"ملف 61/11 V (D 95) مسائل متنوعة خاصة بالحجاز ونجد" [و‎‎١‎٦‎٦] (٥٣٠/٣٤٨)

(/lit
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
^ _
Ud! EASTERN ( Arabia), \ May 16, 1933.
ll W _ -■'
Cilklj CONFIDENTIAL. \0iu.. n S ection 1.
[E 2541/233/25] No. 1.
Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 16.)
^ (No. 119.)
gir, Jedda, April 18, 1933.
iiilj ' WITH reference to my despatch No. 118 of the 16th April, I have the honour
1 : to state that after consulting Fuad Bey Hamza and satisfying myself that it might
be useful to have a business conversation with the King before the arrival of
% the Transjordanian mission, I applied for a further audience and was received
! by His Majesty on the 17th April
i ' 2. I took the opportunity of presenting Mr. Oppenheim to the King. After
ii he had retired. His Majesty left it to me to start the business conversation.
I I reviewed at some length the events leading up to the recent recognition of each
ii other by Ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah, stressing the evidence they had afforded
i: of the friendship of His Majesty's Government towards the King and his
ii Government. I said that a further stage was now impending. It might be
attended by difficulty, one of the reasons being that His Majesty's Government
had expressed readiness to accept a definite responsibility for the execution of
undertakings entered into by the Amir and Government of Transjordan. This
made it necessary that they should not only know the nature of such under
takings, but should assure themselves that they were such that His Majesty's
Government could discharge the obligation implied in their guarantee. I asked
the King to bear this in mind, when questions were referred to him during the
negotiations and to remember that, if at any point His Majesty's Government
took up an attitude distasteful to him, it would be due not to lack of friendship,
but to a desire to avoid future controversy.
3. Ibn Saud replied, also at some length and with animation, but his state
ments were not closely reasoned and I observed the same curious appearance of
preoccupation as at my formal audience of the loth April. His main thesis
was the familiar one that he expected his friends, the British Government and
myself, to see him through and that there need be no difficulties, if they were
willing to do so. He described himself more than once as the older friend,
meaning that he was an older friend of His Majesty's Government than the
Amir Abdullah. He suggested that as the Amir's delegate would have the
support of British officials in Transjordan, his own representatives should
have mine.
4. I persevered in my attempt to impress on the King the consideration
that His Majesty's Government must make certain that they could ensure the
execution of any undertakings they endorsed. I pointed out, d propos of a
reference by the King to Arabs generally, that the Arabs were a large family in
which family quarrels occurred and that His Majesty's Government came into
their affairs from outside. They desired to do their best for all Arabs, but they
stood towards different sections of them in a variety of relationships. They dealt
with His Majesty as an independent ruler. They considered the feelings of the
Amir Abdullah and his people, but they had authority and responsibility in
regard to them. I cited as an illustration a recent incident. The authorities
in Transjordan had been trying to round up one Karayim-bin-Atiya, in order
to put him out of the way of harming the King. I had just heard that the
King had recently entertained this man as his guest. I said I had no objection
to this. It was an Arab way of doing things. My point was that if the same
man were shown favour by the Amir Abdullah, it would be my duty to
deprecate it. '
5. The King was voluble in explanation of his attitude towards Karayim,
which he put down to the fact that he had been asked, and asked by the Amir
Abdullah himself, to be forgiving towards the Beni Atiya. I repeated that I had
mentioned the incident only as an example of a case in which he was free to show
favour to a late enemy and in the counterpart of which His Majesty's Government
[795 q—1]