"دليل الخليج. الجزء الأول. المواد التاريخية والسياسية. ملخص عن التوسع التركي على السواحل العربية للخليج العربي وشؤون الأحساء والقطيف" [‎١‎٥] (١٦٠/٢٧)

15
The Bombay Government observed
" It is probable Turldsh Governor may count on our known policy preventing all naval
operations by littoral powers in Gulf, but Turkey no party to truce. To prevent Wahabi
from acting-by sea against Turk or Koweit it' allied with Turkey is practically an active
interference in favour of Turkey. Neither Wahabi nor Koweit parties to truce/'
58. On the 9th May the following enquiry from Colonel Pelly wns received
ibid. (No. 626.) through the Bombay Government:—
" Can Turks and Koweit make trucial Chiefs harbour a basis of operations against
Wahabis in friendly relation with Chief? * * * I presume British subjects
employed on Turkish vessels could not be concerned in molestation of trucial Chief."
Colonel Felly's object in asking this last question is explained in his letter
No. 505—130, dated 20th May. He was under the imp ression that the debarka
tion could only be effected by force and by aid of the fleet's artillery. A
debarkation of this character would, in his opinion, coustitute a maritime
operation, and would—
" afford ground for misrepresentation- and even misunderstanding of onr known policy of
preventing all naval operations by the littoral powers of the Persian Gulf."
British policy in the Persian Gnlf: That policy how affected by
Nejd Expedition.
59. A general Tiew of the British policy of the Gulf, how that policy was
likely to be affected by the Turkish
Hid K.-W., pages 7-8. i i. au - a -
expedition, was discussed at tins time in
the Foreign Department. The following is extracted from the Poreign Secre
tary Mr. Aitchison's note, dated 3rd May 1871:—
" It should never be forgotten that, in all its main features, our position in the Persian
Gulf is one which we have taken up on grounds of policy. Its foundation in Treaty is of the
most meagre and narrow kind. In reality it is a position which we have arbitrarily assumed as
an act of State or conquest, the justification of it lying,7?^, in the circumstances of the time
at which w^e entered on it; and, secondly> the length of time during which we have asserted
the position we have assumed. His Excellency in Council may, perhaps, rot be aware how
exceedingly narrow is the scope of the Treaty engagements with the Ar.ib tribes fcr the
maintenance of the peace at sea. The Chief of Bahrein is bound by his special agreement to
abstain from all maritime aggressions of every description so long as he is protected by the
British Government from similar aggressions by the Chiefs and tribes of the Gulf. But the
Chiefs who have subscribed the ] erpetual feace have bound themselves only to absiain
from aggressions on the subjects of the subscribing parties, and our rijiht or duty to interfere
in virtue of the Treaty is limited to cases in which one of the parties to the maritime peace
commits an outrage on another. In all other cases our interference with warlike operations,
whether by parties to the Treaty of peace, or by Chiefs who are not parties to that Treaty, is
based on no tetter foundation than our own determina tion to do so, ai)d the fact that we
have done so for a long series of years. If we have no Treaty right, and are under no
Treaty obligation to prevent such an expedition as the present on the part of Turkey or
Persia, neither have we any such right, or are we under any such obligation, to prevent any
of the subscribers to the maritime peace from attacking the Turks or the Persians by sea,
or fitting out a similar expedition against any party who has not signed the Treaty. It may
be said that the Turkish expedition is so far peculiar, that it is proceeding against Turkish
subjects to re-establish authority in their own countiy. The recent telegrams make this by
no means certain, but even if it be the case, it hardly affects the question. We cannot make
our policy at sea depend on Arab politics ash re; we cannot attempt to make our interference
to prevent an expedition by sea depend on the justice or injustice of the claims which the
expedition is intended to assert. To do so would involve us in the intricate domestic relations
of the Arab tribes, which we neither know nor are capable of understanding. Hitherto our
policy has been to prevent all expeditious by sea and to impose the restriction on all alike, both
great and small. The possibility of our maintaining our position seems to me to depend on onr
maintaining it in its integrity If we admit exceptions, I do not see where we can stop in oui
retreat till we reach the narrow ground covered by our Treaties. We shall never make the
exceptions intelligible to those who are not admitted to the benefit of them- If the Turks send
their troops by sta, the Wahabis and the Arab Chiefs who support Saud have clearly a right
to attack them by sea. If the Arabs are defeated, we cannot prevent the Turks from exercis
ing over them ali the rights of successful war, and establishing their supremacy over the Arab
country. There is then an end to our policy in the Gulf ; or if the Arab Chiefs, remaining
quiet now, wish hereafter to lit out some naval force, how are we to prevent them when we