"دراسة نقدية عن الحملة في ميسوبوتاميا حتى أبريل ١٩١٧: الجزء I - تقرير" [ظ‎‎٥‎١] (٤٢٤/١٠٧)

82
and new units were made mobile. The amount of extra labour thrust
on the depleted transport staff by these measures can be imagined.
Lastly, the weather added to all other difficulties, the ground became
impassable for wheels and wheeled transport had to be turned into
pack.
By March the situation had become acute. In the operations of
March 8th the total fighting strength of the Tigris corps was 25,537
men and 92 guns. The decisive attack against Dujaila was made with
19,000 men and 68 guns, the maximum number which could be pro
vided with transport. No provision could be made for the carriage of
water nor of anything except minimum rations and ammunition. The
containing attack at Hanna was completely immobilised.
The cavalry brigade supply section appears to have been the only
complete supply unit utilised as such in the January operations. Other
Supplies formations were provided with supply sections
improvised from personnel available which was
at less than a third of its proper strength. For instance at the battle
of Wadi there were 9 S. & T. officers instead of 40 with the force. For
the actions in January sufficient food was actually available at
riverhead, but personnel was insufficient for distribution; and the
Bituation became worse as more fighting troops arrived. The system
of allotting parent ships was a failure for various reasons, for instance
lack of communications between banks ; storms making movement of
boats impossible ; shipping sent up river not loaded properly ; tugs not
available to move barges from one bank to the other.
The reserve ration situation is instructive.
Brit.
Ind.
Fodder.
Grain.
Fuel.
6th January 1916 .
. 33
34
33
16
38
27th January 1916 .
. 17
17
18
10
20
That is to say that in 21 days the reserves were depleted 17 days.
In the urgency of the situation Headquarters had relied upon victory to
open up the rich grain country of the Hai, and the diary states that,
" undoubtedly some risk was incurred."
By the middle of February the reserve rations were down to seven
days' supplies and the troops were on half rations.
A telegram from Force a D " to the C. Gr. S. India on 14th February
1916 reads as follows :—
" To keep Aylmer's force supplied with the minimum safe reserve of
food and ammunition, and at the same time send up reinforcements,
has been our one constant struggle since the commencement of the con
centration for the relief of Kut. The urgent need for the despatch of
reinforcements has often made it quite impossible to send other auxi
liary essentials, i.e., aircraft, medical personnel, bridging material and