"ملف 61/11 V (D 95) مسائل متنوعة خاصة بالحجاز ونجد" [و‎‎٢‎٣‎١] (٥٣٠/٤٧٨)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC jtafjESTY S GOVERNMENT
EASTEEN (A rabia)
CONFIDENTIAL.
[B 6329/759/25]
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S ection 1.
Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—{Received October 23.)
(No. 305.)
Sir, Jedda, October 3, 1933.
WITH reference to my despatch No. 295 of the 19th September last,,
regarding the strained rel atio ns at present existing between Saudi Arabia and
the Yemen, I have the honour to inform you that, as reported in my telegrams
Nos. 173 and 176 of the 25th and 29th September respectively. Sheikh
Abdullah Suleiman described the general situation as unchanged.
2. The exchange of telegrams which for some time encouraged the hope that
an amicable settlement would be the ultimate issue of present differences, has
unfortunately been interrupted, and no further correspondence has taken place,
if the Minister of Finance is to be believed, since the Imam Yahya's unsatisfactory
reply, to which I referred in my despatch No. 290 of the 12th September. In
consequence, Saudi preparations for a settlement by force of arms are being
energetically pushed forward, and the Minister of Finance himself is actively
engaged in the despatch of men and material to the south. His statement that
Amir Feisal-bin-Saud had been appointed commander-in-chief, with his head
quarters at Abha, I have already reported, and to this he added, in reply to my
question, that if later developments made it necessary Amir Saud would himself
supersede his cousin in the command. Indeed, I learn from a source usually fairly
well-informed, that Amir Saud has already left Riyadh in the direction of Asir,.
but has not unfurled his standard as such a proceeding would be tantamount to
a declaration of war. The same source, although unaware of the appointment of
Amir Feisal-bin-Saud, mentioned that three important personages, viz.,
Ibn Jiluwi, Feisal-bin-Lawey and the Amir Muhammad, brother of the King, had
all been given a command in Asir.
3. There are many minor indications of widespread activity. A number of
tribal leaders recently arrived in Jedda by Khedivial mail steamer from Yanbu
for Asir, and recruiting in those northern littoral districts is reported to be active.
Ibn Saud, it is further stated, has pressed into service and drafted to Najran all
available camels in Nejd, including even those belonging to the Royal family.
4. During Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman's call on me on the 29th September, I
took the opportunity to enquire concerning the report, which had appeared in the
Egyptian press, and which was stated to have emanated from Aden, that a clash
had recently occurred at Salla (a place I have been unable to identify, unless it
be Senta) in the Tihamat Asir between Saudi and Yemeni forces. He professed
to know of no such happening and said the report was probably due to an incident,
now more than six weeks old, when a force of some 300 Saudi soldiers was.
employed to exact taxes from a small but recalcitrant tribe inhabiting a village,
whose name he had forgotten, immediately south of Jizan. The tribe had been
brought to order and its tribal chiefs were now in prison at Jizan.
5. He then volunteered the information that fighting was still going on in
Najran between the tribes and the Zeidi forces, and that as the former had been
reinforced by certain tribal elements from the Wadi Dawasir, they were now
getting the upper hand. The Imamic forces were withdrawing, not rapidly it was.
true, as to abandon Najran would be to admit defeat, but the district was being,
steadily cleared At my remark that the Dawasir tribe is related by blood ties to ;
the Beni Yam of Nairan, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman stated that the Yam (as he
called them), really consisted of elements of Yam proper, Dawasir and Mirri, a.
congerie inhabiting a fairly wide area. . . .. ^ ^ *
6. His last reference to this subject was to reiterate his personal belief, to
which as vou are aware he has previously given utterance, that Ibn Saud would
allow events to take their course until he was militarily ready to enforce upon
the Imam his demands Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman added that he was also of the
opinion that, war or no war, Ibn Saud would maintain his army m Asir m
[935 z—1]