"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [و‎‎٩‎٧] (٤٢٤/١٩٨)

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jmust still remain near the enemy's trenches. I am sending a request
to the Turks for six hours armistice to bury dead and bring away wound
ed. For the present I shall hold the line about 1,200 yards in front of
the enemy's position and a reserve line behind. The troops' condition
may be regarded as prohibiting further advance for the present. My
proposals will follow on receipt of further information of extent of
:reverse. Weather is atrocious and floods increasing."
The ordeal of battle throws a breaking strain on every nerve and
faculty, and this is the reason why errors must be expected in carrying
^out even the most straightforward manoeuvre. It was also probably
:for this reason that Napoleon declared that a commander should not
•accept battle unless he considered the odds to be 7 to 2 in his favour,
or in other words that a wide margin must be allowed for such mistakes
and faults of commission and omission as would inevitably occur during
the contest.
The odds certainly were by no means 7 to 2 in favour of the Tigris
'C^orps on the 21st January. The enemy, as it turned out, had made
good use of the delay in the advance of the British caused by the gales
and rain, and were very well protected ; the trenches in the front line
being from 6 to 7 feet deep, and in addition there were loopholed para
pets and well built parados. Deep communication trenches, with many
traverses, also connected the front with the second line. Against such
oover the comparatively feeble bombardments that could be delivered
by the British were unlikely to prove effective, and as a result the troops
may be said to have attempted with equal numbers (the British apparent
ly were opposed by the combined 35th and 38th Divisions, two battalions
■of the 51st Division, and the whole of the 52nd Division, totalling pro
bably 9,000 infantry with 26 guns) to evict an almost unshaken and re
solute enemy from a most formidable position. This was a task hardly
within human power ; and it is, therefore, not probable that a decisive
success would have been gained had the weather been less inclement,
and the state of the ground such as to enable rapid movement to be
made ; and had such minor errors of execution as the loss of direction
on the part of the 9th Infantry Brigade been avoided.
If the odds were indeed so little in favour of the troops under General
Aylmer, the question must inevitably arise as to whether the battle
, should have been fought. There are of course, occasions on wnich battle
must be offered or accepted whatever the chances of success, and a
commander who hesitated to engage until his prospects of success were
as favourable as those mentioned by Napoleon might never find himseif
m a position to make the great venture. This, however, was in actual
fact not an occasion when it was vital to risk everything in the hope
.that same weak point might unexpectedly be found in the enemy's situa-
.tion. And had Sir John Nixon been aware of what is now patent in
m