'ملف رقم 9/50 (B 16) حادث دبي' [و‎‎٤‎٩] (٤٩٢/١٠٨)

61
of 3rd March 1909. At that time after careful study of the position I
deprecated the appointment being carried out for the present for the consider
ation explained and suggested, as a compromise, that the officer to be
appointed as Vice-Consul at Lingah should visit Debai occasionally as
necessity required and opportunity offered. Since then nearly two years
have elapsed during which the situation has developed in directions which
have greatly accentuated the need for the presence of a British Officer and
a Telegraph Station on the coast. The interests of our own trade need it,
and the attention which foreign merchants, such as Messrs. Wonckhaus and
Messrs. Rosenthal, are now paying to Debai make the appointment politically
important. Latterly again the indications that the coast in question is being
used as a forwarding base for arms lend the question fresh urgency.
It was because the .Arms Traffic question gave us specific grounds, and
the presence of a large fleet of ships in the Gulf gave us means for
safely installing our Agent, that I made the suggestion to send Mr. New
to Lebai for this cold weather. When I asked sanction to that course I in
tended to take Mr, New to Debai myself after the Admiral had left and then
believed that with the support of one of His Majesty's ships I should have been
able to overcome the Shaikh's objections in a friendly way and get Mr. New
installed without any serious obstruction,. But the arms question began to
get acute and Mr. New was on the point of leaving for Debai with the Senior
Naval Officer when the recent incident occurred and upset our calculations.
The Government of India now express the view that requirements will be
sufficiently met by an occasional visit of the Vice-Consul in one of Hia
Majesty's Ships, until such time as friendly relations have been re-established
sufficient to warrant his installation on shore.
I trust, however, that in the absence of unfavourable developments, the
Government of India will feel able to modify their view.
I cannot but fear that, if the location of the British Agent is deferred, it
will be deferred indefinitely and that when the time is forced upon us
there is no criterion that we shall not have the same difficulty to face then as
we have now.
We have naturally incurred a great deal of odium all over the Gulf in
connection with the measures we are taking for the suppression of arms
traffic and this recent incident will no doubt increase it j but it is inevitable
that we should incur this odium and I submit that we should not let it prevent
us from compensating ourselves, where possible, by using such legitimate
opportunities as the course of events and the presence of our ships may
afford us for strengthening our influence and our hold in places where they are
operative.
I would not recommend this perseverance in the present location of the
British Officer, did I think that it would result in any permanent or wide
spread combination or ebullition of hostility against us, but at present I see no
grounds for fearing suet a contingency.
I believe the idea of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief who is
leaving the Gulf now, would be to carry out the installation when he returns
with the necessary ships and men to carry out any naval action or demonstra
tion that His Majesty's Government may finally direct at the north end of the
Gulf; meanwhile, I shall shortly be visiting the Trucial Coast again in con
nection with the Abu Musa case and shall have an opportunity of gauging
the effect of the recent incident and action on the public mind.