"دليل الخليج. الجزء الأول. المواد التاريخية والسياسية. ملخص عن التوسع التركي على السواحل العربية للخليج العربي وشؤون الأحساء والقطيف" [‎١‎٠‎٢] (١٦٠/١١٤)

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bring pressure upon tliese chiefs from the land side ; and they might thus find themselves
subject to a divided or double authority, which would produce confusion, would create factions,
and would tempt them to hoist the Turkish or the maritime treaty flag as might be most
convenient at the moment. This possibility is illustrated by the proceedings of the Sheikh
of El Bidda, who now declares himself subordinate to Turkey, and by the attempt of the
Odied Sheikh to follow the example of El Bidaa/'
It may, also, be necessary to protect the islands of Bahrein by special arrangements
which should provide—
i.—For the maintenance of the territories of the Chief of Bahrein under the protection
of Great Britain.
ii.—.For the fulfilment by the Chief of his treaty obligations including abstention from
all interference with the mainland.
But in the event of attack upon his territories the Chief, acting under the sanction of
the Resident in the Persian Gulf, should be permitted to take such defensive measures as may
be necessary, even to the extent of following up his assailants into Turkish jurisdiction. The
justification for this last provision lies in the peculiar situation of Bahrein. The islands are so
near the mainland as to render them peculiarly liable to piratical attacks, while this same
proximity affords the aggressors every facility for rapid escape into Turkish jurisdiction.
16. Secondly in regard to Ottoman responsibility for order ? Beyond the limits of ac
knowledged Ottoman jurisdiction, no such responsibility would, as a matter of coarse, exist.
But for the reasons already stated, we consider that within these limits the British Govern
ment must continue to exercise some concurrent maritime protectorate ; at least until we can be
better assured than at present that the Turkish Government can protect our subjects and our
interests effectively. It may not be found necessary to place on record any formal agreement
as to the exercise of this joint protectorate ; but some understanding of the following nature
might be arraged
i.—-That pirates, whatever their nationality, taken at sea, as well as pirates followed
up and taken within the territorial waters of Turkey by British officers, or on
shore within reach of the guns of British vessels, shall be dealt with under the
orders of the Resident in the Persian Gulf.*
ii.—That the British authorities shall not undertake operations on the mainland within
the Turkish line, as the duty of destroying pirate strongholds so situated will
devolve upon the Turkish authorities.
iii.—That the necessary representations to the local Turkish authorities shall be ordi
narily made by the Political Agent at Baghdad. If, however, immediate action
is necessary, they may be made in the first instance by the Resident in the
Persian Gulf, who should inform the Political Agent at Baghdad of his pro
ceedings.
iv.—That in case of piracies committad from within their jurisdiction, the Trrkish
authorities shall enforce restitution of plundered property and payment of com
pensation.
17. It may also appear to Her Majesty's Government that the present opportunity should
be taken to reviss our agreements both with Muscat and the Arab Trucial Chiefs including, of
course, Bahrein. It is due to the policy which the British Government has persued for many
years at heavy expense, and to the efficient naval police which it maintains, that piratical out
rages have ceased on all that part of the Arab coast subject to British influence. In conse
quence of this condition of permanent security, the commerce of the Persian Gulf has deve
loped to an extent which a few years ago would have been dpemed impossible, and it continues
steadily to increase. The Arab Chiefs and the Sultan of Muskat have prospered under the
prolonged and settled peace which the British maritime protectorate has secured. Neverthe
less, they contribute nothing towards the maintenance of a condition of thing so profitable to
themselves, and their engagements contain no distinct acknowledgment of the British Gov
ernment as the paramount power. The Government of India has never exercised any right of
sovereignty over these Chiefs, nor, except as regards maritime proceedings, does it possess
any control over them. For the purpose of obtaining a complete and recognized title, and
of securing on a valid international basis the position which the British Government has ac
quired by a long coarse of settled polioy. and at much cost, it will be very advisable to arrange
that the Treaty Chiefs shall render a small tribute to us in exchange for our protection.
18. The question of the effect which a settlement with Turkey is likely to produce upon
Persia, scarcely falls within the province of the Government of India. Colonel Ross remarks
that the Persian Government and its authorities along the coast have become accustomed to the
presence of British ships-of-war, and appreciate the advantages of our operations. He adds
that Persia would certainly resent any attempts on the part of Turkey to assume a similar
P' si'ion ; nor does he think that the Turks would think it worth while to make the attempt.
We may however observe that a determination, somewhat on the lines indicated, of the posi-