"ملف 61/11 V (D 95) مسائل متنوعة خاصة بالحجاز ونجد" [ظ‎‎٩] (٥٣٠/٣٥)

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7. Slavery.—It is impossible to verify the claim made by Fuad Hamza on
behalf of Ibn Saud that he has taken serious steps to prevent slave traffic m
accordance with the obligation accepted by him in the Treaty of Jedda, an
obligation which he has firmly refused to repeat in his treaties with France and
Italy. He is wholly recalcitrant regarding the maintenance of slavery m his
dominions. He resents the continued exercise by the British Legation of the
right of manumission preserved by way of modus vivendi in the letters annexed
to the Treaty of Jedda. Frequent efforts are made to obstruct the repatriation
of slaves manumitted by the Legation. The question has been brought to a head
by the case of the slave Bakhit, whom Ibn Saud claimed as his property, though
not as a member of his household or army, and to whose manumission he objected
on the strength of an alleged oral agreement with Sir G. Clayton qualifying the
letters attached to the Treaty of Jedda.
8. Deportation of British Subjects and Protected Persons .—Although His
Majesty's Government do not question the right of the Hejazi Government to
deport British subjects, &c., without stating reasons, the arbitrary conduct of the
Hejazi Government in the matter is a cause of not infrequent hardship.
9. Akaha and Maan.- —The question of the juridical status of this area is
in abeyance. There is no urgent reason for reopening it on our side, unless it is
found essential to thrash out the subject of the de facto boundary south of the
Jebel Tubeik, or unless serious inconvenience results from claims by Ibn Saud to
regard tribesmen from the disputed area as his subjects. The question should
not, however, be disregarded in any estimate of our general position vis-a-vis of
Ibn Saud.
10. Hejaz Railway. —This question is also in abeyance, and the reasons for
leaving it so are even more cogent than in the case of Akaba Maan, owing to the
sensitiveness of Moslem opinion, inflamed by the illusory idea that the railway is
a Wakf. Otherwise it would probably be in the interest of all concerned if the
former proposal to recondition the railway as a whole, without reference to claims
to Moslem ownership of it, could be made practical politics.
11. Naval Visits. —Greater freedom in the matter of visits to Hejazi and
Asiri ports, other than Jedda, is desirable, but not, in my opinion, essential for
any practical purpose.
12. Treatment of Foreign Representatives in Jedda. —No complaints are
made regarding any lack of personal courtesy towards foreign representatives.
Their official position is, however, impaired in three distinct ways, viz., by the
continued failure of the Hejazi Government to produce a Ministry for Foreign
Affairs worthy of the name, by the denial of access to any place except Jedda
and the jealousy with which the Hejazi Government regard intervention on
behalf of foreign subjects, especially Moslems. The last of these points is a
matter of considerable practical importance, as is shown, inter alia, by the line
taken by the Hejazi Government over the matter of the Shell benzine.
The foregoing list is a general summary of the more important specific
matters requiring consideration in any general estimate of the position of His
Majesty's Government vis-a-vis of Ibn Saud. It reveals a generally unsatisfac
tory position, but not (apart from the repercussion of the Bakhit affair) an acute
one, except in so far as the settlement of the questions at 1 to 4 inclusive, and
perhaps the Eastern Telegraph Company question at 5, may be regarded as
urgent. I have prepared the summary while travelling and largely from memory.
I do not think I have omitted anything of first-class importance, but the list
would need revision, if required for more than the present purpose of a general
review. It might be expanded in various directions, e.g., it does not deal with
matters like the state of the port at J edda and the vexatious character of certain
customs regulations.
(B.)— Position of Ibn Saud.
Ibn baud is almost certainly on the down grade. He has perhaps not reached
the limit of ambition and may, therefore, be tempted into dangerous enterprises,
but he has reached the limit of what he can achieve without embroiling himself
with His Majesty s Government or else trying conclusions with the Imam of the
Yemen. People used to ask whether his system could survive his disappearance
from the scene. It is now a question whether he can maintain it during his own
lifetime. He is still physically robust and there is no reason why he should not
last another twenty years or so, though it may be true that he tends towards