"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [و‎‎١‎٥‎٨] (٤٢٤/٣٢٠)

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Of a total of 150,000 men (ration strength) General Maude had
concentrated 72,000 on the main front. This well exemplifies the manner
in which modern war absorbs men behind the fighting line and on subsi
diary fronts.
Whether the 15th Division on tJie Euphrates front was an unnecessary
detachment is open to argument.
It is interesting to note that prior to the opening of the offensive
General Maude moved his Headquarters from Basra to the Tigris front,
just as General Allenby moved his Hd. Qrs. from Cairo to the Gaza front.
General Maude had concentrated against the enemy a superiority
of over three to one. The light railway, his transport (which included
one M. T. Company) and a strong force of cavalry gave him far greater
power of manoeuvre than the enemy, and to a certain degree enabled
him to leave the river to which the Turk was closely tied.
The courses open to him were limited. To turn the enemy's left was
impossible owing to the Suwaikya Lake. A direct frontal attack on the
Sannaiyat position would be very costly and from previous experience,
success by such a method was doubtful. The apparent vulnerability of
the Sannaiyat position to enfilade fire from the southern bank of the
Tigris had not in practice proved a great weakness. The last course was
to operate against the enemy's right up the right bank of the river and
this was the course adopted.
Looking at the problem, as we now see it, Maude's object was to destroy
the enemy. Such a statement seems to be merely stating the obvious,
but the more one analyses the facts the more it seems to appear that thip
object was at first not dominant in Maude's mind. In one sense, of course,
he was trying to defeat the enemy, and did defeat him ; but his operations
in the period under review do not seem to have been made with the
object of completely surrounding and destroying the force opposed to
him, but rather with the less ambitious project of merely manoeuvring
the enemy out his entrenched positions and compelling him to retreat.
In chapter XV it has been seen that on September 30th, 1916, the
British Government laid down as the mission of the force in Mesopotamia,
the protection of the Persian Oil Fields, the Basra Vilayet and Southern
Persia. The establishment of British influence as far as Baghdad was
only to be undertaken if opportunity offered. No further reinforcements
for Force 'D' could be expected and it was possible that the 13th Division
might have to be transferred to another theatre.
The withdrawal of the Force towards Basra was suggested.
The C. I. G. S. also mentioned fchat he doubted the advisability of
advancing on Baghdad.
From this it will be seen that Maude was in an indirect manner
assigned a defensive role. No word was mentioned of destroying the
Turks opposed to him.