"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [و‎‎١‎٨‎٣] (٤٢٤/٣٧٠)

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21st Brigade had to be sent through, them to prolong the left of the 35th
Brigade.
The Black Watch reached Baghdad station by 0550. By this time
the whole of the 7th Division were advancing along the main road ia
rear.
The Cavalry occupied Kazimain with the 6th Brigade. The 13tii
Hussars policed Baghdad while the remainder of the division camped
on the right bank.
On the left bank our patrols occupied the Tel Mahomed position at
0230. The 13th Division advanced and camped at Es Salekh leaving
two battalions to garrison the city. The 14th Division concentrated
just north of the Diyala Bridge while the 3rd Division (less 7th Brigade
on the south-west sector of Baghdad) remained at Bawi.
COMMENTS—(1) The inactivity and slowness of the cavalry and
their reluctance to move wide is again remarkable.
(2) The great danger in attempting to rush across a river in face of
the enemy without the m«st careful preparations and very thorough
organization is well exemplified by the events on the Diyala, 7th—9tlj
March.
(3) The extraordinary way in which the Turks, disorganized,,
defeated, devoid of signal arrangements, short of transport and mate
rial, not only managed to hang up our advance for four days and inflict
on us heavy casualties, but also despite darkness, dust storm, and dis
aster to slip successfully away from under our noses, is most admirable.
From the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, London, to the General Officer
Commanding, Force " D", Basra, dated 20th February, 1917.
Reference your X-878 (Dy. No. 13224) of February 24th received
yesterday. With reference to the War Cabinet's instructions of Sep
tember 28th, thejr have decided to modify them as follows :—
BEGINS—It is the policy of His Majesty's Government to establish
British influence in the Baghdad Vilayet subject to the security of you r
force and to the capacity of your communications.-—ENDS.
Having regard to your communications, to enemy reinforcements
and to the importance of your main body not being later forced to fall
back for any reason, this decision requires you to press the enemy in
the direction of Baghdad and so exploit your recent success to the full
extent which you hope to be feasible and useful.
Because of its objectionable political effect, the retirement of your
main body above referred to might be an indirect military disadvan
tage, although perhaps not a direct one.
From information in my possession, I have no grounds fox thinking
that Turks can collect sufficient troops to imperil your safet^ south of
X