity o£
Nasir bin Mobarik, expressed his desire tbat I should take steps to prevent the Katar Chief
harbouring him or assisting him in any operations against Zobarah by land or sea. I informed
the Chief tbat I could not undertake to interfere except to repress movements by sea. The
ChieE of Bahrein being apprehensive of an attack on his allies, and as he considers, subjects,
who hold the fort of Zobarah, asked whether he would be allowed to reinforce the garrison of
that place, which he considered a dependency of Bahrein. Sheikh Esau necessarily relies much
on the Naim tribe of Zobarah, who came to his aid in his late dangers, and if he were to be
deprived of their support, his means of defence would be greatly weakened. A refusal on his
part to aid the Naim garrison of Zobarah if attacked by other Arab tribes of Katar would
undoubtedly lose the friendship of that tribe for Sheikh Esau.
<f My reply to the Chief was to the effect that I would as before advise him as far as
possible to keep free o£ the feuds on the mainland. That as regards succouring Zobarah I
would not interfere with the despatch of reinforcements as a purely defensive measure •, but
that it was for the Chief himself to judge as to the necessity for, or expediency of, the
measure. 1 likewise enjoined him to carefully abstain from taking any part in the operations
in which the Turkish Government were engaged."