"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [و‎‎١‎٢‎٦] (٤٢٤/٢٥٦)

(6) Naval co-operation. The 6" guns of the gun boats of the Tigris
Flotilla were used for bombarding back areas. This was the only assist
ance the Xavy could give. Guns, especially direct-nre low-traj ectory
weapons, of somewhat antiquated pattern, fired from a floating platform
cannot be expected to display the degree of accuracy required for
barrage fire in modern battle bombardments.
(7) Air co-operation. In spite of the inferior material and the small
number both of machines and pilots available, the work of the Eoyal
Flying Corps was remarkable. The machines they had to use were of
such types as the old Henri Farman, the Voisin, and at best the B. E. 2 C.
All slow and, except for the last type, with a very poor performance.
Aerial photography had not reached Mesopotamia. The only maps
available were produced by officers sketching from the air and were
therefore quite inaccurate. Aerodrome difficulties were very great.
Ground was either flooded or was a sea of heavy mud, and was restricted,
at least in January and February by having to occupy the centre of a peri
meter camp, such precautions ibeing then considered necessary against
the Arabs. The number of machines available was quite inadequate
for even normal reconnaissance purposes. Contact or counter-attack
work, which would have been invaluable, was out of the question : and
artillery spotting was a rare luxury.
(8) At this period, in Europe, tanks had not yet appeared, gas was in
its infancy, and heavy artillery had not yet reached its full development.
The possible effects of the use of such weapons by the combatants in
Mesopotamia form an interesting study.
In 1915 mechanical transport was already well established in Europe,
and reliable. Had Ford vans even been available for General Aylmer,
the turning of the enemy's position south of the Umm-al Baram would
have presented few difficulties.
Although Kut fell, no man could say that the soldiers did not do all
that could possibly be expected of them and more, to break through
and relieve their comrades. The last attempts to relieve Kut as outlined
in this chapter are a story of grit and determination, well worthy of a
honourable mention in the History of the War.
references to following order are not to maps included with this book
Tigris Corps Order No 29, 8th April 1916,
1. The Corps Commander intends to capture the Sannaiyat Posi-
tion at dawn to-morrow 9th April 1916.
2. Preparatory to the attack the following movements will take place
under arrangements between the G. Os. C., VII and XIII Divisions
{a) After dark the 21st Brigade will be withdrawn down stream from
its present position to point opposite Masons Mounds whence
it will start at 1400 9th April 1916 to rejoin VII Division