"ملف 53/6 (D 2) شؤون الكويت ١٨٩٨-١٨٩٩" [ظ‎‎٨‎٦] (٥٥٤/١٧٢)

between one-Iialf and one-fifth of the new capital annually created in the world, the
enterprise may, therefore, be fairly described by Count Kapnist as " Foeuvre la plus
grandiose de ce si^cle."
The project of the Petition addressed to the Sultan virtually comprises the
exclusive right of exploitation of the basins of the Euphrates and Tigris, ports, railways,
river navigation, mines, and all land capable of being reclaimed, the holders of such a
Concession would undoubtedly have a predominant influence in the country.
As half the capital is to be issued in Hussia, and half the Directors are to bo
persons of Russian nationality, the other halves being distributed over the rest of the
world, it is obvious that if such terms are accepted, the preponderance of the uniform
moiety of capital and direction over the distributed moiety, is amply provided for, and
that the undertaking would be essentially a Russian monopoly/ The scheme in this
form, appears, therefore, to be one which cannot be commended as a patriotic invest
ment for British capital, or as one which would be consonant with the general
interests of this country.
Nor is the basis upon which Messrs.Williams, Meyer, and Co. propose to negotiate,
viz., that Russian representation should be proportionate to Russian capital without
in any case exceeding half the whole, an adequate safeguard. Nothing short of an
assured British majority on the Board of Directors should be considered sufficient to
deserve the support of Her Majesty's Government.
Prom the analogy of other instances of a like nature, it may be inferred that
Count Kapnist's reservation was not intended to furnish a field of investment for the
surplus capital of private persons in Russia; but rather to create an opportunity for
the State financiers of that country to acquire predominant influence in the basins of the
Euphrates and Tigris, with a view to their eventual inheritance. There is little surplus
capital in Russia, and the ordinary Russian manifests no disposition to invest in
<e wild-cat schemes abroad, even when they conduce to the aggrandisement of his
country.
The Trans-Caspian, Siberian, and Manchurian Railways; the Russo-Chinese
Bank ; and the Tehran—Resht road, are all State concerns, and so would be the
Mesopotamian undertaking, if worked on Count Kapnist's lines, which appear to be
favoured by the Russian Embassy at Constantinople. There is a certain grim humour
in the conception of acquiring the reversion of the Euphrates and Tigris basins by
means of a so-called International Joint-Stock Company largely supported by British
capital, but directed by Russia; and from that point of view 30,000,000/. does not
appear to be an inordinately great eventual liability ; for the expenditure of the sum
would in any case be spread over a great many years, and the amount to be raised
annually need not exceed 3,000,000Z.
In connection with^ the Kapnist project, it may be well to call attention to other
schemes which Russia is believed to have in contemplation, and to those of othei^
projectors. Persia is now* in a condition of unrest which occasions grave anxiety as
to its future, and may precipitate a disruption for which even Prussia is hardly prepared.
Events may^ force her hand, and compel her to garner the fruit before it becomes
altogether ripe. In this event, she will presumably take possession or assume a
protectorate over Azerbijan on the west, and a portion of Khorassan on the east. A
railway through the former would connect with the Kapnist scheme at Khanikin;
and that through the latter would lead from Ashkabad to Meshed, Birjand, and
Seistan ; from whence there would be an easy route along the Helmand to Kandahar.
The line from Merv in the direction of Herat is already commenced. Its progress
beyond the Afghan frontier must await future events, but already suggestions have
been thrown out as to the prospect of connecting with Kandahar and Quetta.
These vast conceptions are at present mere castles in the air devised by the
military adventurers who play such important parts in the development of Russian
frontier policy.
Underlying them are the aspirations for extending Russian power over Turkey,
Persia, and Afghanistan, for ports on the Persian G-ulf, and, for the invasion of India •
to none oi; which we can afford to be indifferent, although they have not yet become
burning questions.
November 28, 1898.