"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [ظ‎‎٩‎٠] (٤٢٤/١٨٥)

was not reliable, and the Tigris Corps, was, lie said, without the means
of making good losses. As a result although infantry could be moved
from one bank of the river to the other with moderate rapidity, it was
a very different story as regards the transfer of cavalry and guns. Sir
Fenton Ayimer then stated that, in his opinion, the enemy's object
was now to prevent the British from passing through the defile between
the Tigris and the Suwaikiya marsh and over the Es Sinn entrenchments ;
for if the Turks when in such favourable positions for defence failed to
check our troops, it was plainly most improbable that they would be
able to resist the combined Tigris Corps and garrison of Kut-al-Amara
in the more open ground in the neighbourhood of this town. It was,
continued General Ayimer, and apparently with reference to the move
ments ^hat had recently been reported by General Townshend, of course
possible that, for some reason, the enemy might not desire to offer
serious resistance in the defile, and might resolve to fight a decisive
action subsequent to the relief of Kut-al-Amara. But, in any case,
the dispositions of the troops after this place had been reached, and
ponding and even subsequent to the arrival of reinforcements, must be
governed by circumstances. He added significantly that, it may be
assumed definitely that the 6th Division (holding Kut-al-Amara) will
not be the only weak one when we arrive—though the enemy will doubt
less lose seriously."
By dawn on the 20th January, the troops of the 7th Division (19th,
21st and 35th Brigades) had gained and fortified a line some 600 or 700
yards from the Turkish trenches ; but the use of the word division does
not convey at all an accurate impression of the force that was available.
The war establishment of the three infantry brigades of an Indian Divi
sion comprised at that time more than 9,000 fighting men. But there
were now fewer than 4,000 men in the trenches, after deducting those
employed in various duties such as the care of transport, the camp guards,
and the men suffering from temporary sickness. The Division, therefore,
so called was in reality little stronger as regards infantry than one of its
brigades should have been.
As a result of this lack of numbers Younghusband had been forced
tsmporarily to break up the 21st Infantry Brigade, and to attach the
battalions to the other brigades so as to provide something approaching
a sufficiency of men with whom to deliver the attack. But the units
^hen comprised in the 19th and 35th Brigades would necessarily lack the
cohesion and potential momentum that would be possessed by four
strong battalions in each brigade habituated to work in unison.
The left half of the British position was, as has been stated, held
by the 35th Composite Infantry Brigade, and this was now composed
of the l"5th Buffs, the 37th Dogras and 97th Infantry, together with
t-he Black Watch, the 6th Jats and the 41st Dogras. On the right was