"ملف 61/11 V (D 95) مسائل متنوعة خاصة بالحجاز ونجد" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢‎٣] (٥٣٠/٤٦٣)

■ib«
the 30th August, Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahia were continuing to maintain
telegraphic communication, with a view to reaching a settlement of the questions
outstanding between the two States.
3. In accordance with the request contained in His Britannic Majesty's
Embassy's note verhale of the 30th August, the Royal Ministry for Foreign
Affairs have already taken steps to ascertain the Imam's point of view regarding
the agreement said to have been concluded between him and King Ibn Saud in
1927 in regard to the frontiers between the two States.
Pending, however, the receipt of this information, the Royal Ministry for
Foreign Affairs deem it useful to submit to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy
certain observations on the existence of such an agreement. In the first place,
the fact remains that neither during the Italo-British conversations held in Rome
in 1927 nor in the correspondence subsequently exchanged between the Italian
and British Governments regarding the relations between the Yemen and Saudi
Arabia and the general situation in the Arabian Peninsula was mention
apparently ever made, or recourse ever had, to the agreement referred to above.
In the second place, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs are able to
communicate to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy the following information,
which recently reached them from an authoritative and entirely reliable source
at Sanaa, at the very moment when the negotiations with the Saudi delegation
there were commencing. The latter delegation did, in fact, refer to an alleged
agreement regarding the frontiers, concluded some years ago between Saudi
Arabia and the Yemen, but the Yemeni Government represented to the Saudi
mission that this agreement did not, in fact, exist, and that all that had taken
shape was a mere draft, prepared by the Amil of Midi with some Saudi delegates
on the occasion of the dispute regarding Jebel Ayir—a draft which was never
approved by the Imam. The Saudi delegation were invited by the Yemeni
Government to produce the text of this agreement, but they were never able
to do so.
In the third place, it is known that during the months previous to last May
the Imam's eldest son, Seif-el-Islam Ahmed, undertook a military police
expedition in Nejran to subdue certain tribes.
These operations in a territory which, according to the alleged agreement of
1927, was under the sovereignty of Ibn Saud, did not prevent the latter from
subsequently sending a delegation to Sanaa to negotiate with the Imam. This
suggests that the possession of Nejran by the Saudi Arabian Kingdom was at
any rate not clearly stipulated in any agreement between the Yemen and
Saudi Arabia.
The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, however, may have occasion to
communicate further information as a result of the enquiries which they have
already set on foot.
4. The Royal Government is in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's
Government in considering the present tension between the two Arabian
kingdoms as being of a grave character; and, with a view to contributing their
share towards the maintenance of peace in that region, they consider it incumbent
upon them to submit, in the same spirit of frank and friendly collaboration as
that which marked the Rome conversations in 1927, the following further
considerations to His Britannic Majesty's Government:—
The principal question which divides the two Arabian kingdoms is that of
the sovereignty of Asir, a territory in which King Ibn Saud has, since 1926,
exercised rights of occupation and possession, thus modifying the pre-existing
situation to the detriment of the interests of the Yemen. In their note verhale
of the 10th September, 1931, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs had occasion
to recapitulate the past history of the question, setting forth in detail the
subsequent interventions of King Ibn Saud in that territory, first by the
imposition of a Saudi protectorate (in 1926) and then by the transformation of
the protectorate into an annexation (October 1930).
As mentioned in the above note verhale, the de facto situation created by
King Ibn Saud in Asir resulted in an exchange of views between the Italian and
British Governments, which agreed to postpone any formal or direct act of
recognition of the sovereignty of King Ibn Saud over Asir.
The Royal Government have already had occasion to represent to His
Britannic Majesty's Government that this action of King Ibn Saud in Asir
might provoke natural and comprehensible reactions on the part of the Imam,
and accordingly to indicate the desirability of restraining King Ibn Saud from